

Reducing Crime Affecting Urban Aboriginal People:
The Potential for Effective Solutions in Winnipeg

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Table of Contents

Abstract.....	4
Chapter One: Introduction	6
1.1 The Challenge	6
1.2 The Purpose.....	10
1.3 Overview	13
Chapter Two: What is Known about Risk Factors Related to Crime Affecting Aboriginal People	16
2.1 Historical Context: Colonization, Residential Schools and Intergenerational Trauma	16
2.2 Aboriginal People: Multiple and Interrelated Risk Factors	26
2.3 Conclusion.....	59
Chapter Three: What is Known about the Prevention of Crime Affecting Aboriginal People	61
3.1 Limitations of Canada’s Reactive Strategies	62
3.2 Evidence for Culturally Relevant Prevention that Tackles Risk Factors	75
3.2 (a) General Crime Prevention Evidence	76
3.2 (b) Aboriginal Focused Crime Prevention Evidence	92
3.3 Implementing Collaborative Community Safety Strategies.....	115
3.4 Cost Effectiveness and Investment in Prevention	136
3.5 Towards a Theory of Implementation of Risk-Focused Crime Prevention	138
3.6 Conclusion.....	142
Chapter Four: Research Methods.....	144
4.1 Research Questions	144
4.2 Case Study.....	147
4.3 Analysis.....	157
4.4 Limitations and Considerations.....	161
4.5 Conclusion.....	163
Chapter Five: Crime Affecting Urban Aboriginal People in Winnipeg	165
5.1 Urban Aboriginal Population in Winnipeg	165
5.2 Winnipeg’s Major Social and Economic Issues.....	169
5.3 Winnipeg’s Crime Trends	172
5.4 Conclusion.....	180
Chapter Six: What are the Perceptions of Crime and Risk Factors Affecting Urban Aboriginal People in Winnipeg?	182
6.1 Perceptions of Crime Affecting Winnipeg’s Urban Aboriginal Population	182
6.2 Perceptions of Risk Factors.....	187
6.3 Conclusion.....	200

Chapter Seven: Do Prevention Programs in Winnipeg Target Urban Aboriginal People Risk Factors Related to Crime?	202
7.1 Programs Specific to Reducing Risk Factors for Crime Affecting Aboriginal People.....	210
7.2 Aboriginal Programs Not Targeting Crime but Tackling Risk Factors Related to Crime	229
7.3 Programs Specific to Reducing General Risk Factors for Crime.....	236
7.4 Programs Not Targeting Crime but Tackling General Risk Factors Related to Crime.....	244
7.5 Conclusion.....	251
Chapter Eight: Are Collaborative Community Safety Strategies Used For Urban Aboriginal Crime Prevention Programming?	252
8.1 Is There a Responsibility Centre to Mobilize Different Sectors to Tackle the Crime Problem?.....	252
8.2 Is There a Strategic Planning Process in Place? (diagnose, plan, implement, evaluate) ..	272
8.3 To What Extent is Evidence about What Works and What is Cost Effective Used in the Planning Process?.....	285
8.4 Conclusion.....	295
Chapter Nine: What Are the Attitudes and Expectations of Aboriginal Stakeholders Compared to non-Aboriginal Stakeholders toward Aboriginal Crime Prevention and its Implementation?	298
9.1 The Extent of Involvement by Aboriginal People in Crime Prevention	299
9.2 Stakeholder Groups Attitudes and Expectations of Aboriginal People Involvement in Crime Prevention.....	300
9.3 Stakeholder Groups Attitudes about and Expectations of Non-Aboriginal People Involvement in Crime Prevention	302
9.4 Conclusion.....	309
Chapter Ten: Conclusions and Recommendations for Urban Aboriginal Crime Prevention	310
10.1 Summary of Empirical and Descriptive Conclusions	310
10.2 Discussion: Practical Implications	318
10.3 Recommendations	323
References	330
APPENDICIES:	351
APPENDIX A: Interview Format: Program Stakeholders.....	351
APPENDIX B: Interview Format: Policy Makers/Policy Development Analysts	353
APPENDIX C: Informed Consent Document.....	355
APPENDIX D: Coding Categories Codebook.....	358
APPENDIX E: Circle of Courage Program Logic Models.....	370

Abstract

This study examined the knowledge relevant to reducing crime affecting urban Aboriginal people through a risk-focused approach to prevention and a growing body of knowledge about how it gets implemented. It then examined this knowledge in a case study of its application in Winnipeg.

Interviews were undertaken using a structured questionnaire with program stakeholders and policy planners involved in crime prevention initiatives, programming and policy in Winnipeg. Approximately half of the stakeholders were involved primarily with Aboriginal people and the other half were involved with programs that included both Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginal people. The interviews took place from September to November 2009.

The interviews show that many stakeholders agree with the risk-focused prevention literature on risk factors and that there are prevention programs operating in Winnipeg serving at-risk Aboriginal people. Therefore, there exists the possibility of reducing crime given that they are tackling risk factors in a way which is consistent with crime prevention research.

However, when the interviews turned to issues of implementation, it showed:

- There is no responsibility centre to mobilize different sectors to tackle crime
- Many programs are not implemented comprehensively
- There is a lack of localized coordinated action (including support from the police chief and public engagement)
- There is a lack of political leadership
- There is no city-wide strategic plan, and
- Programs are in constant competition for funding in order to continue operations.

If we are to reduce the disproportionate rates of victimization and offending affecting urban Aboriginal peoples, we need to find more effective ways to implement the strategies that are proven to tackle risk factors. There must be support from the mayor and police chief, training and capacity development, and public engagement which fosters strong use of proven strategies. A responsibility centre with Aboriginal representation must be created. Funding must be expanded to support the community based organizations that are tackling established risk factors. Finally, sustained and adequate funding must be provided to these programs and the responsibility centre.

Chapter One: Introduction

There are disproportionate rates of victimization and offending affecting urban Aboriginal peoples in Canada (Brzozowski et al., 2006). In order to arrive at conclusions which address this urgent challenge, this study examined knowledge relevant to reducing crime affecting urban Aboriginal people through a risk-focused approach to prevention, and a growing body of knowledge about how it gets implemented. It then examined this knowledge in a case study of its application in Winnipeg.

This inquiry is intended to fill the large gap in both the literature and crime prevention theory and practice itself. No empirically informed analysis existed that thoroughly and exclusively identified and unveiled local action around risk-focused crime prevention for an urban Aboriginal population in Canada, such as that in the highly populated Aboriginal Census Metropolitan Area of Winnipeg.

1.1 The Challenge

Aboriginal people are being victimized and are engaging in offending at much higher rates than that of the non-Aboriginal population (see Brzozowski, et al., 2006; Landry and Sinha, 2008; Perreault, 2011).

In 2009, Aboriginal people were found to be much more likely than non-Aboriginal people to be a victim of a crime (Perreault, 2011: 7). In the General Social Survey undertaken in 2009, Statistics Canada showed that:

- 37% of Aboriginal people (aged 15 years or older) reported being a victim of a crime compared to 26% of non-Aboriginal people (Perreault, 2011: 7). This is equivalent to almost 322,000 Aboriginal people aged 15 years or older.

Aboriginal people are three times more likely to experience a violent victimization, and twice as likely to be repeat victims of crime (Brzozowski et al., 2006; Perreault, 2011). The rate of violence for Aboriginal young adults (those aged 15 to 34 years) is nearly two and a half times greater when compared to those Aboriginal peoples aged 35 years and older (Brzozowski et al., 2006: 5). The rate of violence for Aboriginal women is three and a half times greater than that of non-Aboriginal females (Brzozowski et al., 2006: 5).

Aboriginal people are also incarcerated more often than non-Aboriginal people, (Perreault, 2009:9). This suggests that they may be more likely to be offenders of crime as well. Aboriginal adults 18 years and older, who only made up 3.1% of Canada's population in 2001 (4% in 2006) accounted for 17% of adults admitted to remand, 18% admitted to provincial and territorial custody, 18% admitted to federal custody, 16% admitted to probation and 19% admitted to a conditional sentence in 2007/2008 (Perreault, 2009:9).

Aboriginal youth, who make up 6% of Canada's youth population, accounted for 25% of youth admitted to remand, 33% admitted to sentenced custody and 21% admitted to probation in 2007/2008 (Kong, 2009).

Furthermore, Aboriginal females are more commonly represented among the female correctional population than are Aboriginal males within the male correctional population (Perreault, 2011:9). Aboriginal females accounted for 22% of female adults admitted to remand and 24% of female adults admitted to sentenced provincial and territorial custody (Perreault, 2011: 20). Compared to Aboriginal males who accounted for 16% of male adults admitted to remand and 17% admitted to sentenced provincial and territorial custody (Perreault, 2011: 20).

In terms of arrest data, the homicide survey provides police-reported data for arrests and victimization in regards to homicide cases. Although the homicide survey does not collect data

regarding Aboriginal identity for every case, it does however, contain data for the homicide cases where Aboriginal identity was recorded by the reporting police officer (Perreault, 2011: 8). Over a six year span from 2004 to 2009, police reported 330 homicides with an Aboriginal victim, and they also reported 417 cases with an Aboriginal accused (Perreault, 2011: 8). Of these cases, 73% of the victims, and 91% of the accused were under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the offence (Perreault, 2011: 8). Of these homicides, 82% were males with an average age of 24 years old (Perreault, 2011: 8).

More recently, the Urban Aboriginal People Study (2010), which included interviews¹ with 2,614 urban Aboriginal people in 11 Canadian cities,² found that of those interviewed about one in two (52%) had been involved with the justice system as a victim of a crime, or having been arrested or charged with a crime, or being a witness to a crime (Environics Institute, 2010: 97). Thirty percent (30%) reported being a victim of crime in the past 10 years, 27% reported that they were arrested, 23% reported being charged with a crime, and 21% reported being a witness to a crime (Environics Institute, 2010:97). Furthermore, the majority of this group (62%) were found to have been involved with the system in both ways (i.e. being a victim *and* a witness), while 38% had only one type of experience (Environics Institute, 2010:97).

As is the case with most research on children, data on Aboriginal children's victimization and associations with the criminal justice system are limited. However, there is urban Aboriginal specific research which shows that exposure to family violence as a child can lead to increased associations with the criminal justice system in later juvenile or adult life (La Prairie, 1994: 421). In general, this urban Aboriginal specific research has shown that (La Prairie, 1992; 1994; 2002) those who experienced exposure to factors such as childhood disadvantage, child abuse, contact

¹ These interviews took place between March and October 2009 (Environics Institute, 2010: 7).

² These cities included Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Thunder Bay, Montreal, Toronto, Halifax and Ottawa (Environics Institute, 2010: 7).

with parental drinking and/or violence, would often lead adult lives disproportionately affected by many similar problems, including victimization and association with the criminal justice system.

The ultimate objective of this study is to seek ways to reduce the number of Aboriginal people who are victims and offenders of crime. Preventing offending and victimization would reduce harm to Aboriginal victims.

This is an important area of inquiry given that there are many costs to victims. This includes injury, trauma and financial loss (Zhang, 2008, Waller, 2011). Injuries include pain and time spent in hospitals. Trauma includes emotional distress and suffering (which can also be transferred down to children and other family members causing the next generation to still suffer from crime). Financial loss includes loss of property (or may even include loss of wages if a crime has caused one to miss work). In regards to property, Aboriginal persons in Winnipeg who suffer from crime may not have much property to lose, however, what they do have may be more vital to them because they may not have much to begin with. Many times people place an emotional value on items on which one cannot place a dollar value. In addition, harm caused by incarceration is a major cost of crime suffered by Aboriginal people.

Justice Canada estimates the cost of harm to victims as \$16.4 billion in tangible losses, such as medical attention, hospitalizations, lost wages, missed school days, stolen/damaged property (Zhang, 2008). They also identified a further \$68.2 billion in intangible costs such as, pain and suffering and loss of life (Zhang, 2008). This provides a total of \$84.6 billion in costs/harm to victims (Zhang, 2008).

If the harm to Aboriginal crime victims was proportionate to the total Canadian adult victims of crime, which was estimated to be 7.4 million adult Canadians in 2009, we can then

arrive at a ballpark figure for the costs and harm to Aboriginal crime victims in Canada (Perreault and Brennan, 2009). Dividing this \$84.6 billion by 7.4 million, multiplied by the number of Aboriginal people who were a victim of a crime in 2009, which is 322,000, we then we have a ballpark figure of about \$4 billion worth of harm borne by Aboriginal crime victims (Perreault, 2011).

Finally, major effective action has yet to be taken in Canada to break what has now become a continuing cycle of both victimization and offending affecting urban Aboriginal people, which is now resulting in harm to Aboriginal victims.

We currently have a professional enforcement system; what we do not have is a professional prevention system. The implications of this might be a complete reliance on enforcement as well as continued funding for enforcement. The argument in the risk-focused crime prevention literature is not about having either or, rather to move from only enforcement to a balance between enforcement and prevention.

1.2 The Purpose

There were two ways that this dissertation was intended to contribute to reduce these disturbing rates of victimization and offending affecting urban Aboriginal people, which would in turn, reduce harm to Aboriginal victims.

The first involved assessing the literature in terms of three questions: (1) What is known empirically about factors that put urban Aboriginal people at risk of victimization and offending, and (2) what is known about the effectiveness of programming that has worked to tackle those risk factors and so reduce victimization and offending, and (3) what is known about the factors affecting successful implementation of effective programs based on the growing consensus from

a number of meetings and publications involving intergovernmental agencies, networks of municipalities and others working on implementation.

The second way involved grounding this material in a case study of Winnipeg by examining whether potential implementers of programs in Winnipeg: (1) agree with the risk factors identified in the literature; (2) organise programs which were consistent with the promising and proven programs that tackle these factors; and (3) whether the conditions were present for these programs to be implemented successfully.

This study was informed by a risk-focused approach to prevention (WHO, 2002, UN, 2002, Waller, 2006; Farrington and Welsh, 2007; Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, 2010). This risk-focused prevention approach is based on a large body of empirical evidence which has amassed around this approach (see, for example, WHO, 2002, UN, 2002, Sherman et al., 2002, Waller, 2006; Farrington and Welsh, 2007; Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, 2010). Fundamentally, it argues that we know what risk factors are from longitudinal studies of child development and analysis of the socio-demographic and socio-economic correlates of police recorded crime rates. A number of random control trials have shown that if we tackle these risk factors, crime can be reduced. There is increasing consensus on the considerations that lead to these proven and promising programs being implemented (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, 1999; World Health Organization, 2004; Waller, 2006; Institute for the Prevention of Crime, 2009).

This body of knowledge has not been applied to prevent crime that affects urban Aboriginal people, including First Nations status and non-status, Inuit, and Métis.³ One of my

³ Although Canada has 52 uniquely distinct Aboriginal cultural groups, Aboriginal populations in Canada are typically classified into four major groupings: Status Indians, Non-Status Indians, Métis and Inuit (Norris, 1998: 168). Status Indians are registered under the Indian Act of Canada. Non-Status Indians have Aboriginal ancestry, but have lost it or never had previously received status under the Indian Act. Métis people are of mixed ancestry,

major objectives was to analyse its relevance and applicability to reducing crime affecting urban Aboriginal people.

The second part of the study was to examine this literature in the context of a Canadian city, as it provides the opportunity to present conclusions and recommendations which may be able to inform the reduction of crime (and thus, harm) affecting urban Aboriginal people in Winnipeg—because gaps between research and practice will be brought forth.

The city of Winnipeg was chosen for the case study because it has become well-known for crime affecting their Aboriginal population. Winnipeg has an exceedingly high number of Aboriginal people who experience both victimization and offending (Fitzgerald et al., 2004: 20; Gannon and Mihorean, 2005: 22) it offers many different programs and initiatives for their urban Aboriginal population. As of September 22, 2011, the City of Winnipeg had reported 31 murders this year, with a little over three months left in the year. Although Aboriginal identity is not known in all cases, Aboriginal people as victims and offenders are high among these cases.

There was an interest in the city in action that was being taken. Two community leaders' forums on crime prevention seeking to prevent crime in Winnipeg brought together over 85 community leaders in November 2008—and a follow-up meeting in January 2009 initiated an inquiry. A broad array of representatives from many sectors and government and non-government organizations were in attendance. Many were adamant about putting knowledge into action.

having Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal origins. They are distinct from individuals claiming some Aboriginal ancestry; they have a variety of legal statuses, including treaty, legislated, traditional or none. Many people reporting Métis identity do not know if they could be considered part of the Métis people or community in any recognized fashion. Inuit are the original inhabitants of Canada's Arctic and sub-Arctic areas including parts of the Yukon, Northwest and Nunavut Territories, Northern Quebec and Labrador. The term "First Nations", a political neologism, is used for both Status and non-Status Indians (Norris, 1998: 168). This name came into widespread usage during the 1970s, and for the most part has sought to replace the words "Indian" and "band" (terms previously used in the Indian Act to refer to Aboriginal communities and seen as reflective of colonialism) (Norris, 1998: 168).

The primary data collection was conducted from September to November 2009, and included interviews with 31 program stakeholders and policy planners involved in crime prevention initiatives and programs in Winnipeg.

When discussing crime affecting urban Aboriginal people, this study will be referring to both victims and offenders of crime (unless indicated otherwise). This is because, according to some scholars, victim and offending groups typically overlap (Lauritsen et al., 1991; Daday, et al., 2005; Jennings et al., 2010). Much empirical research in the United States has demonstrated that a major predictor for risk of becoming a victim is the degree of involvement in offending (see Lauritsen et al., 1991; Daday, et al., 2005; Jennings et al., 2010).

Research in Winnipeg has also showed that, for many types of offences, crime is concentrated in and around city centres (Fitzgerald et al., 2004), and victims and offenders of crime tend to reside in similar, socially disorganized areas. Therefore, some crime typically occurs between two interrelated and overlapping victim and offender groups living in similar geographic locations (Fitzgerald et al., 2004). Thus, both groups will be considered in this study.

1.3 Overview

Chapter One introduces the study. Chapter Two outlines the causes of crime affecting Aboriginal people. It begins by providing a historical context followed by an outline of general risk factors and explanations for crime as well as risk factors and explanations for crime specifically affecting Aboriginal people.

Chapter Three identifies (1) the current state of knowledge with regards to the prevention of crime, and (2) how this knowledge is or is not relevant to Aboriginal people. First, this section provides a discussion of Canada's current system of crime control. It reviews crime

prevention evidence, which includes general crime prevention evidence, followed by Aboriginal specific crime prevention evidence.

Next, there is a discussion on how to put this evidence of prevention into practice, outlining and presenting a crime prevention implementation model, which has been evolving within the crime prevention field. This chapter also illustrates the cost effectiveness of risk-focused crime prevention. The final section of this chapter provides an outline of the theoretical framework utilized for this study.

Chapter Four presents the research methods used for the case study including: the major and minor research questions, the research design, and the methods of analysis, the ethical safeguards, and the overall limitations.

Chapter Five outlines crime related issues as it pertains to Winnipeg specifically. First, there is an overview of Winnipeg's urban Aboriginal population, which includes a discussion of population characteristics. This is followed by an outline of Winnipeg's major social and economic issues, as well as crime issues and challenges facing the city.

Chapter Six outlines stakeholder perceptions of both crime affecting urban Aboriginal people in Winnipeg, as well as the risk factors related to these crimes.

Chapter Seven begins by identifying stakeholder responses in regards to program(s) they felt were in place to tackle urban Aboriginal people risk factors related to crime. The programs we then described and found to have overlaps with research evidence reviewed in Chapter's Two and Three.

For ease of understanding, the programs identified through this analysis are categorized into four different categories. The first category outlines the programs which are specific to reducing risk factors for crime affecting Aboriginal people. The second looks at Aboriginal-

focused programs tackling risk factors related to crime. The third category examines specific programs designed to reduce general risk factors for crime. Finally, there is an examination of programs not targeting crime but tackling general risk factors for crime.

Chapter Eight begins by discussing whether a responsibility centre to mobilize different sectors to tackle crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg exists. This discussion outlines whether a strategic planning process (i.e. diagnose, plan, implement, evaluate) is in place for Aboriginal crime prevention programs and services in Winnipeg. Stakeholder responses with regard to whether they felt knowledge of what is “cost effective” (in regards to implementing prevention based on risk factors) is utilized in Winnipeg are also outlined.

Alternatively, in Chapter Nine the focus is on the attitudes and expectations of Aboriginal stakeholders compared to non-Aboriginal stakeholders when determining who is best suited to implement crime prevention strategies and programming. The Aboriginal prevention research reviewed indicated the importance of Aboriginal traditions and culture when implementing prevention programming (see Section 3.2: b).

Chapter Ten outlines the conclusions and recommendations of this study. There is a review of the key conclusions from the study, followed by a discussion of these conclusions. These discussions deal with both theoretical and practical implications. Finally, there are recommendations for reducing crime affecting urban Aboriginal people through prevention.

Chapter Two: What is Known about Risk Factors Related to Crime Affecting Aboriginal People

This chapter highlights explanations for risk factors affecting Aboriginal people, both as victims and offenders. It begins by outlining historical events which have negatively impacted Aboriginal people and so both risk factors and the context for addressing risk factors. This includes colonization—both historic and ongoing—of traditional values and culture, as well as Aboriginal people's experiences in residential schools, among other related issues. Literature outlining general explanations and risk factors for crime are outlined, followed by Aboriginal specific literature. Theories which touch on aspects of these risk factors are then described.

2.1 Historical Context: Colonization, Residential Schools and Intergenerational Trauma

Major events in history have negatively affected Aboriginal people. This history will be briefly outlined given the tie these experiences may have to the crime that affects so many Aboriginal people (see Gagné, 1998; Monture-Angus, 1998; Corrado and Cohen, 2003: 46-48; Cote and Schissel, 2008).

Although it is difficult to calculate direct effects, the accumulated negative outcomes of colonialism and residential schools may provide a partial explanation to why many Aboriginal people suffer from multiple risk factors related to crime.

Doctrine of Discovery

A short history outlining European thinking and ideas will first be briefly reviewed in order to assist in the understanding of European reasoning for colonization at the time of arrival and settlement.

In Chapter Five of his *Second Treatise of Government*, John Locke introduces his theory of property rights (this was 17th century liberalism's Lockian doctrine on property). Locke, the principal author of the philosophical underpinnings of colonialism and himself a senior official in the British Colonial Office, argued that it is a natural right of mankind to preserve itself by eating, drinking and doing things by taking from nature, stating that: "God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience."⁴ He explained that the earth should be considered the property of people and it should be used for their survival and benefit, stating that "the earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being."⁵ He also explained that property becomes acquired by adding labour to it. According to Locke, if one builds a house, or farms, or cultivates a piece of land, it then becomes theirs, "as much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property."⁶

Thus, when the Europeans arrived on this continent, some ingrained notions and ideas regarding property were already pre-existing. Aboriginal people became colonial subjects in their own land as Europeans advanced their goals (Berkhofer, 1978: 115). According to Alfred and Corntassel (2005:601), "colonialism is a narrative in which the Settler's power is the fundamental reference and assumption, inherently limiting Indigenous freedom and imposing a view of the world that is but an outcome or perspective on that power."

The Americas were colonized under an international legal principle referred to as the "doctrine of discovery" (Miller, 2006: 1). According to Miller (2006: 1) when the explorers landed on 'new' lands (in the fifteenth through twentieth centuries) they justified their governmental and property claims over lands and Aboriginal people with this discovery doctrine,

⁴ John Locke's theory of property rights in Chapter Five (Section 26) of the *Second Treatise of Government* (1690)

⁵ John Locke's theory of property rights in Chapter Five (Section 26) of the *Second Treatise of Government* (1690)

⁶ John Locke's theory of property rights in Chapter Five (Section 32) of the *Second Treatise of Government* (1690)

significantly owing to Locke's formulations of the right of property. This discovery doctrine was created, and justified, by religious and ethnocentric ideas of European superiority over other religions, cultures, and races (Miller 2006: 1). It was developed primarily by Spain, Portugal, England, France and the Roman Catholic Church (Miller, 2005: 2).

Under established international law, this doctrine provided Europeans automatic property rights in native lands (Miller, 2006: 1). It allowed them to gain governmental, political and commercial rights over the Aboriginal people who lived there without the knowledge or consent of the Aboriginal people (Miller, 2006: 1). When flags were planted in the land the explorers were taking part in well-recognized legal procedures and rituals of discovery designed to demonstrate legal claim over the "newly discovered" lands and people (Miller, 2006: 1).

Through a historical recounting of constitutional documents and treaties, Lindberg (2010) demonstrates how the doctrine of discovery is firmly entrenched in Canada's legal history. Through this examination of legal documents she argues that Canadian law still applies the doctrine of discovery today (Lindberg, 2010: 89-170).

An examination of European ways of thinking, at the time of their arrival and settlement, shows that some ingrained notions and ideas regarding property were already pre-existing. Aboriginal people became colonial subjects in their own land as Europeans operated on notions which allowed them to gain governmental and political rights over Aboriginal people and their lands. Most importantly, these ways of thinking enabled Europeans to consider Aboriginal people as subjects without rights.

Discriminatory Laws and Policies

Discriminatory laws and policies will now be briefly outlined. These are outlined in order to more fully understand the relationship between Aboriginal people and the Canadian state. This relationship is outlined because it may also provide a broader context in which to more fully understand Aboriginal people's victimization and offending within the criminal justice system.

The Europeans created laws based on hierarchal principles of governance which enabled Aboriginal people to be displaced from their land so it could be used to further European interests. Aboriginal people who had little bargaining power were moved to small tracts of usually unproductive lands called "Indian Reserves" through the signing of treaties (Fournier and Crey, 1997: 55).

Throughout the following centuries Europeans established many treaties, laws and policies which legitimised their authority and "right" to settle on Aboriginal land. Many of the policies also sought to maintain and extend their control and domination over Aboriginal people, by not only taking their land, but also subjugating them to European culture, legal systems and Christian religions.

From the 1800s until today, many policies were created—and still exist—which impose government control and authority over Aboriginal people, their ways of life, and their lands. For example, laws that prohibited Aboriginal people's dancing, cultures, and even traditional clothing were in place from 1884 to 1951 (Backhouse, 1999; 53; Rice and Snyder, 2008: 51). There were many Acts, policies and regulations, the most notably the "Indian Act," which is still in force today. The Indian Act disrupted and usurped the traditional ways of many Aboriginal people, and it continues to impact Aboriginal people today. It still gives the federal government final

legislative authority over all Aboriginal reserve communities and lands, and it still uses the notion of “Indian Status” to define who is legally an “Indian” and who is not, based on a blood quantum concept.

Residential Schools

Another former policy, which has a lingering legacy, is the Canadian government’s implementation of “Indian Residential Schools,” in effect in Canada from 1831 to 1996 (Kelly, 2008: 23). These schools will be briefly described. Although it is difficult to calculate direct effects, they provide a partial explanation to why many Aboriginal people suffer from multiple risk factors related to crime.

These schools were operated by Christian churches, encouraged and financed by the Canadian federal government (Cote and Schissel, 2008: 222-223). Although the alleged primary function of these schools was to provide education to Aboriginal children, in many schools this was only part of their purpose. As the Canadian government explained, they would be used as a mechanism to solve what they termed their “Indian Problem” (Chrisjohn et al., 2006: 61; Fournier and Crey, 2006: 145).

Schools compelled the students to ‘unlearn’ their Aboriginal culture and practices. Most educational activities were centered on industrial education (Dickason, 2002: 315; Kirmayer et al., 2007: 66). All of the schools had a mandatory requirement to teach and have the students adopt Christian religion. They were prohibited to speak their traditional languages and/or wear their traditional clothing. A main tenet of the schools was an assimilation policy designed to move Aboriginal people and communities from their “savage” (Fournier and Crey, 2006: 143)

state to “civilization,” in order to make Canada a society of one people, based on a European way of life and culture (Milloy, 1999: 3).

Attendance at these schools was voluntary at first, but in 1920 the federal government made it compulsory for Aboriginal children to attend the schools (Kelly, 2008: 23). Children were forcibly removed from their homes and families and enrolled in the schools, where they were required to stay for approximately ten months of every year (Kirmayer, et al., 2007: 68). Many children were not allowed to have any contact with their families during their time at the school, and some of the schools were far from the children’s homes, in order to ensure the children were not being influenced in any way by their Aboriginal culture. It became punishable by law for parents to refuse to send their children to these schools (Kelly, 2008: 23). Given that the law stated that “Indians” were not “persons,” Aboriginal parents, families and communities had no rights to challenge government orders allowing children to be taken away.

Immediately upon attending the schools, the children’s traditional names would be changed to English or French names. Names were also replaced by numbers. They would have their braids shorn, and their traditional clothing was confiscated and replaced by standard issue uniforms (Fournier and Crey, 1997: 57; Kelly, 2008: 24). Many of the children were beaten, molested and raped, with sexual abuse reaching epidemic levels (Grant, 1996: 225-231; Milloy, 1999: 298; Corrado and Cohen, 2003:41; Fournier and Crey, 2006: 141-142; Chrisjohn, et al., 2006: 49-50). Much of this abuse was among peers, continued after pupils left schools and returned with them to their communities. In 1990 the Special Advisor to the Minister of National Health and Welfare on Child Sexual Abuse declared that “...closer scrutiny of past treatment of Native children at Indian residential schools would show 100% of children at some schools were sexually abused” (Milloy, 1999: 298).

Some Aboriginal students themselves began to learn from this behaviour they endured, and as a result, some children at residential schools also began inflicting abuse onto each other (Grant, 1996: 229). As identified by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People (1996: 379)—whose commission completed over 2000 consultations and public hearings with Aboriginal communities across Canada—this “learning” may be the most powerful legacy of the residential schools.

Residential School After-Effects

The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People (1996) report discusses traumatic effects residential school experiences had on former students, their communities and on the following generations. The testimony, which was provided by Aboriginal people themselves, as well as by professional consultants representing their interests, identified social maladjustment, family breakdown, suicide, alcoholism, domestic violence and loss of parenting skills as legacies of the residential schools (RCAP, 1996: 370-380).

The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People (1996) report also described how many of the abuses experienced in the residential schools have now become intergenerational, so even after the schools were closed⁷ the after-effects echoed through the lives of following generations. As one consultants’ report explained:

“The survivors of the Indian residential school system have, in many cases, continued to have their lives shaped by the experiences in these schools. Persons who attended these schools continue to struggle with their identity after years of being taught to hate themselves and their culture. The residential school led to a disruption in the transference

⁷ The last school was closed in 1996.


of parenting skills from one generation to the next. Without these skills, many survivors have had difficulty in raising their own children. In residential schools, they learned that adults often exert power and control through abuse. The lessons learned in childhood are often repeated in adulthood with the result that many survivors of the residential school system often inflict abuse on their own children. These children in turn use the same tools on their children (RCAP, 1996: 379).”

The accumulated after-effects of these historical events have been noted in many other reports and research studies which have examined the residential school legacy (Wesley-Esquimaux and Smolewski, 2004; Chansonneuve, 2005; Söchting et al., 2007; Jacobs and Williams, 2008). Problems commonly identified in this literature includes mental illness, post-traumatic stress disorders, addictions to alcohol and drugs, powerlessness, dependency, low self-esteem, suicide, prostitution, homelessness, gambling, sexual abuse, and violence both intra-familial and extra-familial (Wesley-Esquimaux and Smolewski, 2004; Chansonneuve, 2005: 43-48; 50-53; Söchting et al., 2007; Jacobs and Williams, 2008: 126). Although causality is a hard case to make, the fact remains that Aboriginal people now suffer from high rates of both victimization and offending.

Chansonneuve (2007: 12), in a study involving 18 key informants from the addictions field with experience in the Aboriginal context, explained that some residential school survivors express their grief as lateral violence directed toward family and community members, thereby creating intergenerational cycles of abuse which resemble many of the experiences at the residential schools. Given the abundance of research concluding that negative childhood and youth experiences are linked to crime and its associated risk factors (see Farrington and Welsh,

2007), it is no surprise that the resulting after-effects of these schools might play a part in causing many former students to be re-victimized, or to become victimizers themselves (Söchting et al., 2007: 323-324). This cycle of intergenerational trauma is sketched out in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Cycle of Crime Affecting Aboriginal People



Corrado and Cohen (2003: 46), in an analysis of 127 case files of Aboriginal residential school survivors who had undergone a clinical assessment, showed that almost half (49%) had been convicted of charges (in total, 62 people were convicted of 150 charges). These included murder, theft, arson, possession of a weapon, robbery, major driving offences, drug offences and sex offences. Slightly more than half (51.6%) of the subjects were convicted of at least one

sexual offence, and 55% were convicted of assault. The authors argue this is not unexpected given the extensive cases of abuse in their sample, with 100% of the case files indicating sexual abuse while attending a residential school, and nearly 90% indicating physical abuse (Corrado and Cohen, 2003). Also, with the sample's alcohol use/abuse history—89.1% indicating information about their alcohol use and abuse—Corrado and Cohen (2003: 46) argue that it is not surprising that 64.5% of the subjects also have major driving convictions.⁸

Conclusion

Understanding the accumulated negative outcomes of colonialism and residential schools provides a context for understanding why many Aboriginal people suffer from multiple risk factors related to crime.

European ways of thinking at the time of their arrival and settlement shows that some ingrained notions and ideas regarding property were already pre-existing. Aboriginal people became colonial subjects in their own land as Europeans operated on notions which allowed them to gain governmental and political rights over Aboriginal people and their lands.

Discriminatory laws and policies were implemented (some which still exist today) to maintain and extend control over Aboriginal people (i.e. laws that prohibited Aboriginal peoples culture, traditional clothing, and/or policies who legally define who is and who is not an “Indian”). Although it is hard to calculate direct effects, the Canadian government's implementation of their Residential Schools policies provides a partial explanation as to why

⁸ This study did not include a comparison to non-Aboriginal peoples. However, research from the United States (conducted on the general population) has shown that people who tend to suffer from alcohol and drug abuse, and engage in other related risk-taking behaviours are more likely to have driving convictions (see Sonderstom et al., 2001). Thus, this is not something “unique” to being Aboriginal.

many Aboriginal people suffer from multiple risk factors, and thus have high rates of both victimization and offending.

Having outlined this historical context (and possible partial explanations) for Aboriginal people' multiple risk factors related to crime—the next section presents the current state of knowledge with respect to risk factors.

2.2 Aboriginal People: Multiple and Interrelated Risk Factors

This section provides an outline of the literature on explanations for Aboriginal people's overrepresentation⁹ in the criminal justice system. First, literature outlining explanations for criminal justice system overrepresentation in the general population are discussed. This is followed by a discussion of Aboriginal specific explanations.


General Risk Factors

Research demonstrates the correlation between offending and victimization, and poor individual, social and economic factors for the general population. Numerous longitudinal studies (for e.g. see Farrington, 1990; Loeber, et al., 1998; WHO, 2002) as well as self-report studies (for e.g. see Thornberry and Krohn, 2003) have shown many general risk factors related to crime. Many research studies have brought together literature on commonly cited risk factors identified from previous studies (for e.g. Farrington and Welsh, 2007). Some frequently mentioned risk factors in the general literature related to crime includes family abuse, lack of parental supervision, academic failure, substance abuse, delinquent friends, extreme poverty and poor living conditions, just to name a few (Hawkins et al., 1992; Sampson and Laub, 1993).

⁹ For example by La Prairie and Stenning (2003: 191) use the term “overrepresentation” to “refer to the situation in which the proportion of Aboriginal people involved in the criminal justice system, as offenders or victims, is greater than the proportion of Aboriginal people in the general population (i.e., a purely statistical over-representation). Use of the term in this sense does not involve any judgement as to whether such disproportionate representation may or may not be justified (or justifiable) (e.g., by disproportionate offending and/or victimization).”

Risk factors are frequently categorized according to whether they originate at individual, relationship, community, or societal levels. The model below illustrates common risk factors which exist at these four levels. An individual's risk of being involved in crime, whether as a perpetrator or a victim, may be elevated when risk factors at various levels interact with one another.

Figure 2: Risk Factors: The World Health Organization Ecological Model



Source: World Health Organization (2002)

An accumulated effect can result from the co-existence of numerous risk factors. If the presence of one risk factor increases the risk of offending or victimization, multiple risk factors will cause even greater increases. This is not to say that crime is merely the result of the presence of risk factors, as an individual may experience several crime related risk factors and not be involved in crime, however, it would be more likely that they might be given that they experience such factors. Furthermore, risk factors are not fully independent of the dynamics of individual development, relationships, and community and societal relations, and may undergo transformations depending on a variety of possible conditions.

General Risk Factors and Causes Related to Crime: Evidence from Longitudinal Research

The World Health Organization examines large bodies of research regarding violence prevention. In their most recent report on violence prevention, several risk factors related to victimization are outlined. For example, the WHO (2009: 35) suggests that low academic achievement and truancy are risk factors for violence. They also outline the strong links between alcohol and violence. In an examination of studies from across the world, the WHO (2009: 46) found that individuals who begin to consume alcohol at an early age, consume it more frequently, in large quantities, as well as to the point of intoxication, have much higher risks of violence as compared to those who do not. Likewise, those who are living in a culture characterized by heavy alcohol consumption and who are living in circumstances where alcohol is readily available, experience higher levels of violence. This suggests that, not only are people who drink alcohol more likely to be offenders of violence, but also, those who engage in heavy alcohol use also are more likely to be victims of violence (WHO, 2009: 46).

Furthermore, according to the WHO (2009: 47) “problematic use of alcohol can even develop as a coping mechanism among victims of violence.” Ultimately, many of the accumulations of research which the WHO (2002, 2004, 2009) has brought together and examined from across the world have shown that living with people who are violent, or living in a household characterized by violence, abusing alcohol and/or drinking heavily, and being younger in general, make one more susceptible to being a victim of violence compared to those people not characterized by these risk factors.

Using existing longitudinal data from Glueck and Glueck’s 1950’s “Unravelling Delinquency Study” Sampson and Laub (1993) attempted to more thoroughly understand reasons for crime and deviance over a full life course (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 2).

The original sample from Glueck and Glueck (1950) consisted of 1000 boys: 500 delinquent boys¹⁰ and 500 non-delinquent boys¹¹ aged 10-17 (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 29). The boys were matched case by case on measured intelligence, race/ethnicity (birthplace of both parents), age and neighbourhood (for example, boys who were both living in delinquent areas) (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 27). Glueck and Glueck's (1950) original research collected data via interviews with the subjects themselves, their families, employers, schools teachers, neighbours, and criminal justice/social welfare officials. This is in addition to extensive record checks across a variety of social agencies (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 29).

These boys were followed up at two different points in time, at the age of 25 and at the age of 32, which took place from 1949 to 1963¹² (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 29). Data relating to criminal career histories, criminal justice interventions, family life, school, unemployment and recreation were examined—in childhood, adolescence and young adulthood (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 29).

Using these longitudinal data, Sampson and Laub (1993) attempted to more thoroughly understand reasons for crime and other kinds of deviance over a full life course (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 2). One of the first areas of investigation was to seek which factors differentiated boys brought up in similarly disadvantaged neighbourhoods to become either delinquent or not delinquent.

Results demonstrated that family processes of informal social control relating to “aspects of family functioning involving direct parent-child contacts,” are the most powerful predictors of

¹⁰ White males who were recently committed to one of two correctional schools: the Lyman School for Boys in Westboro, Massachusetts and the Industrial School for Boys in Shirley, Massachusetts (Glueck and Glueck, 1950: 27, as cited by Sampson and Laub, 1993:3).

¹¹ White males who were chosen from Boston public schools: these boys were chosen based on official records, interviews with teachers, parents, local police, social workers, recreational leaders as well as the boys themselves (Sampson and Laub, 1993:3).

¹² Data were available for 438 of the original 500 delinquents (88%) and 442 of the original 500 non-delinquents (88%) at all three age periods (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 29).

delinquency for boys (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 96). It was also found that if the children had deviant parents, then this would increase delinquency because it strongly disrupts family processes of social control (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 96).

In an examination of the role of school, peers and siblings, it was found that early un-attachment to school were found to have a large effect on delinquency. In terms of peers and siblings, it was found that sibling's delinquent attachment has an insignificant influence on delinquency while attachment to delinquent peers has a large effect on delinquency (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 116-117).

It was also found that boys who had misbehaviour problems early in life, had hostile temperament as a child, and who had violent tantrums, were also more likely to be delinquent later in life (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 118). The continuity between childhood misbehaviour and later adult outcomes was a significant finding, with arrests during ages 17-25 and ages 25-32 periods being four times greater for those who were delinquent in childhood, as compared to those who were non-delinquent in childhood. Furthermore, more than half of the delinquent boys were arrested between ages 32-45, compared to only 16% of the boys from the non-delinquent group (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 129).

Social factors of job stability, commitment to educational, work and economic goals and attachment to spouse (among those who were married) were also examined in order to determine whether these factors had an effect on deviant behaviour over a life span. It was found that a lack of job stability had a large correlative effect on deviant behaviour (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 147). Delinquent subjects with high aspirations and efforts to advance educationally and occupationally were much less likely to engage in deviant behaviour, including being arrested at ages 17-25 and 25-32 (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 147). Marital attachment in middle adulthood

also shows a similar relationship with deviant behaviour in later adult life (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 148).

Ultimately, Sampson and Laub (1993) found that poor family processes of informal social control, parental delinquency, lack of attachment to school, delinquent peers, misbehaviour early in life (aggressive temperaments, violent tantrums), lack of job stability and/or commitment to education or work, and lack of marital attachment in middle adulthood are all predictors of delinquency and crime (for males) (Sampson and Laub, 1993). Social bonds, work, education and family have a powerful protective influence on adult deviance and crime (Sampson and Laub, 1993: 148).

Based on this study they developed what they termed “an age-graded” theory of informal social control to explain childhood antisocial behaviour, adolescent delinquency, and crime in early adulthood (Sampson and Laub, 1993). This theory emphasises the importance of social ties at all ages across the life course, arguing that social bonds are relevant at all life stages (Sampson and Laub, 1993). They suggested that crime and deviance are most likely to occur when an individual’s bond to society becomes weakened or broken (Sampson and Laub, 1993).

In 2003 Laub and Sampson conducted a follow-up to their 1993 study. They analyzed newly collected data for the 500 men who were the original subjects of the Gluecks’ (1950) study, making this study the longest longitudinal study of crime in the world (Laub and Sampson, 2003: 8). They collected national death records and criminal history searches for all 500 men in the delinquent sample up to age 70. They also tracked, located and conducted detailed life-history interviews with 52 men from the original delinquent group as they approached age 70 (Laub and Sampson, 2003: 9). They selected these 52 men based on their

trajectories of offending (for example, “persisters,” “desisters,” and “intermittent” offenders) as derived from the criminal record checks (Laub and Sampson, 2003: 9).

They found that there is a general declining pattern in crime—which declines sharply with age (Laub and Sampson, 2003: 86-90). However, there are relatively high participation rates for alcohol/drug offences that hold steady between early adulthood and age 50 (Laub and Sampson, 2003: 90). They found that with age, desistance from crime is the norm (Laub and Sampson, 2003: 91). Even serious delinquents were found to desist from crime (Laub and Sampson, 2003: 91). The age-crime curve for the general population is almost identical for the serious active delinquents (Laub and Sampson, 2003: 91). This suggests that the cessation processes are active even for the high risk and persistent life course offenders, and although early childhood risk factors are moderately accurate in predicting different levels of future offending, they do not provide distinct groupings that are necessarily valid for troubled youth (Laub and Sampson, 2003:112).

In determining why some offenders stop committing crime, Laub and Sampson (2003: 145) found that successful desistance from crime occurs when the proximate causes of crime are influenced in particular ways. Offenders who stop offending were found to do so because of a combination of individual actions (choice) in combination with situational contexts and structural influences, involvement in institutions such as the military, reform schools, and marriage often played a role in ending a criminal career (Laub and Sampson, 2003: 145). Structured role stability across life domains, involving commitment to marriage, work, and residence was found to have a positive effect in regards to a successful cessation from crime. Men who desisted from crime were found to share a daily routine that provided structure and

meaningful activity. It also involved a break in ties from delinquent peers in adulthood (Laub and Sampson, 2003: 146).

In determining why some offenders persist, Laub and Sampson (2003: 194) found that the persistent offenders they interviewed experienced residential, marital, and job instability, failure in school and the military and somewhat long periods of incarceration. Compared to the men who managed to desist from crime (those who were found to lead orderly lives), the lives of persistent offenders were marked by frequent “churning.” As Laub and Sampson (2003: 194) explain, this “chaos” signals an inability to end attachments or make any new connections to other people, or anything else. Laub and Sampson suggest that this lack of structure in the lives of their research subjects is what led them on a downward spiral towards persistent offending in crime throughout their life course (Laub and Sampson, 2003:195). The authors (Laub and Sampson, 2003) found that in addition to informal social control which explains crime across the full life course (Sampson and Laub, 1993), routine activities and human agency also shape trajectories of offending across the life course.

Aboriginal People: Explanations and Risk Factors Related to Crime

In terms of explanations for Aboriginal people’s involvement in crime there has been an array of different explanations offered and debated. Some of these explanations for crime affecting Aboriginal people will be explored. First, one common debate is the “over-policing” and “under policing” debate which will be briefly explained. Explanations relating to the Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal similarity in offending patterns, as well as demographics are then outlined. Risk-focused explanations which seek to explain the different risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people will be outlined. Finally, theories which touch on aspects of

these risk factors and contribute to a broader understanding of these factors are outlined and described.

Over-Policing and Under-Policing Debate

This is a popular debate over whether Aboriginal people are “over policed” or “under policed.” According to the Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry (1999) this “over-policing” side of the debate involves the idea that Aboriginal people are singled out by police officers—simply for looking Aboriginal people. Given this perceived stereotyping of police forces, it is felt that Aboriginal people are being charged with offences more so than non-Aboriginal people (Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry, 1999). Furthermore, this also includes the argument that Aboriginal people are often held in custody when a non-Aboriginal person in the same circumstances might not be held in custody, or even arrested at all (Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry, 1999).

The other side of the debate is the “under-policing” side. This side of the argument contends that the police tend to ignore Aboriginal communities in the sense that they are typically not present on a day-to-day basis to prevent crime or provide other police services to Aboriginal people (Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry, 1999). This argument contends that often police only come to Aboriginal communities to make an arrest (Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry, 1999).

Ultimately, this over- and under-policing debate has been picked up numerous times by various reports and inquiries, but there is yet no empirical foundation to support either side.

Taking into consideration labelling theory (Becker, 1963), which contends that deviance is not so much about acts and attributes per se as the reactions of self and others to perceive acts

or attributes. The focus is on the tendency of majorities to negatively label minorities (or others seen as deviant) from standard cultural norms. For example, Aboriginal people may be “labeled” as deviant in a variety of ways and the reactions of the police and other state agents may be a result of such labelling. Furthermore, when examining the under-policing / over-policing debate through such a lens, both sides of this debate may in some way hold some credibility. Given the propensity throughout history (until present day) for many Aboriginal people to still undergo racism and thus, many times are in fact considered “deviant” it does not seem extreme to suggest that Aboriginal people may sometimes be ignored, or other times maybe be singled out. On the same token, the reaction may simply depend on the person who is reacting to their “deviance.”

Furthermore, when taking into consideration the social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay, 1942). Street crime is much more likely to happen because of one’s residential location, rather than because of one’ individual characteristics (i.e. race). Thus, similar to the labelling theory, Aboriginal peoples being over-policed and/or under policed may not be due to the fact that they are simply “Aboriginal” but instead because of where they might be more likely to reside (i.e. areas of social disorganization).

Explanations: Similarity in Aboriginal/Non-Aboriginal Offending Patterns/Demographics

A study conducted by Roberts and Melchers (2003) which examined incarceration trends of Aboriginal offenders revealed that there has been much similarity in the offending patterns of Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginal people (Roberts and Melchers, 2003: 227). This suggests that the factors that influence one group also influence the other. Through their analysis they showed that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal admissions to custody have followed a familiar

course over the 23 year period examined, and that common factors within both groups are responsible for the increase observed (Roberts and Melchers, 2003: 236).

Analyzing data from 1997-1998, and 2000-2001, their study showed that many changes relating to demographics, definitional changes, and criminal justice policy changes had a marked influence on trends in sentencing and sentenced admissions to corrections of Aboriginal people during this time. The changes have also led to significant impacts on the trends regarding admissions of Aboriginal offenders and non-Aboriginal offenders.

First, examining the time period of 1978-1979 and 1982-1983, they witnessed the non-Aboriginal population hovering over the Aboriginal population in regards to sentenced admissions to provincial and territorial custody. In their analysis, they suggest that the Aboriginal population experienced their “baby boom” 10 years after the rest of the Canadian post-war baby boom. Therefore during 1978-1979, and 1982-1983, there is a higher rate of non-Aboriginal sentenced admissions to custody given that they were in their adult sentencing ages at the time. During the same period, the Aboriginal population was lagging 10 years behind and would have just been starting to reach their adult sentencing age, therefore explaining the difference in the trends observed (Roberts and Melchers 2003: 224).

Their analysis then looked at the next time period from 1982-1983 to 1990-1991, which experienced a trend in a different direction, with Aboriginal admissions continuing on their upward trajectory with a rise of 9%, and non-Aboriginal admissions beginning a decline with a fall of 15%. In their analysis, they revealed that Aboriginal people were in fact becoming more disproportionately and gradually involved in the overall increase in crime which was being experienced throughout the 1980s¹³ (Roberts and Melchers 2003: 225). They also explain this

¹³ Given that ethnicity was not included in the Uniform Crime Reporting System throughout these years, it is not possible to confirm this hypothesis

deviation in trends between these two groups by the more rapid increase in the Aboriginal population within the ages of highest risk for offending and sentencing to state custody (Roberts and Melchers 2003: 18-24). This growth particularly was the result of the Aboriginal “baby boom”, when the birth rate for Aboriginal people increased to four times that of the average Canadian rate (Roberts and Melchers 2003: 225).

Roberts and Melchers then considered the next time period from 1991-1992 to 2000-2001. This time period revealed that both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal admissions to custody experienced an overall general decline throughout the 1990s. From 1997-1998, Aboriginal admissions experienced a more rapid decline as compared to non-Aboriginals, followed by a brief increase during 1998/1999, and then a levelling off to a steady plateau while non-Aboriginal admissions continued to decline. Roberts and Melchers suggested that during this period, Canada was experiencing the aftermath of a crime peak with fewer cases entering the justice system as a whole (Roberts and Melchers 2003: 225-226).

Alternatives to incarceration were also beginning to be used by judges during this period such as the “Gladue Court” in Toronto and elsewhere, which were created as a result of the 1996 appeal (*R. v. Gladue*) (The *Gladue* Court is a court dedicated to processing of Aboriginal offenders which seeks to divert them from the court system, and instead places offenders into the community as opposed to admitting them into custody). Incarceration alternatives such as these were being employed to a much larger extent in the 1990s. These alternatives to incarceration did not have as significant an anticipated effect when compared to the non-Aboriginal population, whose rates of incarceration continue to follow a similar downward trend (Roberts and Melchers 2003: 226).

In an examination of the over-representation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system, La Prairie and Stenning (2003) suggested that there is increasing evidence that the factors that give rise to Aboriginal people's involvement in the criminal justice system are basically the same factors that give rise to non-Aboriginal involvement (La Prairie, and Stenning, 2003: 182). Using demographic data from Statistics Canada's 2001 census, they show that the reason for Aboriginal over-representation in the justice system is that they are affected by more of the factors than are commonly faced by offenders in general (La Prairie, and Stenning, 2003: 184). For example, the 2006 census data from Statistics Canada show that Aboriginal people still tend to fall into categories which make them more susceptible to involvement in the criminal justice system. The Aboriginal population is much younger than the non-Aboriginal population, with the median age of Aboriginal people being 27 years, compared to 40 years for non-Aboriginal people, a difference of about 13 years (Statistics Canada, 2006). The census data also showed that Aboriginal children are more likely than non-Aboriginal children to live in single parent families. Furthermore, although the size of the disparities is declining¹⁴, Aboriginal people are still more likely than non-Aboriginal person to live in crowded conditions.

La Prairie and Stenning (2003) assert that it is reasons such as these, along with the fact that Aboriginal people are more disadvantaged and disproportionately concentrated in high-crime areas—such as inner cores of central metropolitan areas—that cause them to be more susceptible to involvement in crime (La Prairie and Stenning, 2003: 185). They also suggest that “cultural insensitivity” or racial discrimination on the part of the police, is not the overarching reason why Aboriginal people are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, but suggest that it is more likely due to demographic and socio-economic characteristics, such as having a far

¹⁴ In 2006, 11% of Aboriginal people were living in homes with more than one person per room, which is down from 17% in 1996.

greater proportion of its population in the higher offending (younger) age group, lower education levels, more unemployment, and higher rates of substance abuse and addiction (La Prairie and Stenning, 2003: 187). Finally, La Prairie and Stenning (2003) contend that the factors that influence Aboriginal people's association with the criminal justice system are universal, and are also found in the non-Aboriginal population. Therefore, no assumptions should be made that there is anything inherently different about the Aboriginal population, when compared to at-risk non-Aboriginal people (La Prairie and Stenning, 2003: 190).

Aboriginal People's Risk Factors Related to Crime

Literature explaining Aboriginal people's victimization and offending has outlined the multiple and excessive number of risk factors many Aboriginal people face and/or experience in their day-to-day lives (La Prairie, 1992, 1994, 2002; La Prairie and Stenning, 2003; Latimer and Foss, 2004; Brzozowski et al., 2006; Yessine and Bonta, 2009).

There have been no longitudinal studies or self-report studies in particular that focused directly on Aboriginal people's risk factors related to victimization and/or offending. There is however a body of literature that has studied issues related to crime affecting Aboriginal people through the use of interviews, focus groups, and the examination of existing data (such as census data) (for e.g. (La Prairie, 1992; 1994, 2002; La Prairie and Stenning, 2003; Latimer and Foss, 2004; Brzozowski et al., 2006). Most of the literature has a prime focus on factors related to Aboriginal people's offending, over incarceration and/or overrepresentation in the criminal justice system, and little literature has a prime focus on factors related to Aboriginal people's victimization, which is a limitation in the literature (for e.g. La Prairie, 1992; 1994, 2002; Waldram, 1997; La Prairie and Stenning, 2003; Latimer and Foss, 2004). Thus, this review

brings forth an outline of the risk factors based on what is available, and pulls out information from the existing literature to inform factors related to victimization as well.

According to the GSS, socio-demographic factors which were found to be linked to Aboriginal people's victimization included young age, heavy alcohol consumption and drug use, as well as participation in evening activities. These risk factors related to victimization were more frequently found with Aboriginal people compared to non-Aboriginal people. According to Perreault (2011), when these risk factors were taken into account, the risk of victimization among Aboriginal people was 58% higher as compared to non-Aboriginal people.

Furthermore, data from the Homicide Survey, which collected data on 330 Aboriginal homicide victims cases and 417 Aboriginal homicide offender cases from 2004 to 2009, showed that, of these cases 73% of victims, and 91% of the accused were under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the offence (Perreault, 2011: 8). Of these homicides, 82% were males who made up an average age of 24 (Perreault, 2011: 8).

Many risk factors have been identified in the literature by Carol La Prairie, who is well known for her research into Aboriginal people and criminal justice issues. She did one of her most notable studies for the Solicitor General of Canada in 1994. The study examined inner city Aboriginal people in four Canadian cities (Toronto, Montreal, Edmonton and Regina) from April to September 1993. After interviewing 621 Aboriginal people who were considered vulnerable to crime, victimization and criminal justice response, La Prairie (1994) found that inner city Aboriginal people were not connected to their families and communities, lived in disadvantaged urban living conditions, were generally poor, and had low skill and education levels.

Many of those interviewed had also experienced child violence and other forms of family violence, and suffered substance abuse problems such as dependency to alcohol. La Prairie

(1994) concluded that upbringing, parental alcohol abuse (and its severity), paternal unemployment, instability and mobility were all linked to family violence (La Prairie, 1994: 79). Family violence is one of the major issues discussed in La Prairie's findings, with 75% of the total sample having reported experiencing violence in their families (La Prairie, 1994: 406). She also found that being a victim of family violence as a child leads to increased alcohol problems for youth, with 83% of the people who reported drinking "all the time" also reporting having been victims of family violence as a child (La Prairie, 1994: 418). Child exposure to family violence was also found to increase associations with the criminal justice system in later juvenile or adult life (La Prairie, 1994: 421).

La Prairie's (1992; 1994; 2002) research found that Aboriginal people who experienced exposure to factors such as childhood disadvantage, child abuse, contact with parental drinking and/or violence, deprivation and/or poor living conditions, would often lead adult lives disproportionately affected by many similar problems, including victimization and association with the criminal justice system. More recent research has supported many of La Prairie's findings, upholding some of her conclusions and/or arriving at similar conclusions (See Waldram, 1997; Latimer and Foss, 2004; Fitzgerald and Carrington 2008).

For example, Fitzgerald and Carrington (2008) tested La Prairie's (1992: 2002) findings that the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system is directly related to disadvantaged urban living conditions. Using geo-coded crime incident data, as well as census data from the City of Winnipeg in 2001, Fitzgerald and Carrington conducted a neighbourhood level ecological analysis of urban Aboriginal crime. As with La Prairie, they concluded that the high rates of overrepresentation in the criminal justice system are due to the structural characteristics of the neighbourhoods, finding that large numbers of people who are involved in

the criminal justice system also suffer from a high degree of socio-economic disadvantage, and more residential mobility.

In a study for the Department of Justice, Latimer and Foss (2004) examined Aboriginal youth who were in custody in Canada. Using a “sharing circle” method—similar to a focus group—and collecting one-day, “snap shot” data of youth in the criminal justice system, they found that Aboriginal youths’ high incarceration rates were related to a series of interrelated factors, such as high rates of poverty, substance abuse, and victimization which led to family breakdown.

Through life history interviews that were part of a study¹⁵ of Aboriginal male inmates at federal and provincial facilities in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, Waldram (1997: 45-46) found that many of the men in the study had had experiences with long term trauma and considerable violence, including physical and sexual abuse and alcoholism. In a survey of 249 men, Waldram (1997: 46) also showed that 66% had physical violence in their families when they were growing up, and 80% said that at least one parent (or foster/adoptive parent) had a problem with alcohol or drugs. Familial disruption was also a significant finding, as 35% of the men interviewed had spent time in foster homes, 30% had attended residential schools and five percent were adopted (Waldram, 1997: 46).

In a more recent study of Aboriginal violence and street gangs in Winnipeg, Comack et al. (2009) met with six Aboriginal gang members living in the city’s north end, adopting an approach intended to “...learn from the wisdom of street gangsters” (Comack et al., 2009: 14).

¹⁵ This study used a variety of research techniques, including participant-observation, survey instruments, and open-ended, ethnographic style interviews. Initial data collection began in 1990 at the Regional Psychiatric Centre in Saskatoon, with participant observation and ethnographic interviews with 30 inmates. This research continued through to 1994, when an additional phase was implemented, which involved interviewing 249 Aboriginal inmates at the Saskatchewan Penitentiary and Riverbend Institutions in Prince Albert, and the Stony Mountain Penitentiary and Rockwood Institution in Winnipeg (Waldram, 1997: xi).

Ultimately, the gang members demonstrated that street gangs and gun violence are a product of poverty and systemic racism, and that there associated consequences and conditions—addictions, violence, family disintegration, neglect, drugs, and abuse—which these men grew up with (Comack et al., 2009: 1-5). The men indicated that, to them, such conditions were normal “everyday events” (Comack et al., 2009: 5).

Yessine and Bonta (2009) examined the offending trajectories of young Aboriginal offenders under a probation sentence in Manitoba comparing them to non-Aboriginal offenders. A total of 439 male offenders between the ages of 12 to 19 were randomly selected from all probation cases closed in Manitoba between 1986 and 1991 (Yessine and Bonta, 2009: 440). In over half of the cases, the offenders were Aboriginal (53.5%) and the remainder were non-Aboriginal (46.5%).

Yessine and Bonta (2009: 440) collected the standardized risk/need information previously recorded for the offender, as well as information pertaining to their personal circumstances from the probation reports. With this information they created a database to better understand the criminal careers of the offenders (Yessine and Bonta, 2009: 441). In 2005, Yessine and Bonta (2009) conducted a follow-up using criminal data from the RCMP’s criminal records branch as well as from Manitoba corrections.¹⁶

Findings revealed that the majority of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal offenders engaged in fairly infrequent and/or non-serious criminal behaviour through the course of their lives, whereas a minority of offenders were involved in more recurrent, serious, and persistent offending (Yessine and Bonta, 2009: 447). Of this minority who were found to be persistent

¹⁶ They could not locate follow-up data for 50 offenders (Yessine and Bonta, 2009: 441). There was neither a CPIC nor a provincial record, even though these offenders were identified in the original sample (Yessine and Bonta, 2009: 441). Therefore these 50 offenders were eliminated from the study which left a final sample of 439 offenders (Yessine and Bonta, 2009: 441).

offenders, it was found that most were Aboriginal offenders (18.7%), opposed to non-Aboriginal offenders (12.3%) (Yessine and Bonta, 2009: 436). Their criminogenic needs/risks which were found to contribute to their serious and persistent patterns of criminality included: substance abuse, negative peer associations, as well as their impoverished backgrounds and unstable family environments¹⁷ (Yessine and Bonta, 2009: 436).

In a literature review of Aboriginal youth and violent gang involvement in Canada, Totten (2009: 137) suggests that factors related to Aboriginal youth involvement in gangs were ultimately linked to many psycho-social problems, which include racism, colonization, marginalization and dispossession; the loss of traditional land, traditional culture, spirituality and values; and the breakdown of kinship systems and Aboriginal law. These psycho-social problems are then linked to factors such as the following: entrenched and severe poverty; overcrowded substandard housing; high numbers of placements into child welfare; mental health; and other institutions; alcohol and drug abuse; low educational attainment and high rates of school dropout and unemployment; ill-health and suicide; high rates of criminalization; and high rates of violence; which includes family violence; sexual assault; children witnessing spousal violence; and homicide involving Aboriginal people as both perpetrators and victims. All these factors help to explain Aboriginal youth gang violence (Totten, 2009: 137-138).

Additionally, Jaccoud and Brassard (2003: 134, 143), who analyzed the lives of 10 urban Aboriginal women who were considered excluded/marginalized¹⁸, through narrative interviews, concluded that the marginalization process begins in early childhood and is rooted in a much broader social context associated with the consequences of the colonization of Aboriginal

¹⁷ When considering general research on needs/risk factors related to crime, these same factors are typically identified in non-Aboriginal specific research as well (for e.g. see Farrington and Welsh, 2007).

¹⁸ Jaccoud and Brassard (2003: 132) define exclusion/marginalization as the absence of certain social groups from the labour market and, more generally, from participation in society's core institutions. Therefore these two terms are both, one aspect of social isolation, poverty, and economic insecurity.

people. They further concluded that, from childhood, the lives of the urban Aboriginal women in their study were conditioned by their circumstances including high levels of poverty, non-integration into the conventional job market, involvement in socially unacceptable activities, unacceptable or even criminal violence, alcohol and drug abuse, homelessness, reliance on food banks and shelters, a minimal informal social network and strong institutional social networks. They suggested that the factors that play the largest role in Aboriginal women's involvement with the criminal justice system were the relationships they form throughout their marginalized lives with people such as partners, spouses and friends in similar circumstances (Jaccoud and Brassard, 2003: 143).

Lambertus (2007) conducted a qualitative study of violence affecting Aboriginal women in Alberta. Interviews with 262 Aboriginal women, police, and shelter and crisis workers were conducted from July 2004 to May 2006—in 207 separate interviews (Lambertus, 2007: 25). Victim, domestic violence and shelter statistics were also collected from Statistics Canada, the Government of Alberta, and homelessness reports from Edmonton, Calgary, and Fort McMurray (Lambertus, 2007: 25).

The study identified victimization from the perspectives of the Aboriginal women participants. These victimizations included chronic domestic violence, fear of going to local shelters, fear of spousal attacks, homelessness, sex-trade, re-victimization from reporting to the police, among other related victimizations. Many risk factors for victimization affecting Aboriginal women were identified. Some of the key risk factors included being involved in prostitution, having gang affiliations, substance addictions, history of family violence, being socially isolated, having disabilities (including Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder), having low self-esteem and loss of hope, lacking community support, residing in a high crime area, and

lacking healthy networks, (Lambertus, 2007: 44-59). It was also found that the impact of social and geographic isolation, poverty and unemployment further compounded these and other risk factors (Lambertus, 2007: 209).

Overall, many studies outline several related risk factors, below is an attempt to synthesize and outline risk factors which have been identified in various research and reports. This has been created in order to be used as a basis for comparison for the case study—as this study intends to test whether risk factors are being targeted in relation to Aboriginal specific crime prevention programming in Winnipeg.

As noted in the chart below, some risk factors have more recorded evidence than others—as indicated. Ultimately, the purpose of this list is to make it all inclusive so it could be used as a basis for comparison to compare what risk factors (if any) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people are being targeted in Winnipeg (including those supported by evidence and those which are not).

Table 1: Risk Factors Related to Crime Affecting Aboriginal People

Risk Factors Associated with Crime Affecting Aboriginal People	Criteria	Evidence
Individual Factors:		
Interpersonal Skills:		
Poor Social Skills	This refers to persons who have little or no social/interpersonal skills, have impulsive behaviour, and have poor self-management as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little research specific to Aboriginal people. • Doone (2000), in a review of risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in New Zealand included this as a factor.
Aggressiveness	This refers to persons who are both verbally and physically aggressive against both people and objects as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little research specific to Aboriginal people. • Doone (2000), in a review of risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in New Zealand included this as a factor.
Dependence/Addictions:		
Substance Abuse and Addictions	This refers to persons abusing alcohol and/or other substances, and/or addictions to alcohol and/or other substances (e.g. illegal drugs), as well as paternal substance abuse in which children are exposed to such behaviour as being risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fairly consistent findings in Aboriginal specific research studies (see above) • La Prairie (1994) • Waldram (1997) • Yessine and Bonta (2009)
Dependency	This refers to persons who are dependent on others and/or the system for their livelihood, (e.g. reliance on food banks and shelters) as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jaccoud and Brassard (2003)
Mental Health:		
Poor Mental Health and Health Related Issues that Go Untreated	This refers to poor mental health and health related issues that go untreated, and/or are not adequately prevented, including Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) and other mental health problems as being risks factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little research specific to Aboriginal people. • Lambertus (2007) identified this as a factor related to violence

	related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	affecting Aboriginal women.
Hopelessness	This refers to persons who have no vision for their future, who feel hopeless and/or have no respect for themselves or others and/or have internalized shame about themselves as being risks factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little research specific to Aboriginal people. • Lambertus (2007) identified this as a factor related to violence affecting Aboriginal women.
Social Factors:		
Families:		
Poor Child Rearing and Supervision	This refers to persons who have poor child rearing skills, including those who do not supervise their children, and/or children who come from homes where discipline is inconsistent and erratic, and/or where parents do not care for them, and/or the parents themselves may have problems with drugs and/or crime, and/or parents and other family members are antisocial and where negative parent-child relationships exists, and an unstructured home as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La Prairie (1994)
Family Violence and Crime	This refers to persons who experience and/or are exposed to family violence and/or abuse as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal. This includes experiencing and/or witnessing any type of crime within the family, or being exposed to violence or sexual assault as a child.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fairly consistent findings in Aboriginal specific research studies (see above) • La Prairie (1994) • Waldram (1997) • Lambertus (2007) identified this as a factor related to violence affecting Aboriginal women.
Single Parent Families	This refers to those who live in a single parent household situation and it being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La Prairie (2002) • Brzozowski, Taylor-Butts and Johnson (2006)
Dysfunctional, Disorganized, and Disconnected Families	This refers to persons who live in or come from dysfunctional and/or disorganized families, including having little family support in their lives,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fairly consistent findings in Aboriginal specific research studies (see above)

	and/or being disconnected from family members and older generations, including a disconnect between Elders and youth as all being risks factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La Prairie (1994) • Latimer and Foss (2004) • Yessine and Bonta (2009)
Employment and Education:		
Low Education and Poor School Access and Involvement	This refers to persons having little or little education/skills and/or having failed in school, and/or having little involvement in school, having difficulty in accessing appropriate schooling, and/or not having graduated from school and it being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fairly consistent findings in Aboriginal specific research studies (see above) • La Prairie (1994, 2002) • La Prairie and Stenning, (2003)
Unemployment	This refers to not having a job or having difficulty in finding a job as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fairly consistent findings in Aboriginal specific research studies (see above) • La Prairie (1994, 2002) • La Prairie and Stenning, (2003)
Social Networks:		
Few Social Ties	This refers to persons who have few social ties in regards to being involved in social activities, and being low in popularity, and/or experience isolation from larger society as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little research specific to Aboriginal people. • Lambertus (2007) identified this as a factor related to violence affecting Aboriginal women.
Poor Peer Influences	This refers to persons who have little positive influence and/or mix with antisocial peers and/or other negative influences (e.g. joining a gang) as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yessine and Bonta (2009)
Social Exclusion and Marginalization	This refers to social exclusion and/or marginalization, including a lack of strong institutional social networks, as being risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La Prairie (1994) • Jaccoud and Brassard (2003) • Lambertus (2007) identified this as a factor related to violence affecting Aboriginal women.
Lacking Cultural	This refers to those who lack cultural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little evidence.

Identity and Pride	identity and/or cultural pride, including having negative self-imagery as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Doone (2000), in a review of risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in New Zealand included this as a factor.
Community:		
High Residential Mobility and Mobility Between Reserves and City	This refers to persons moving frequently, also referred to as “transiency,” this also includes moving from reserves to the city and not being prepared for urban city life, and/or moving back and forth between reserves and the city as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fairly consistent findings in Aboriginal specific research studies (see above) La Prairie (1994, 2002) Fitzgerald and Carrington (2008)
Overcrowded, Disorganized and Substandard Living Conditions	This refers to persons living in overcrowded and/or substandard housing, and other poor, disorganized and unstructured living conditions, and/or living in a distressed neighbourhood, and/or being homeless and these being risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fairly consistent findings in Aboriginal specific research studies (see above) La Prairie (1994) Fitzgerald and Carrington, (2008) Totten (2009)
Racism and Discrimination	This refers to racism and/or discrimination by other persons and/or institutionalised racism and discrimination, including racism by the police, the legal system, (including racist laws, such as the Indian Act) and/or the government as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comack et al. (2009)
Poverty	This includes having little or no income and/or low socioeconomic status as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fairly consistent findings in Aboriginal specific research studies (see above) La Prairie (1994,2002) Latimer and Foss (2004) Yessine and Bonta (2009) Lambertus (2007) identified this as a factor related to violence affecting Aboriginal women.

Anomie, Social Disorganization and Differential Opportunity Theories

There are also a number of theories which touch on aspects of these risk factors. In many ways they provide a broader understanding of some of these risk factors identified in the literature. Three theories which assist in this broadened understanding are Anomie, Social Disorganization and Differential Opportunity Theory.

Anomie

Drawing on Merton's (1938) explanation for deviance assists in broadening the understanding of the link between poverty and crime. Merton's (1938: 674) explanation for deviance is what's termed "anomie." Although first advanced by Durkheim in his 1893 book, "The Division of Labor in Society", it was later picked up and expanded on by Merton in 1938. Durkheim (1893) first described anomie as a condition of deregulation occurring in society, meaning that when the procedural rules of society break down people no longer know what to expect from each other. This deregulation, or normlessness, then leads to deviant behaviour.

Merton then borrowed this concept to explain deviance among lower-class urban areas and lower-class minority groups in the United States. His concept differed from Durkheim in that he divided social norms into two types, norms with regard to the societal "goals" being strived for, and norms with regard to the "means" to be used to achieve those societal goals. Anomie is described as a split between goals and means resulting from how society is structured (e.g. because of class distinctions and social disorganization) (Merton, 1938: 673). Therefore, according to Merton (1938: 674), deviance results from anomie.

Merton (1938) argues that problems are not so much created by a sudden social change (as proposed by Durkheim), but rather, by a social structure that places the same expectations on

all members to achieve goals, yet, does not give them equal means to achieve these goals. As Merton (1938: 673) explains “there may develop a disproportionate, at times, a virtually exclusive, stress upon the value of specific goals, involving relatively slight concern institutionally appropriate modes of attaining these goals.” Therefore, this lack of access to be able to achieve such goals is a structural problem which then leads people to deviant behaviour, which can in turn, lead to crime.

These “goals” which Merton discusses are those typically associated with achieving the “American dream,” of success (most notably, monetary success) and material items. Merton uses a lack of financial success as an example of when anomie occurs, thus, resulting in crime. Drawing on the United States, he observes financial success as something highly stressed, yet, something not everyone has equal access too. As Merton (1938: 680) explains: “the American stress on pecuniary success and ambitiousness for all thus invites exaggerated anxieties, hostilities, neuroses and antisocial behaviour”. He theorizes that some people are left to search for other, perhaps, illegitimate ways of reaching such a goal, such as anti-social behaviour (deviance/crime).

Merton explains that goals and aspirations are a product of socialization, claiming that competitiveness and success are embellished in the media, communicated in schools, hyped by public authorities and refreshed in peoples values systems, which then become passed on from one generation to the next. Since he used the United States as an example, Merton claimed that Americans are more likely than other societies to do whatever it takes in order to achieve success and reach goals that have been placed upon them, even if it means resorting to crime. As Merton (1938: 679) explains, “the dominant pressure of group standards of success is, therefore, on the

gradual attenuation of legitimate, but by and large ineffective, strivings and the increasing use of illegitimate, but more or less effective, expedients of vice and crime.”

Drawing on this concept of anomie, and applying it similarly to the way Merton draws on the United States, understanding poverty as being linked to crime affecting Aboriginal people broadened in the sense that many Aboriginal people are expected to (like everyone else) succeed and reach certain goals (such as monetary success and those associated with the “American dream”). However, given that many Aboriginal people do not have equal access to reaching such goals (because of social structures in place, such as living in poverty) they are then left to resort to deviance in order to reach these unrealistic goals. Deviance then, typically takes the form of criminal behaviour (Merton, 1938: 681). As Merton (1938: 679) argues “on the one hand, they are asked to orient their conduct toward the prospect of accumulating wealth and on the other, they are largely denied effective opportunities to do so institutionally.”

Another common risk factor identified in the literature is low education and poor school access and involvement. Applying the theory of anomie to this risk factor broadens understanding of the connection between low education and poor school access and involvement, and its relation to crime. There is a strong message placed on society that promotes the idea that opportunity for success is equally available to all people (Merton, 1938: 680). However, the reality is that disadvantaged minority groups do not have equal access to legitimate opportunities such as education (Merton, 1938: 680). Minorities and lower social classes are socialized to hold high aspirations for educational achievement, however, in reality they are completely obstructed from obtaining a mainstream education (or occupation). This “anomic” condition creates “strain” on these groups, thus, causing them to take advantage of any kind effective means to

income and success that they can find, even if these means are criminal in nature (Merton, 1938: 679-681).

Social Disorganization

Social structures in place that Merton primarily draws on are class division and social disorganization. He suggests that certain groups of people who are typically the lower social class and minorities are placed in disadvantaged positions because of the way society itself is structured. Merton views the social structure itself as anomic. He suggests that the United States operates in a permanent state of anomie (which could also be argued in Winnipeg).

Merton's theory was quickly embraced by early social disorganization theorists such as Shaw and McKay (1942)¹⁹. They adopted the basic concept of anomie in terms of the disparity between "goals" and actual "means". According to Shaw and McKay (1942):

"Children and young people in all areas, both rich and poor, are exposed to the luxury values and success patterns of our culture...among children and young people residing in low income areas, interests in acquiring material goods and enhancing personal status are developed which are often difficult to realize by legitimate means because of limited access to the necessary faculties and opportunities"

¹⁹Shaw and McKay's research does not take into consideration where there is non-delinquency in delinquency areas. Furthermore, the use of official court records used in their work lowers actually the percentage of recognized delinquency, when compared to other data sources of delinquency (Shoemaker, 1996). Although it is not realistic to expect a theory to explain all aspects of delinquency, this theory also lacks of specification of why delinquent rates are concentrated in certain areas of a city (Shoemaker, 1996). Furthermore, since this research was done in one specific geographical location, it is not generalizable to other locations. For example, in some countries, wealthy people live in the centre of cities and poor people live on the fringes.

Both social disorganization theorists, such as Shaw and McKay (1942), and anomie theorists such as Merton (1938), assert that if there is a disruption in social order and/or societal structure, crime and deviance will exist. Shaw and McKay (1942) place a large importance on one's residential location as being specifically related to street level neighbourhood crime. This idea is one of the main tenants of their social disorganization theory.

According to Shaw and McKay (1942) social disorganization theory explains delinquency as not being caused at the individual level, but is instead a normal response of normal individuals to abnormal social conditions. This conclusion was drawn from their research in Chicago neighbourhoods, where they plotted out residential locations of youth who had been referred to juvenile court from different areas of the city.

This study showed that rates of delinquency in lower-class neighbourhoods were highest near the inner city and declined closer to the more prosperous areas. They found that right across from the commercial and business core of the city was what they termed a "zone in transition." This zone in transition was changing from residential to commercial and had the highest rates of delinquency and crime as compared to other zones studied. This transition zone was characterized by fragmented families, high rates of illegitimate births and unstable heterogeneous populations. The residents of their neighbourhood were suffering economically, had low income, education and occupations. Ultimately, Shaw and McKay (1942) identified three structural factors consisting of, mobility of residency, ethnic heterogeneity, and economic status as key factors leading to a disruption of community social organization, which, in turn accounts for higher rates of crime and delinquency.

Taking into consideration Shaw and McKay's (1942) explanations for crime and delinquency serves to both support and broaden understandings of risk factors related to

Aboriginal people's involvement in crime. The literature has identified risk factors similar to the explanations for crime provided by Shaw and McKay, most notably, poverty, overcrowded, disorganized and sub-standard living conditions, dysfunctional, disorganized and disconnected families, and high residential mobility. Thus, the literature on risk factors provides support for this theory, and simultaneously provides support for these findings.

At the same time, Shaw and McKay's social disorganization theory provided an explanation for delinquency which argued that it is not caused at the individual level, but is instead a normal response of normal individuals to abnormal social conditions. Understanding through such a lens avoids blaming Aboriginal people for being in the circumstances which they are caught in. Instead, it directs focus on social structural factors that need to be addressed, which is key in this thesis, given that the focus is placed on improving environments social and not trying to change something "inherent" in an individual.

Differential Opportunity Theory

Drawing from Merton's (1938) anomie theory and Shaw and McKay's (1942) social disorganization theory²⁰, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) advanced a theory called Differential Opportunity. Although Cloward and Ohlin (1960) agreed with Merton (1938) and Shaw and McKay (1942) in that the cause of crime is related to location and opportunity structures. At the same time, they felt that Merton was incorrect with his assumption that lower-class persons, who are denied access to legitimate opportunities, automatically have access to illegitimate opportunities.

According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), just because legitimate opportunities are obstructed, it does not automatically mean that illegitimate opportunities are freely accessible.

²⁰²⁰ They also drew on Cohen's subcultural theory (see Cohen, 1955).

Some illegitimate roles may be accessible, while at the same time some might not be accessible at all. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argue that same way there is unequal access to role models and opportunities to live up to compliant roles, there is also unequal access to illegitimate roles and opportunities.

In line with Merton and Shaw and McKay, they agree that deprivation and strain plays a role. However, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) expanded these notions, explaining that one learns a good or bad response to that strain contingent on accessible opportunities and role models, either legitimate or illegitimate.

Cloward and Ohlin (1960) developed a theory of criminal gangs that contends that gangs develop delinquent subcultures depending on the illegitimate opportunities available to them in their neighbourhoods as well as the legitimate ones. They identify three types of delinquent subcultures (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960: 20). The first type of delinquent subculture is the “criminal” subculture. In criminal subcultures, juveniles are organized to commit income producing offences. A primary goal of this subculture is to make money through activities such as “extortion, fraud, and theft” (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960: 20).

The second type of delinquent subculture is the “conflict” subculture. In this subculture there are few legitimate or illegitimate opportunities. These groups are primarily found in poor socially disorganized neighbourhoods. They are non-stable and non-integrated. An absence of criminal organization contributes to their instability, and as a result, fighting and displaying toughness become their primary goals. As Cloward and Ohlin (1960: 20) explain, “violence is the keynote: its members pursue status (“rep”) through the manipulation of force or threat of force.”

The final delinquent subculture is the “retreatist” subculture. This subculture is equally unsuccessful in legitimate as well as illegitimate means. This subculture “have become alienated from conventional roles, such as those required in family or the occupational world” (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960: 20). They are known as “double-failures” (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960: 184). As Cloward and Ohlin (1960: 184) explain, they “are restrained in participating in other delinquent modes of adaptation because access to these illegitimate structures is limited” (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960: 184). They cannot fight well or profit from their crimes, thus they retreat into a world of drugs, sex and alcohol.

Linking risk factors identified in the literature to Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) Differential Opportunity theory broadens the understanding of these risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people. It is clear that deprivation of legitimate means produces a stronger likelihood that people will engage in crime (Merton, 1938). However, the types of activities they will become engaged in are contingent on what illegitimate opportunities are accessible to them in their neighbourhood (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960: 150). For example, the literature on risk factors identified low education and a lack of poor school access and involvement. Taking this factor into consideration it would be expected those suffering from such a factor compared to someone who is not, would be more likely to be involved in crime. However, the kind of subculture or delinquency available to them depends on the nature of the illegitimate opportunities they have access to. These opportunities are dependent on the social organization of the neighbourhood, or, in which specific neighbourhood they reside in.

2.3 Conclusion

Historical events such as residential schools and colonization have negatively impacted Aboriginal people. The legacies of their negative effects continue to impact Aboriginal people, and so there are increased potential for risk factors affecting urban Aboriginal people.

General evidence from longitudinal research explains reasons for crime in boys; in particular it showed that risk factors include poor family processes of informal social control, parental delinquency, un-attachment to school, delinquent peers, misbehaviour early in life, lack of job stability and/or commitment to education or work, and lack of marital attachment in middle adulthood.

The root of Aboriginal people's disturbing rates of victimization and offending are complex and influenced by many factors. Although there is not a large body of research identifying Aboriginal specific risk factors related to victimization, victimization surveys have linked Aboriginal people's socio-demographic factors to victimization, finding that violent victimization is often associated with young age, heavy alcohol consumption and drug use, as well as participation in evening activities. These risk factors related to victimization are more frequently found with Aboriginal people compared to non-Aboriginal people. Research also links family violence to future victimization and offending in Aboriginal populations.

Evidence shows that crime affecting Aboriginal people is mostly attributed to their demographics (a much higher proportion of people in the "high risk" 15 to 24 age group, lower education levels, higher rates of substance abuse and higher unemployment), the review of literature also showed that Aboriginal people experience many multiple and related risk factors for crime. Some of the risk factors that were fairly consistent in Aboriginal specific research

studies included family violence and crime, dysfunctional, disorganized and disconnected families, high residential mobility, alcohol abuse, and poverty.

Finally, a number of theories which touch on aspects of these risk factors were outlined. They provide an expanded understanding, as well as support for some of these risk factors; however, more focus continues to be given to the empirical data on risk factors given the nature and purpose of this study.

Chapter Three: What is Known about the Prevention of Crime Affecting Aboriginal People

This chapter will provide an outline of risk-focused crime prevention evidence and literature. Canada's current system of crime control is discussed. This includes brief discussions of Canada's current police, corrections and court systems—from a risk-focused prevention perspective. A review of social science and public health evidence that analyses the effectiveness of risk focused crime prevention-interventions is outlined. The first part looks at this evidence without a particular focus on urban Aboriginal peoples but does focus on many of the risk factors identified in the previous chapter. The second part looks for evidence that is specific to urban Aboriginal peoples.

How to put this evidence of prevention into practice is then discussed. A crime prevention implementation model has been evolving within the crime prevention field which may help to understand the likelihood of risk-focused crime prevention being implemented in relation to urban Aboriginal people is outlined.

Literature outlining the cost effectiveness of risk-focused crime prevention and the degree to which Canada invests in this prevention is briefly discussed. The final section of this chapter identifies some hypotheses on the likelihood of risk-focused prevention being used.

Defining “Crime Prevention”

For the purpose of this study “crime prevention” will be referred to using a definition outlined by Cusson et al. (1998). Cusson et al. (1998) described crime prevention as a set of tasks and strategies involving the use of non-penal interventions, which have the specific goal of reducing the risk and gravity of crime as well as the harm caused by crime. They describe “crime prevention” as being focused on the identification and subsequent reduction of the causes

of crime; the hope being that the preventative actions will break a link in the chain of causality that would have led to a crime being committed had the chain not been broken (Cusson et al., 1998: 174-175). More recently, Cusson (2007: 49) has considered crime prevention as simply being a mode of acting in a proactive and non-coercive manner in the hope of reducing the frequency or the severity of criminal infractions.

Research has convinced many experts that crime prevention based upon risk factors is something that can be implemented now, and it will make a difference in both victimization and offending (Linden, 2001; Waller, 2006). Many of these experts such as Waller (2006), and Farrington and Welsh (2007) have reviewed, examined, and brought together results of evaluations (including randomized control trials and longitudinal studies) of the effectiveness on reducing crime through prevention (early identification and tackling of risk factors for crime). In their reviews of research, numerous experts have concluded that prevention is a more effective way to reduce crime reacting to crime after it has happened (for example, see, Sherman et al., 1997; Linden, 2001; Waller, 2006; Preston, Carr-Stewart and Northwest, 2009; WHO, 2009; Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, 2010). This would involve a shift from the current heavy reliance on interventions by the criminal justice system (police, courts, corrections) to a system of crime control based on prevention. Such an approach would seek to break the cycle of victimization and offending before it repeats again in subsequent generations—through the identification and subsequent tackling of risk factors related to crime.

3.1 Limitations of Canada's Reactive Strategies

There is a consensus reached within the field of crime prevention which advocates for a move from an over-reliance on reactive measures to control crime (policing, corrections and

courts), to one which focuses on the identification and subsequent tackling of risk factors related to crime. The argument is that the Canadian governments (i.e. federal, provincial and municipal) currently rely mainly on the standard crime control approach which uses police, corrections and the courts to address crime, including the disproportionate amount of crime affecting Aboriginal people. This system of crime control which is largely centred on deterrence and incapacitation has become increasingly expensive (Waller, 2006; also see Taylor-Butts, 2002; Beattie and Mole, 2007; Public Safety Canada Portfolio Corrections Statistics Committee, 2007). The concept of deterrence can be seen in the use of the Canadian Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, as well as new laws that are introduced, and how the system is continually being ‘tinkered’ with in the hope that harsher penalties will discourage people from committing crime.²¹ Incarceration and incapacitation are simply locking people in jails and prisons in order to keep offenders off the streets.

Webster (2004: 119), who examined research regarding the effectiveness of incapacitation and deterrence, concluded that at best, they have very modest transient effects on reducing crime rates and often no effects at all. This is not to say that deterrence never works, as persons may be discouraged from committing a crime because of fear of a criminal penalty. For example, people can be deterred from speeding in order to avoid a costly speeding ticket, or, people can be deterred from breaking and entering a home with an alarm, or a home which has its lights all on (which thus, also reinforces the possible success of situational crime prevention)²².

²¹ For example, there are now twenty-nine offences in the Canadian Criminal Code that carry a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment. The majority (nineteen) of these were introduced with Bill C-68, a bundle of firearms-related legislation enacted in 1995.

²² Situational crime prevention is a concept used to describe crime prevention efforts which aim to alter the physical and social environment through design and organization with the intention of making criminal opportunities more difficult to execute, increasing risk of detection, reducing the incentive and increasing guardianship.

Difficulties of Relying on Policing

One of the major methods of crime control in Canada is policing (Waller, 2006). Aboriginal people have been policed under Euro-American policing systems for many decades; as long as these systems have been used in Canada to control crime. Similar to the United States, policing has evolved in terms of utilizing new technologies and incorporating some innovative targeted strategies, however, it is still primarily reactive in that police typically wait for a crime to happen before action is taken, and it is still the primary way Canada attempts to reduce crime affecting Aboriginal people.

In 2004, the US National Academy of Sciences reviewed a large body of research to determine how effective police strategies are at reducing crime, disorder, and fear of crime (US National Academy of Sciences, 2004: 218). Overall, it was found that unfocused police strategies, such as impersonal community policing, adding more police, general patrol, rapid response, follow-up investigations, and undifferentiated arrest for domestic violence, offer little or no evidence of effectiveness (US National Academy of Sciences, 2004: 249). It was found that problem solving in hot spots, had strong evidence for effectiveness, and police strategies such as problem oriented policing, intensive enforcement and hot spot patrols provided moderate to strong evidence of effectiveness (US National Academy of Sciences, 2004: 249). Yet, these latter strategies are not the primary focus of most police agencies. Instead, focus is still on adding to police strength, increasing salaries, random patrol, and/or investigations.

Every year more police officers are hired in Canada, and more money continues to be allocated to policing²³ (see Beattie and Mole, 2007). Concurrent with the findings from the US National Academy of Sciences (2004), many researchers, commissions and other scientific studies have determined that increasing the number of police officers on the street is not an

²³ There has also been a continued growth in rate of Canada's general population (Statistics Canada, 2010).

effective mode to achieve reductions in crime (see Kelling et al., 1974; The Report of the National Criminal Justice Commission, 1996; Waller and Welsh, 1999: 213-214).

Aboriginal people in Canada have typically been policed by non-Aboriginal people, and this continues to a large extent²⁴. Canada has implemented a number of different types of programs intended to address this situation, which has been cited as unfavourable to both the Aboriginal people being policed and the non-Aboriginal officers doing the policing. This was typically due to community hostility and social isolation of the Aboriginal officers (Seagrave, 1997: 256). For many of these programs and initiatives, the primary goal was increasing the number of Aboriginal police officers. A good example of this was the RCMP Native Special Constable Program, a major initiative which started in 1975 to promote the recruitment of Aboriginal people to police other Aboriginal people in their own communities.

Many significant issues with this program, and subsequent similar programs, have been identified. For example, with respect to the RCMP Native Special Constable Program, first, Aboriginal members received less training and lower salaries than non-Aboriginal recruits, and many Aboriginal people were reluctant to join, due to the aforementioned community hostility and feelings of social isolation from their communities (Seagrave, 1997: 256). This specific program is no longer in operation because of its many failures, and it was replaced by the Aboriginal Constable Development Program in 1990. However, the new program operated on the same principle, as it was designed to increase the number of Aboriginal people eligible to become regular RCMP members and, thus, to hire more Aboriginal people as police officers (Jars, 1992 as cited by Seagrave, 1997: 256). This has been the direction that many policing

²⁴ This is still the case even with the implementation of Canada's First Nations Policing Program in June of 1991 (Public Safety Canada, 2011). There are currently 1,240 First Nations police officers operating within the First Nations Policing program, which are situated within in 408 First Nation and Inuit communities (Public Safety Canada, 2011).

initiatives have taken in recent years, attempting to get more Aboriginal persons to join the police service, as both officers and civilian members.

According to Dickson-Gilmore and La Prairie (2005: 71) the RCMP's special constable program, and other programs like it, are ineffective because they attempt to ““indigenize” or “indianize” the white system. This means that Aboriginal people are slotted into various roles within the justice system”, but the system isn't changed. This assumes that the system is fundamentally “good” and only small inconsequential reforms are needed in order to make it just as “good” for all people (Dickson-Gilmore and La Prairie, 2005: 68).

This fundamental concept of “indigenization” can still be seen today in many different programs which operate on the same ideas implemented in 1975 (e.g. the First Nations Policing Policy and the RCMP's many Aboriginal focused programs). Throughout the 1980's to the present day, numerous cross-cultural and culturally sensitive policing programs based on this same fundamental concept have been launched throughout Canada. These programs seek to hire more Aboriginal police officers and/or provide cultural training to non-Aboriginal officers.

The inclination toward indigenization is not limited to the police (Dickson-Gilmore and La Prairie, 2005: 76). The court and correctional systems also implement measures based on this concept. For example, the push for Aboriginal people to become lawyers and insert them into the system has been an ongoing trend in recent years (Dickson-Gilmore and La Prairie, 2005: 76). Similarly, the corrections system is continually trying to hire more Aboriginal people to perform a range of services.

Limitations of Relying on Corrections

Correctional Services Canada (CSC) also attempts to implement programs and initiatives which have Aboriginal traditional methods or culture in their designs. The CSC has implemented a National Healing Program for Aboriginal Offenders in all federal facilities. And many provinces have incorporated healing lodges under Section 81 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, whose primary purpose is to heal offenders using traditional healing methods and culturally-appropriate programming. This may reflect a shift to more culturally focused traditional healing and the use of Aboriginal culture, however, it is being delivered as a reactive response to Aboriginal peoples over-incarceration, and thus may also represent a form of indigenizing the white system given that its main focus is simply trying to slightly modify or adjust the current reactive system, instead of actually changing the system itself. Thus, the correctional system is simply making small changes to a non-Aboriginal system, in an attempt to make it “fit” Aboriginal people better.

This does not mean that cultural concepts should not be considered when implementing criminal justice programs. For example, the Aboriginal Offender Survey, prepared for CSC in 1997 by Johnston,²⁵ found that some incarcerated Aboriginal offenders would feel most comfortable with an Elder, spiritual leader, friend or family member as a counsellor. It also showed that 69% of Aboriginal inmates surveyed aspired to have more institutional programs tailored to their culture and traditions. A more recent study, prepared for CSC by Heckbert and Turkington (2001: 3), arrived at similar conclusions, finding that 72% of the ex-offender respondents of their survey felt that involvement with tribal Elders had had a positive effect in helping to turn their lives around. As well, a report prepared for the Department of Justice

²⁵ Johnston studied approximately 50% of Aboriginal people who were in federal custody by reviewing their files, executing face-to-face interviews and researching the offenders’ criminal history data obtained through the Canadian Police Information Centre.

Canada by Latimer and Foss (2004)²⁶ showed there was keen interest in Aboriginal culture and spiritual programming among Aboriginal youth in the justice system.²⁷

Thus, based on the aforementioned literature reviewed, the argument is that instead of relying only on a system which locks up Aboriginal people then delivers cultural programming, the focus should also be to deliver the programming before people end up in the correctional system in the first place (Linden, 2001; Dickson-Gilmore and La Prairie, 2005).

Limitation of Relying on Courts

Canada has tried to divert Aboriginal people from the court system by attempting to change and adapt laws. In 1996, the federal government decided to address the high incidence of Aboriginal people' incarceration through law reform. The first measure was to add a qualification to a restriction principle regarding the use of incarceration as a sanction. The courts declared that the intent of this measure was to decrease the incarceration of Aboriginal offenders. This is outlined in Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, and states:

²⁶ This study had two parts to its data collection: the "Sharing Circle" method and the "snap shot" method. A key finding of this study was that the high incarceration rate of Aboriginal youth is likely related to a series of interrelated factors, such as high rates of poverty, substance abuse, etc. (Latimer and Foss, 2004: 22).

²⁷ These claims do beg the question of whether or not they are simple Hawthorne responses; i.e. any change is better than the status quo, regardless of what the change is and even if we are not sure what that change might be. The concept of a "Hawthorne" response came from a study by Mayo (1933) of the Hawthorne Plant of the Western Electric Company in Cicero, Illinois (Mayo, 1933). This study originally sought to study the efficiency of workers. This was done by the experimenters manipulating a range of conditions (pay, light levels, rest breaks, etc.). However, every change resulted in efficiency rising, including eventually a return to the original conditions. This was true of each of the individual workers, in addition to the group mean. It turned out that the variables the experimenters manipulated were not the only dominant causes of productivity. Perhaps even more important was the response to being studied (i.e. one has been selected for special attention) which is now commonly referred to as "the Hawthorne effect."

“All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances, should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal Offenders”

This provision became the focus of imperative ruling judgments from the Supreme Court of Canada. In 1996, in *R. v. Gladue*, the court presented an interpretation of this section, concluding that “the jail term for an Aboriginal offender may in some circumstances be less than the term imposed on a non-Aboriginal offender for the same offence.” The Court went on to state, “Aboriginal offenders must always be sentenced in a manner which gives greatest weight to the principles of restorative justice, and less weight to goals such as deterrence, denunciation, and separation.”²⁸ The court directed sentencing judges to sentence Aboriginal people differently. When sentencing an Aboriginal offender, the judge must take into consideration “the types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender, due to his or her particular Aboriginal heritage or connection” (*Gladue*, 1999).

Roach and Rudin (2000: 357) state that a problem with trial judges making use of *Gladue*, is that greater reliance on alternatives to custodial sentences may lead to a “net-widening” of the system, and could even increase incarceration of Aboriginal people. (Net-widening is a term used to describe a program that is set up to divert people away from the criminal justice system—usually incarceration—but, instead, causes more people to enter the criminal justice system, some who might not have otherwise and who may eventually wind up incarcerated (e.g. through breaches) where they would otherwise not have been).

²⁸ Although, the Supreme Court opined in the case of *R. v. Wells* that “the more violent and serious the offence, the more likely as a practical matter that the appropriate sentence will not differ between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal offenders.”

According to Roach and Rudin (2000: 357), trial judges who employ *Gladue* when sentencing offenders may be more likely to impose corrective and impractical healing conditions as part of conditional sentences, with the result that Aboriginal offenders could be disproportionately breached and imprisoned, possibly for longer periods than if they had been sent directly to jail in the first place. They suggest that this problem, combined with the shortage of programs which provide alternatives to imprisonment, makes it unlikely that a *Gladue*-inspired sentencing innovation will have any significant effect on lowering the high rates of Aboriginal incarceration in the future (Roach and Rudin 2000: 357).

Restorative Approaches

In order to move crime prevention forward from its secondary role to a more mainstream focus within the criminal justice system, it has been argued that lessons learned from restorative justice might be able to assist in this transition (Braithwaite, 1998).

Restorative justice measures are another “alternative” to the current law and order justice system. The concept of restorative justice has been known for centuries, and with its focus on restoring harmony and balance it has been said to be rooted in many Aboriginal healing traditions. Restorative approaches are designed to repair the harm from crime that affects victims, offenders and communities. When executed in practice, they typically entail a process that brings the offender, victim and community together to discuss the crime.

Restorative approaches aim to shift power to communities and individual victims and away from the state. Instead of relying on retribution, such as incarceration, probation or another predetermined sanction, communities and victims determine their response to the crime and/or conflict. The idea is for offenders, victims and communities to work together to develop and

implement solutions arrived at through collaborative, non-confrontation agreement. Thus, responses to the harm caused by crime are determined in a manner that seeks to restore harmony in the community, and between all those affected and/or involved in the crime or conflict.

For example, the victim might explain the harm and consequences of a crime that they have had to deal with, and the offender would have a chance to listen and learn, explain their point of view, and apologize if warranted. The process can allow the victim and offender to arrive at a collective solution to repair any harm done, both emotional and material. It may also involve others from the community explaining harm they have experienced, and what they would like to see done.

This process would confront the offenders while giving them the opportunity to explain the consequences of their crime, and also help the victims with the healing process. The restorative justice process/theory/approach has been applied to many different types of programs, including victim-offender mediation, healing circles, sentencing circles and other restorative type actions.

The argument put forth by Braithwaite (1998) suggests that the best way to make crime prevention work is to link it to restorative justice. Braithwaite identifies four reasons for as to why crime prevention often fails:

- 1) Lack of motivation
- 2) Lack of resources
- 3) Insufficiently plural deliberation
- 4) Lack of follow through

He claims that if these failures of crime prevention are linked to restorative justice, crime prevention may be able to have a larger place within the mainstream justice system.

In terms of a lack of motivation, he notes that people typically do not have a strong enough desire to be involved in crime prevention in their community and that organizing people around crime prevention is not something that people typically take the time out to do. On the other hand, people tend to be more apt to participate in a restorative justice program in their community. Thus, learning from restorative justice, Braithwaite suggests that crime prevention should be coupled with individual criminal cases. Meaning that when someone is victimized by crime, people should be reminded of how it could have been prevented. He gives the example of how right after someone is burglarized; it is the best time for police to persuade that person to invest in stronger security.

In terms of crime prevention typically struggling with a lack of resources, Braithwaite claims that restorative justice can be helpful again. Many restorative justice programs have become offered through police services. Being couched within police services typically means that there will be sustained funding for such a program. Thus, the recommendation by Braithwaite is to have crime prevention also be delivered through policing services rather than being “ghettoized” in specialized prevention units. He suggests that crime prevention needs to be linked alongside cases of victimization, most notably with street level victimization, as this is the area where a large majority of police funds are allocated.

In terms of what Braithwaite describes as a lack of “plural deliberation”, he means that when it comes to crime prevention there is a lack of a large number people who will actually get together and get organized around a community’s crime problems. Restorative justice on the other hand has shown success in terms of getting large groups of people organized and deliberating the crime issue at hand. He suggests that getting a large array of people together to discuss a crime problem as well as its multiple causes and multiple ways in which it can be

prevented is effective. Like restorative justice, he suggests that what is needed for crime prevention is to push for this community collaboration. Ultimately, he argues that the capacity to read criminal situations from the different angles, illuminated by different explanations from an array of community people, is what proves successful for restorative justice, and therefore, could prove successful for crime prevention.

Finally, Braithwaite also noted that a failure of crime prevention is the lack of follow through. His hypothesis is that restorative justice programs attain higher levels of application than court orders precisely because they are agreements rather than orders. The offender actually has to agree to take part in a restorative justice program. They cannot be mandated to take part in one. Many times when offenders are given orders they are typically broken or not followed through on (Braithwaite, 1998). However, when offenders agree to do something, there is much more of a chance they will follow through with what has been agreed too. Given this, Braithwaite argues that follow-through of a program is an essential component. This is because voluntary agreement secures greater compliance as opposed to a legally mandated one.

Crime Prevention and its Relationship to Restorative Justice

The concept of crime prevention has become much broader and more extensive in meaning over the last twenty years or so (Crawford, 1997: 43). Restorative justice itself may also be defined by some as “crime prevention.” This is best understood when drawing on the use of a classification system borrowed from the medical model which defines crime prevention at three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary prevention (Brantingham and Faust, 1976).

Primary prevention refers to efforts which attempt to adjust universal social, educational and economic policies and conditions. It is directed at the modification of conditions in the physical and social environment that may lead to crime (Brantingham and Faust, 1976).

The World Health Organization utilizes a similar yet slightly different definition of primary prevention, defining it as actions aimed at the prevention of crime before it occurs (WHO, 2002: 15). The majority of the literature prefers the former definition, emphasizing interventions that tend to focus on crime in an indirect way (Hastings, 1996: 320). Programs or initiatives that fall into this category seek to utilize the broad link between certain social factors or environmental factors and the occurrence of crime. Unemployment insurance is an example of such a program in that it does seek to improve some of the conditions that are associated with the occurrence of crime, but its goals are much broader than crime prevention alone.

Secondary prevention is pre-crime prevention that is targeted towards persons and groups at risk of either offending or victimization. This is the type of crime prevention which is largely drawn on for this thesis, as the risk-focused approach to prevention relies heavily on this type of crime prevention.

Secondary prevention focuses on early identification and interventions in the lives of individuals or groups who are considered at-risk of future involvement in crime. Once these “at-risk” individuals, situations, places, or opportunities are identified, interventions designed to modify those risk factors are implemented with the hope that they might prevent these individuals from later involvement in criminal activity. Situational crime prevention is a concept used to describe prevention which also takes place at the secondary level of prevention (Hastings, 1996: 320). It aims to alter the physical and social environment through design and organization with the intention of making criminal opportunities more difficult to execute, increasing the risk of detection, reducing the incentive and increasing guardianship.

Unlike primary and secondary prevention, tertiary prevention focuses on prevention efforts taking place after a crime has been committed. Its primary aim is the reduction of repeat

offending (Brantingham and Faust, 1976). According to Hastings (1996: 320), tertiary prevention is within the traditional realm of the criminal justice system, and involves the vast majority of the activities included under the heading of “police, courts and corrections”. Hastings (1996: 320) notes that most activity at this level focuses on the detection, conviction, punishment or treatment of offenders. Given that it is primarily focused on reducing repeat offending, it can be argued that restorative justice programming could also fit within this rubric of tertiary prevention. Thus, like police, courts and corrections, it is a reactive response. It does not seek to eliminate crime before it happens, but instead, respond to afterwards.

Finally, there are many researchers and others who have addressed the issue regarding what to do, or not do, in order to reduce victimization and offending within the Aboriginal population. Common themes have pointed to the failure of the current Euro-centric justice system, with its overreliance on incarceration (Bell, 1999: 276; Comack et al., 2009: 3). As Bell (1999: 276-277) argues, the problem with many laws and their administration, and correctional policies and practices, is that they fail to acknowledge the different life experiences of Aboriginal people compared to non-Aboriginal people, as well as the fundamental Euro-Canadian culture that forms the basis of Canada’s justice system.

Thus, researchers and others have argued for a more balanced approach, one which gives equal importance to crime prevention and other related risk-focused practices (Linden, 2001; Preston, Carr-Stewart and Northwest, 2009; Monchalin, 2010). The next section will explore these crime prevention programs and initiatives.

3.2 Evidence for Culturally Relevant Prevention that Tackles Risk Factors

Given that not all Aboriginal people are involved in victimization and offending shows the “resilience” of some people. This concept of resilience is defined as, “patterns of positive adaptation during or following significant adversity or risk” (Masten et al., 2009: 118). Even though many Aboriginal people who have suffered from intergenerational traumas find themselves in unfortunate situations, there are also those who have taken the necessary steps to offset negative outcomes. For example, many residential school survivors found support from Elders, Alcoholics Anonymous and healing circles (Dion Stout and Kipling, 2003: v). Many also sought higher education, regained their Aboriginal languages and culture, and took their own spiritual paths in order to re-establish and reinforce their Aboriginal identity (Dion Stout and Kipling, 2003: v). In order to strengthen resilience, tackling risk factors and enhancing protective factors are two concepts discussed in the literature (Linden, 2001; Dion Stout and Kipling, 2003; Capobianco, Shaw and Dubuc, 2003). Evidence for tackling risk factors and enhancing protective factors is explained in the remainder of this chapter.

3.2 (a) General Crime Prevention Evidence

Risk factors are defined as factors that increase the probability of a negative outcome such as being exposed to crime or victimization. For example, poverty or parental alcoholism would be considered a risk factor for a child’s future delinquency or victimization. Protective factors aid in counteracting risk factors and decreasing vulnerability to conditions such as crime or victimization and increasing durable resiliency. For example, the presence of nurturing parents in a home would be considered a protective factor.

Risk-Focused Prevention

According to Farrington and Welsh (2007: 95), this approach to prevention has recently been termed ‘developmental criminology’ and/or ‘risk-focused prevention.’ It was imported from the medical and public health literature into the fields of community psychology and criminology by David Hawkins and Richard Catalano in 1992. Since the 1990’s, the concept of risk-focused prevention has become more prevalent in the field of criminology (Farrington and Welsh, 2007: 94). The fundamental design of this approach is straightforward: “identify key risk factors for offending, and implement prevention methods designed to counteract them” (Farrington and Welsh, 2007: 95).

Using the medical model as an example, if significant risk factors for heart disease—such as smoking or a high-fat diet—are identified and quantified, then preventative measures designed to reduce these risk factors would be expected to lead to reductions in rates of that adverse outcome (in this case, heart disease). The risk-focused approach suggests that the same approach can be applied in crime prevention in order to reduce or prevent factors associated with victimization or offending. For example, if the model asserts that inconsistent or poor parenting in childhood predisposes one to a higher risk of victimization or offending later in life, then tackling these risk factors through measures such as public health nurses offering parenting classes, and support to at-risk populations should lead to reduced rates of offending and victimization. In order to be identified reliably, well-established, evidence-based models for both risk and/or protective factors must be utilized.

This study was informed by literature and research evolving from this risk-focused approach to prevention. It is typically argued that using the concept of ‘at-risk’ is a practical mode of description and a useful point of departure for interpretation, because, though it is very broad, it avoids blaming, and instead directs the major focus to the environmental hazards which

need to be addressed (Brendtro et al., 2002: 3). Emphasis is typically placed on the structural environmental hazards and processes and the focus is placed on improving environments and/or social processes, increasing resiliency, durability and guardianship, reducing inequality or improving access to resources.

Many reviews of research examining risk-focused crime prevention confirm and argue that when risk factors for crime and victimization are tackled, and/or protective factors are enhanced, crime and its related issues can be reduced in both effective and efficient ways, which helps keep people from entering into the criminal justice system in the first place (see Sherman et al., 2002; Waller, 2006; WHO, 2009; Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, 2010). This evidence has accumulated from numerous scientific studies and randomized control trials, or is based on other empirical evidence (Hahn et al., 1994; Olds et al., 1999; Wolfe et al., 2004; Schweinhart, 2005), as well as reviews of research (Sherman et al., 2002; Waller, 2006). Many publically accountable organizations, such as The World Health Organization (2002, 2004, 2009) and the United Nations (2002), have also arrived at similar conclusions.

Commonly cited projects which support this evidence include The Triple P Positive Parenting Program²⁹ which helps parents learn effective management strategies to deal with many childhood developmental and behavioural issues and has shown much evaluative success in terms preventing and reducing child abuse and maltreatment (for example see Sander et al., 2003; Prinz, et al., 2009 for evaluations). Mentoring has also been cited in much of the risk-focused crime prevention research evidence (Waller, 2006). Big Brothers Big Sisters mentoring programs represent a prime example of the positive effects mentoring can have, such as having improved family relationships, improved school attendance and performance, and less likelihood

²⁹ This program will be more thoroughly discussed in section 3.2 (b) in the discussion of Aboriginal focused crime prevention evidence, because this program included an evaluation on an Aboriginal population.

to start using drugs and alcohol (see Tierney et al., 2000 for full evaluation). Youth Inclusion Programs demonstrate the success targeted interventions can have. They show very positive results in terms of steering youth away from offending and crime related activities through offering positive programming (that includes sports, education and training, arts, culture and media, mentoring, health and drug education, motor programmes, outreach and detached work, group development, personal assessments, and family programmes) on a weekly basis to at-risk youth in the most deprived neighbourhoods (see Burrows, 2003 for a full evaluation).

Though there are several more programs like these briefly mentioned above, four key projects covering the full range of age groups (infant to teen) have been selected for discussion from the large body of risk-focused crime prevention literature: first, The Elmira Prenatal/Early Infancy Project and The Perry Preschool Project (including ages of early infancy to 5), followed by The SNAP (Stop Now and Plan) Project (including ages 6 to 12), and finally The Quantum Opportunities Project (including ages 13-19).³⁰

The Elmira (New York) Prenatal/Early Infancy Project

The Elmira (New York) Prenatal/Early Infancy Project was a randomized controlled trial which took a sample of 400³¹ women in the Elmira, New York area who were low income (85%), unmarried, or younger than 19 years of age (Olds et al., 1999: 53). The women were split

³⁰ These examples of successful prevention provided are just some of the commonly cited examples available in the literature pertaining to crime prevention. In reality, there have been many crime prevention programs that have been ineffective. Rather than using these failures to conclude that crime prevention is altogether ineffective, these failed experiments can be used to expand the knowledge concerning what interventions might or might not succeed in the future. Some commonly cited examples of ineffective yet popular prevention programs include police-organized Neighbourhood Watch, DARE, and Scared Straight (Sherman et al., 2002; Waller, 2006).

³¹ Five hundred women (500) were invited to participate and 400 enrolled (Olds et al., 1999: 53).

into two groups, with 200 receiving home visits and the other 200 relying on the standard services being offered in the area at the time (Olds et al., 1999: 53).

The home visits program consisted of public health nurses visiting high-risk mothers³² for 75 to 90 minutes on a weekly or monthly basis (Olds et al., 1999: 49). Mothers would typically be enrolled at the end of their first trimester of pregnancy, and continue in the program until their child was two years old (Olds et al., 1999: 49). The nurses provided mothers with information on the health and development of their children, while assisting them to develop supportive relationships with friends and family, and other essential health and human services (Olds et al., 1999: 49).

Outcomes of program effectiveness were measured using data derived from interviews, observations of parenting, conditions in the homes and reviews of medical and social service records from pregnancy until the age of 15 (Olds et al., 1999: 53). At the 15 year follow-up, assessments were completed on 324 participants, representing 81% of the original random sample, as well as 87% of the families in which there were no foetal, maternal or child deaths (Olds et al., 1999: 54).

The final analysis showed that the mothers visited by nurses were less likely to abuse and neglect their children, achieving an 80% reduction in verified cases of child abuse and neglect through age 15 compared to the control group (Karoly et al., 1998: 32; Olds et al., 1999: 44). Mothers visited by nurses were also less likely to have rapid repeat pregnancies, enabling them to maintain employment more reliably since they would have fewer children to care for (Olds et al., 1999: 44). They were also found to be more likely to avoid substance abuse and other criminal behaviours than were these in the control group (Olds et al., 1999: 44). Furthermore, the children of the mothers who received nurse visits had 56% fewer arrests than the control group

³² According to Olds et al., (1999: 45) this meant that the mothers were unmarried, adolescent or poor.

by age 15 (Olds et al., 1999: 44; Waller, 2006: 26). These results were replicated by similar programs in an African American community in Memphis, Tennessee, and a Mexican American community in Denver, Colorado (Olds et al., 1999: 46). A cost benefit analysis conducted on the Elmira project identified a net savings of \$18,611, or more than four times the cost of the entire program (Greenwood et al., 2001: 133).

The High/Scope Perry Preschool Program

Another example is a longitudinal study commonly referred to as the High/Scope Perry Preschool Program, which showed that enriched pre-schooling can have a significant positive effect on the reduction of crime (Schweinhart, 2005). This program began in 1962 in Ypsilanti, Michigan (Schweinhart, 2005: 1; Muennig et al., 2009: 1431). A sample of 123³³ African American children (aged 3-4), who were born into poverty and assessed to be at high risk of school failure,³⁴ were split into two groups: 58 of them were put into a program group that received a high-quality preschool program at ages 3 and 4, and 65 were put into a group which received no preschool program³⁵ (Schweinhart, 2000: 137; Schweinhart, 2005: 1; Muennig et al., 2009: 1431).

This was a two-year program which required a high-quality, active learning curriculum, led by teachers who had masters degrees as well as training in child development (Muennig et

³³ These individuals made up five study “waves” beginning in 1962, with a selection of a group of children aged four (wave zero) and a group of children aged three (wave one); and was completed over the following three years by the annual addition of a group of children who were aged three—wave two in 1963, wave three in 1964, and wave four in 1965 (Schweinhart, 2000: 138).

³⁴ These children were identified via census data, referrals from neighbourhood groups, and using door-to-door canvassing (Muennig et al., 2009: 1431). Children had to be of low socio-economic status (based on an index score derived from parental income, education, and occupation) and to have an IQ score between 70 and 85 as assessed by the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test (Schweinhart, 2000: 138; Muennig et al., 2009: 1431). Children who had a physical handicap were excluded (Muennig et al., 2009: 1431).

³⁵ The process of participant allocation to the programming and control groups was not done blindly; however, researchers were blind to the collection of follow-up data (Muennig et al., 2009: 1431).

al., 2009: 1431). Programming was delivered five mornings a week for two and a half hours (Muennig et al., 2009: 1431). This was backed up by 1.5 hour weekly home visits once a week for thirty weeks in each year of the two year program (Muennig et al., 2009: 1431). The activities delivered included problem solving and decision-making activities, which were planned, carried out and reviewed by the children themselves, with active assistance and support from adults.

Data were gathered on the study participants through a variety of outlets, including the participant's school, social services and arrest records (Schweinhart, 2000: 137). Also, at age 27 and age 40 the original study participants were interviewed face-to-face (Muennig et al., 2009: 1432). Using data assessing education levels, economic performance, family relationships and health, as well as arrests for violent, property and drug related crime, comparisons were made between the group which received the programming and the group that did not. (Schweinhart, 2005: 1-3).

Data were collected annually on both groups from ages 3 through 11, and again at ages 14, 15, 19, 27 and 40, with a missing data rate of only 6% across all measures (Schweinhart, 2005: 1; Muennig et al., 2009). For the age 40 interview survey, 4 of the original 123 respondents (two in the programming group and two in the control group), could not be located, and seven participants had died (two in the programming group and five in the control group) (Muennig et al., 2009: 1432).

The results of the project showed that children who received the programming significantly outperformed the no-program group in overall academic performance, school completion and employment earnings (Schweinhart, 2005: 1-3). The project played a considerable role in reducing overall arrests, arrests for violent crimes, arrests for property and drug crimes, and subsequent prison or jail sentences (Schweinhart, 2005: 3). For example, results

demonstrated that only 36% of those who received the programming had five or more arrests by age 40, compared to 55% for the control group (Schweinhart, 2005: 2). That is, the program provided to at-risk children at ages 3 and 4, caused a 34% reduction in arrests by age 40 (Schweinhart, 2005; Waller, 2006: 24). The cost-benefit analysis of the Perry Preschool program identified the economic return to society as being \$258,888 per participant on an investment of \$15,166 per participant, or a return of \$17.07 per dollar invested over 40 years (Schweinhart, 2005: 3-4).

SNAP Program (Stop Now and Plan)

The SNAP (Stop Now and Plan) program is a cognitive-behavioural strategy that helps parents and children control angry feelings by getting them to stop, think, and plan positive alternatives before acting impulsively. The strategy itself was developed in the late 1970's for use with behaviourally disordered children in a day treatment program in Toronto (Child Development Institute, 2010). The program was later enhanced and officially developed in 1985 in conjunction with the Toronto Police Service, and was named the SNAP Under 12 Outreach Project (SNAP ORP) (Koegl et al., 2008: 421). In 1996, a program specifically targeting girls was launched, named the SNAP Girls Connection (SNAP GC) (Child Development Institute, 2010). Since the initial SNAP program in 1985, both programs have undergone many extensive evaluations (including randomized controlled trials), all showing very positive results in terms of helping children control aggression and impulsive behaviour—which can aid in decreasing future involvement with the criminal justice system (Koegl et al., 2008; Child Development

Institute, 2010).³⁶ Given that SNAP ORP has undergone more evaluations than SNAP GC, it will be explained and a recent evaluation will be outlined.

SNAP ORP is a community-based program for children under the age of 12 (Augimeri et al., 2007: 799). Those admitted to the program are those children who have had, or who are at risk of having contact with the police, resulting from participation in an array of antisocial activities including theft, vandalism, assault, fire setting or breaking and entering (Augimeri et al., 2007: 800). It is a 12-week, multi-component outpatient program provided in the community (Augimeri et al., 2007: 801; Koegl et al., 2008: 422). Two central components make up the program. First is a 90 minute children's session which includes structured curriculum, facilitated discussion and role playing, and teaches children a cognitive behavioural self-control and problem solving technique called SNAP (Stop Now And Plan) (Augimeri et al., 2007: 801; Koegl et al., 2008: 422). Second is a 90 minute parenting group (attended separately) that teaches parents hands-on effective child maltreatment strategies (Augimeri et al., 2007: 801; Koegl et al., 2008: 422). In addition to these two main components, children and their families are able to access added components based off their need and preference. This includes one-on-one family counselling, academic tutoring for children not performing at their age-appropriate grade level, as well as individual befriending which provides support to children who are unconnected to positive structured activities in their community (Augimeri et al., 2007: 801; Koegl et al., 2008: 422).

One of the recent randomized controlled trials conducted on SNAP ORP which included examining children's criminal records as part of their methods was conducted by Augimeri, et al., (2007). A randomized controlled trial (RCT) design was used to assess the effects of the

³⁶ The evaluations did not specify whether Aboriginal youth were included in the study or not. They were conducted on the general population.

children and families receiving the SNAP ORP programming, as compared to a wait-list control group (Augimeri et al., 2007: 800). However, the wait-list control group did receive a delayed and less intensive version of the SNAP ORP rather than no treatment because of ethical considerations (Augimeri et al., 2007: 800). The total sample consisted of 32 children aged 12 and under (24 boys and 8 girls) who were referred to the program (Augimeri et al., 2007: 801).

In order to be admitted into the program and be eligible for the study the children had to have had police contact six months prior to the referral and/or a T-score on the Delinquency scale of Child Behaviour Checklist of 70 or greater³⁷. The majority of the children had both; 81% had a T-score of 70 or more and 78% had police contact (Augimeri et al., 2007: 801). The main reasons for referral were theft (45%), fighting (16%), severe defiance at home (13%), vandalism (6%), assault (6%), arson (3%), trespassing (3%), or public mischief (3%). Over one-third (38%) of those children who were referred exhibited more than one type of offending behaviour (Augimeri et al., 2007: 801).

A Child Behaviour checklist was issued to the parents, and used as a measure to determine levels of children's aggression and delinquency (Augimeri et al., 2007: 801). Data from this measure were collected at separate five time periods over an 18-month period: Time 1 (pre-treatment); Time 2 (post treatment—at least three months after Time 1); Time 3 (three months after Time 2); Time 4 (six months after Time 3); and Time 5 (six months after Time 4)³⁸ (Augimeri et al., 2007: 802). In addition, official criminal offending records were collected on all offences committed between each child's 12th and 18th birthdays (Augimeri et al., 2007: 802).

³⁷ Therefore indicating behaviour problems more serious than 98% of peers in the same age and sex (Augimeri et al., 2007: 801).

³⁸ The research assistant who collected the outcome data, was unaware of the assigned conditions of the participants (Augimeri et al., 2007: 802).

Results showed that, compared to the control group, children in the SNAP ORP programming had significant decreases on the Delinquency and Aggression subscales of the Child Behaviour Checklist pre- to post-intervention, and these effects were maintained over time³⁹ (Augimeri et al., 2007).

Criminal records were also examined pre and post programming, and although it was not statistically significant, children receiving the SNAP ORP programming were also found to have fewer criminal records at follow-up (31%), as compared to the control group (57%) (Augimeri et al., 2007). Overall, this specific evaluation showed that SNAP ORP was found to be an effective cognitive-behavioural program for antisocial children in the short term, with possible effects extending into adolescence and adulthood (Augimeri et al., 2007).

Quantum Opportunities Project

Another commonly cited example is the Quantum Opportunities Project. This was a demonstration project carried out in five different US communities (San Antonio (TX), Philadelphia (PA), Milwaukee (WI), Saginaw (MI) and Oklahoma City (OK), beginning in September 1989 (Hahn et al., 1994: 6). The program focused on disadvantaged teens⁴⁰ by providing them with after-school developmental programming.

Each participating site randomly selected from a group of grade eight students whose families were receiving public assistance. Each site enrolled 50 disadvantaged teens, assigning 25 of them to a group that received the developmental programming, and 25 to a control group which received no programming (Hahn et al., 1994: 6). The programming was structured around educational activities, and provided up to 250 hours of education, 250 hours of development

³⁹ For statistically significant differences, effect sizes were larger (.79 to 1.19) (Augimeri et al., 2007: 799).

⁴⁰ According to Hahn, Leavitt and Aaron (1994: 6), this included high school aged youth who were from families receiving public assistance.

activities, and 250 hours of service every full year from grade 9 through high school graduation for in-school teens or teens who had dropped out or left their original school neighbourhoods (Hahn et al., 1994: 6). The educational activities consisted of tutoring, computer skills training and life and family skills training, as well as guidance activities such as planning for post-secondary education or employment following graduation (Hahn et al., 1994; Greenwood et al., 1996). For their participation in the program, the teens from the program groups were given a small financial incentive, and any money that they earned was matched by the program to put toward college (Hahn et al., 1994; Greenwood et al., 1996).

An evaluation comparing the program and control groups was conducted throughout the duration of the program. Beginning in September 1989, before the programming was delivered, questionnaires were given to all participants in both groups. The questionnaires were provided to both groups again once the program started, first in the fall of 1990, then in 1991, and again in 1992 (Hahn et al., 1994: 7).

Of all of the sites, only Milwaukee did not complete its data analysis. The magnitude of sample attrition was otherwise low, and it did not affect the final analysis (Hahn et al., 1994: 5). When comparing the original sample from 1989 to the final sample four years later, 88% of the program group and 82% of the control group were represented in the final sample (Hahn et al., 1994: 5).

Results of the evaluation showed that the program groups fared better in terms of the outcome parameters at all the study sites. The groups which received the programming were more likely to graduate from high school, enrol in post-secondary education or receive an honour or award, and less likely to get pregnant, drop out of high school or get involved in crime, compared to the no-programming groups (Hahn et al., 1994: 15). Furthermore, the number of

teens arrested after completing the program was 70% lower than the number arrested from the control group (Waller, 2006: 29). The cost-benefit analysis showed that for every dollar spent on the program, \$3.68 in benefits was returned (Hahn et al., 1994: 24).

Finally, as shown above, there is an abundance of research evidence regarding crime prevention that tackles risk factors. See tables 2 and 3 for a brief outline of the projects described, followed by the programs compared to the risk factors derived from Chapter Two:

Table 2: Summary of General Crime Prevention Projects

Ages 0-5		Ages 6-12	Ages 13 - 19
The Elmira Prenatal/Early Infancy Project	The Perry Preschool Project	The SNAP (Stop Now and Plan) Project	The Quantum Opportunities Project
Randomized Controlled Trials in 3 U.S Cities	Longitudinal Study following 123 African American children	Multiple Randomized Controlled Trials (4) and other (15) rigorous evaluations in Canada	Randomized Controlled Trials in 5 U.S Cities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Targeted at-risk families (i.e., marginalized teen mothers) with newborns and toddlers ➤ Provided continued prenatal care and support ➤ Improved access to local services and opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Targeted at-risk children (ages 3-4) born into poverty ➤ Provided enriched pre-schooling to children as well as home visits to the families 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Targeted at-risk youth who have had, or are at risk to have police contact ➤ Provided cognitive behavioural self-control and problem solving programming ➤ Provided parents programming teaching hands-on effective child maltreatment strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Targeted at-risk disadvantaged teens (those with families receiving public assistance) ➤ Provided after school activities: tutoring, computer skills training, volunteering, college/employment planning, etc. ➤ Small remuneration provided for participation (~\$1/hr) – money earned matched towards college fund
<u>Evaluated impacts:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reduced verified cases of child abuse and neglect by 80% through to age 15 ✓ Reduced youth arrests by 66% through age 15 	<u>Evaluated impacts:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reduced overall arrests: arrests for violent crimes and property crimes: ✓ A 34% reduction in arrests by age 40 for children who received the programming at ages 3/4 	<u>Evaluated impacts:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reduced delinquency and aggression for children receiving programming ✓ Children receiving programming were found to have fewer criminal records at follow-up (31%), as compared to the control group (57%) 	<u>Evaluated impacts:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reduced high school dropout by 27% ✓ Increased post-secondary school attendance by 26% ✓ Reduced youth arrests by 71% over 4 years
<u>Cost Benefit:</u> A net savings of \$18,611 or more than	<u>Cost Benefit:</u> Economic return to society was \$258,888	Cost benefit not conducted	<u>Cost Benefit:</u> \$1 = \$3.68 benefits returned

four times the cost of the entire program.	per participant on an investment of \$15,166 per participant, or a return of \$17.07 per dollar invested over 40 years		
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Table 3: General Crime Prevention Programs vs. Risk Factors

[illegible]

However, little of the evidence-based knowledge that is derived from these projects, or other evaluated programs, is specific to Aboriginal people. This means that many of the projects which show evidence for risk factors were not conducted on Aboriginal specific programs, or on programs that had a high degree of Aboriginal involvement.

However, more recently what might be termed as “promising” prevention evidence focused on Aboriginal people has been evolving (for example see Gilchrist et al., 1987; Mushquash, Comeau and Stewart, 2007; Carter, Straits and Hall, 2007; Turner et al., 2007; Totten and Dunn, 2010). This type of evidence is beginning to be compiled in reviews of such research (for example see Capobianco, Shaw and Dubuc, 2003; Bodson, et al., 2008: 141-174; Totten 2009; Monchalin, 2010). The following section provides an outline of some of this evolving Aboriginal-focused research evidence.

3.2 (b) Aboriginal Focused Crime Prevention Evidence

The evolving Aboriginal-focused evaluations are based on both national and international evidence of prevention programming, conducted with Aboriginal populations in Canada, the United States and Australia. However, the current state of evidence regarding Aboriginal focused prevention programming has not undergone randomized controlled trials with long term follow-up or other rigorous evaluations similar to those described in the previous sections. Thus, unlike the general evidence provided above which included longitudinal studies (i.e. Perry Pre-school) or randomized controlled trials (i.e. SNAP), the evidence which exists for the Aboriginal focused programs is not as strong. Thus, such programs might be considered as simply “promising” but not proven. In fact, there is actually a lack of Aboriginal focused crime

prevention evidence in existence, and this study attempted to bring together the current state of knowledge in regards to what currently exists.

It was found that the existing Aboriginal prevention programming evidence has identified numerous core components that are the same as those found with non-Aboriginal populations. These include providing prevention programming that is targeted to at-risk children and youth, as well as to parents and/or families of at-risk youth and children (Mushquash, Comeau, and Stewart 2007; Turner et al., 2007; Totten and Dunn, 2010).

In addition, some Aboriginal experts and scholars and their colleagues have researched and endorsed solutions for at-risk Aboriginal youth with many more similar and related components. These include skills and educational based intervention, which seeks to build positive relationships for youth, provides educational enhancement through a variety of learning techniques, mobilizes positive youth involvement, fosters pro-social values and behaviour, provides positive social support networks, supports and enhances personal development, enhances positive social support networks, and involves role models and cultural/spiritual practices (see Brendtro, Brokenleg⁴¹ and Van Brockern 2002; Wardman⁴² and Quantz, 2005).

Examples of this programming and their evaluations are now briefly described. First, descriptions of two preventative programs that have shown promising results in reducing one of the major risk factors for crime (addiction to alcohol)⁴³ are presented, one developed in Canada, and the other in the United States and expanding into Canada. This is followed by an examination of a family support program developed in Australia, which has also recently been expanded to Canada, and which has shown promising results in reducing problem child

⁴¹ Dr. Martin Brokenleg is a member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe.

⁴² Dr. Dennis Wardman is member of the Key First Nation.

⁴³ See Yuan et al. (2006) and Brzozowski, Taylor-Butts and Johnson (2006) who show and describe the correlation between alcohol and crime.

behaviour and poor parenting practices and, thereby, reducing child abuse and maltreatment. Finally, two Aboriginal gang prevention programs developed and implemented in Canada that have shown promising results in reducing and preventing Aboriginal youth gang involvement and related risk factors for gang related crime, and which were recently evaluated, are reviewed.

‘Nemi’simk, Seeing Oneself Intervention’

The ‘Nemi’simk, Seeing Oneself Intervention’ is a prevention program that did not evaluate impacts on crime, however, has evaluated and shown promising results in reducing drinking behaviours—a risk factor highly correlated to victimization and offending—among Aboriginal youth in Nova Scotia. This was an early alcohol misuse/abuse intervention initiative that was developed and pilot-tested with Aboriginal youth from four schools in two Mi’kmaq communities in Nova Scotia.

Before initiating the program, a pre-planning methodology was implemented (see Comeau et al., 2005). Essentially, program developers worked with the community to more thoroughly assess the needs and unique risk factors of their intended target population, so they could then tailor interventions based on the target population’s specific needs⁴⁴ (Mushquash et al., 2007: 18). Invited to participate in the program were Mi’kmaq teen drinkers, who had displayed at least one of three personality characteristics identified by the researchers (anxiety sensitivity, hopelessness and/or sensation seeking) as risk factors for alcohol abuse (Comeau et al., 2005: 43).

Interventions delivered through the program were cognitively behavioural in nature and culturally relevant, incorporating traditional Mi’kmaq knowledge and teachings. The evaluated

⁴⁴ This pre-assessment program methodology is itself an entire research project. Given that the purpose of this program description is to outline the outcome program evaluation component, this initial planning research stage is not described in-depth. See Comeau et al. (2005) for a complete description.

interventions were brief (i.e. two 90 minute sessions) (Mushquash et al., 2007: 20). These sessions incorporated interactive exercises, visual images and scenarios, and were delivered using intervention manuals which are culturally relevant, based on information gathered in the pre-planning stage from the youth in the community. For example, cognitive behavioural strategies used in the interventions, and included in the intervention manuals, include references to traditional sacred Medicine Wheel teachings (Mushquash et al., 2007: 19). The interventions were delivered by trained guidance councillors (program facilitators), and trained members of the RCMP Aboriginal and Diversity Policing Services, H Division (co-facilitators) at Mi'kmaq First Nations' schools.

Youths from two Mi'kmaq communities in Nova Scotia between the ages of 14 and 18 years ($M = 16$) participated in the project (Mushquash et al., 2007: 19). From a screening sample of 169 students, 41 were identified as eligible⁴⁵ and willing to participate (26 females and 15 males). Of these 41 students, 29 (20 female, 9 male) underwent the interventions—the other 12 were unable to participate for various reasons (e.g. illness, family issues), and were assigned to a control group, but were not used as a comparison group (Mushquash et al., 2007: 19). From the original 41 students, 25 (from both the experimental and control groups) participated in the four-month follow-up (61%) (Mushquash et al., 2007: 20).

Many different evaluation measures and tools were used to determine program outcome effects. These included the 'Substance Use Risk Profile Scale,' which was the initial assessment tool used to select students for the intervention, and was also applied as one of the several follow-up outcome measures. It is a 23 item tool that measures the levels of specific personality

⁴⁵ Eligible students were Mi'kmaq teen drinkers who had displayed elevations of at least one of the three personality risk factors (anxiety sensitivity, hopelessness, and sensation seeking) on the Substance Use Risk Profile Scale, a 23 item pre-assessment tool that measures levels of these specific personality risk factors for alcohol abuse/dependence (Mushquash, Comeau and Stewart, 2007: 19).

risk factors for alcohol abuse/dependence (i.e. anxiety sensitivity, hopelessness, and/or sensation seeking), collects demographics such as age, gender and grade level information, and records whether students said they had consumed alcohol within the last four months (Mushquash et al., 2007: 19). The other outcome measure used was the 'Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index' which is a 23 item self-report questionnaire used to measure adolescent problem drinking symptoms (Mushquash et al., 2007: 19). Frequency of drinking and binge drinking (i.e. five drinks or more on one occasion), were measured using five point scales built into the questionnaire. In order to determine if their findings were specific to alcohol, a measure of recent marijuana use which asked participants whether or not they have used marijuana in the past 30 days, was also applied (Mushquash et al., 2007: 20).

The results of the evaluation were encouraging. Compared to pre-intervention, students who participated in the program drank less overall, engaged in fewer binge drinking episodes, had fewer alcohol related problems, were more likely to abstain from alcohol use, and had also reduced their use of marijuana (a positive result that the study had not anticipated) (Mushquash et al., 2007: 21). The non-random control group had experienced no significant changes at the four month post-intervention follow-up (Mushquash et al., 2007: 21).

There is now an attempt by The Strong Heart Teaching Lodge, an Aboriginal organization in Winnipeg, is running a program based on this model. This is something that will be further explored and outlined in the findings section in Chapter Six.

Project Venture

Another promising program is 'Project Venture,' an outdoor experiential development program designed for high-risk Native-American youth. Although this program did not evaluate

impacts on crime, it did evaluate impacts on reducing substance abuse. The programs central aim is to reduce substance abuse, which is a risk factor found to be highly correlated to both victimization and offending. The program is culturally relevant, and grounded in Aboriginal culture. It involves classroom-based problem solving activities, skills-focused outdoor experiential activities, adventure camps and treks, and community-oriented service learning. It incorporates mentoring and parent/family involvement in community based-activities, as well as Elder involvement in planning and a variety of different activities (Carter et al., 2007a: 397-398).

Over the past 15 years this program has served over 4,000 Native-Americans and other youth in New Mexico, and has been implemented in more than 50 Native-American and other communities throughout the United States (Carter et al., 2007a: 397; Carter et al., 2007b: 7). The program's primary target group is students in grades five through eight, however, it has been adapted to older teens as well (Carter et al., 2007b: 7). The program model is guided by Native-American traditional values, including family, learning from the natural world, spiritual awareness, services to others and respect (Carter et al., 2007b: 7).

In autumn 1996, an evaluation of this program was conducted on a group of grade six students from two randomly assigned public middle schools in Gallup, New Mexico. A total of 397 students (263 in the group receiving the programming and 135 who were assigned to a control group) participated in a baseline assessment (Carter et al., 2007b: 11). A six month follow-up was completed by 222 of the programming group participants and 124 control group participants, and an eighteen month follow-up was completed by 162 program group participants and 98 control group participants (Carter et al., 2007b: 11). Ethnic distribution of all study participants was 75.5% Native-American, 15.8% Hispanic, 5.3% white, 0.3% Asian or Pacific Island, and 3.3% who were other (Carter et al., 2007b: 11; Carter et al., 2007a: 398).

The programming group members were enrolled in the project for one year, and received the weekly classroom-based activities throughout the school year (a minimum of 20 hourly sessions). They were also enrolled in weekly after school challenge activities and monthly outings on weekends, and they participated in a wilderness camp during the summer (Carter et al., 2007a). The control group did not receive any programming or take part in any of the activities.

Surveys were used to evaluate effectiveness (baseline, six month post-exit, and eighteen month post-exit) (Carter et al., 2007b: 12). The surveys were announced to the students in the two classroom settings (programming group and no-programming group), with assistance from at least two proctors (Carter et al., 2007b: 11). The Centre for Substance Abuse and Prevention National Youth Survey⁴⁶ was used and administered in all three surveys. The surveys assessed actual substance abuse, as well as related risk and protective factors related to substance abuse.

Of those who participated in the programming, alcohol use from the six month follow-up to the 18 month follow-up levelled off over time, whereas the control group use increased significantly over the same time period (Carter et al., 2007a: 398-399). Additionally, there was a significant difference in terms of composite substance abuse patterns between the participant and control groups, with the participant group demonstrating less growth in substance abuse (Carter et al., 2007b: 12).

The National Registry of Effective Programs (NREPP), which is the Centre for the Substance Abuse Prevention (SAMHSA) national registry on evidence-based programs and practices, has reviewed outcome data from the program evaluation surveys, and named Project Venture one of its model programs. The program has been replicated in rural Alaskan Native,

⁴⁶ This survey was adapted from an instrument created by Delbert Elliot at the University of Colorado (Carter, Straits, and Hall, 2007b: 10).

Hispanic/Latino and Native Hawaiian locations, as well as in an urban Native-American (Cherokee) location. And four programs based on this model are currently being implemented in four Aboriginal communities in Nova Scotia (Pictou Landing, Membertou, Indian Book and Eskasoni) and are being supported on a pilot project basis through the National Crime Prevention Centre. Furthermore, similar programs are also being offering in British Columbia, Alberta, Northwest Territories and the Yukon and are called “the Rediscovery Program” (see <http://rediscovery.org/>).

Aboriginal Triple P

The ‘Triple P Program’ is another promising prevention initiative. It is a parenting program which encourages positive, caring relationships between parents and children, and helps parents learn effective management strategies to deal with many childhood developmental and behavioural issues. It was originally developed by Matthew Sanders and colleagues at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia. Since then numerous evidence-based studies have shown that the program can alleviate parents’ stress and depression, and thus help prevent and reduce cases of child abuse and maltreatment (for example see Sanders et al., 2003; Prinz et al., 2009).

The program provides five different levels of support for families, as it is recognized that parents and families are not all the same in terms of needs. These different support levels range from a universal support level (level 1), which is largely media-based and provides general information for all parents, to mid-range support (levels 2, 3 and 4), which is provided through professionals already in contact with families, such as public health nurses, day care staff, general practitioners and home visitors, and incorporates tip sheets, parenting advice and

workshops. Level 5 support is clinical, and characterized by the provision of comprehensive support by clinical professionals to families facing more deep-rooted and difficult challenges.

In addition, there is Group Triple P. This consists of eight sessions conducted in groups of 10 to 12 parents, directed at families whose needs meet the criteria for level 4 support. The program includes one group session to provide an overview of the program and establish rapport with the group, followed by four group sessions of parent training, two home based consultations and a final group session (Turner et al., 2007: 430).

A randomized clinical trial of the Group Triple P Program for Australian Aboriginal families was conducted in 2002 (Turner et al., 2007: 430). This program was a culturally relevant parenting program modelled after the mainstream Group Triple P program, providing parenting support and parent education sessions. It took into consideration the specific cultural values, aspirations, traditions and needs of the Australian Aboriginal people. The program's fundamentals are centred on strengthening family, community and kinship connections, operating on the basis that these relationships are fundamental aspects of life, and strengthening them can lead to increased resilience in Aboriginal communities (Turner et al., 2007: 429-430).

The clinical trial was conducted at four different South-East Queensland community health sites in Brisbane which have high proportions of Aboriginal families with young children (Turner et al., 2007: 430). The study sites were also low-income areas, characterized by high rates of unemployment (Turner et al., 2007: 430). The children who participated in the trial were at risk of severe pathology (i.e. alienation, isolation, withdrawal), though they were not yet displaying it (Turner et al., 2007: 430). The participating families were those with a child between the ages of one and thirteen, of which the primary caregiver had expressed concerns about their child's behaviour, or their own parenting skills.

A repeated measures randomized group design methodology, that compared people receiving the intervention to a waitlist control group, was applied to evaluate the program's effectiveness. Families were randomly assigned—using a random number generator and consecutive case allocation—to either the programming group (n=26) or a waitlist control group (n=25)⁴⁷. The approach involved pre and post-intervention, as well as a six month follow-up of the intervention group. Of the 26 families who took part in the programming, 23 attended one or more sessions (88.5%) and 20 completed the post-program assessment questionnaires (77%) (Turner et al., 2007: 432-433). Of the 25 waitlist control group families, 18 completed the post-assessment (72%) (Turner et al., 2007: 433).

A variety of different questionnaires were used to evaluate the program's effectiveness, including the Eyberg Child Behaviour Inventory (a 36 item evaluation of parental perceptions of disruptive behaviour in children which assesses the frequency of disruptive behaviours), the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (a 25 item evaluation of parents' perceptions of pro-social and difficult behaviours in children which assesses the frequency of positive and negative behaviours), and the Parenting Scale (a 30 item questionnaire measuring dysfunctional discipline styles in parents and others).

Compared to the waitlist families (the control group), parents who attended Aboriginal Group Triple P experienced a significant decrease in the rate of problem child behaviour after the intervention—as indicated through parents responses on the survey questionnaires—which was a shift from the clinical range of child program behaviour into the non-clinical range (Turner et al., 2007: 436). Responses from the survey questionnaires also indicated that parents who received the programming relied less on dysfunctional parenting practices compared to the control waitlist

⁴⁷ Interest was expressed by 62 families; of these families, 51 completed a pre-assessment and entered the study (Turner et al., 2007: 432).

group (Turner et al., 2007: 436). Overall, the study provided significant empirical support for the effectiveness and acceptability of a culturally relevant approach to Group Triple P (Turner et al., 2007). It concluded that the outcomes of the trial made a compelling case for providing increased and appropriate services to Aboriginal families, and reducing barriers to accessing available services within the community (Turner et al., 2007).

Furthermore, in 2003, Sanders et al. reviewed all the evaluation research of the Triple P Programs which had been done since the first findings were published—a period from 1981 to 2003—and concluded that children participating in the program experienced fewer problems, were more cooperative, got along better with other children and were better behaved at school than peers who had not been involved with the program, and parents who participated in the Triple P program had greater confidence in their parenting ability, more positive attitudes toward their children and were less depressed and stressed by their parenting role than peers who had not participated in the program.

A variety of Triple P program support programs are now being implemented in a number of Aboriginal communities in Alberta and Manitoba. In Manitoba, they are provided through 'Healthy Child Manitoba' and were officially launched throughout the province in the fall of 2008. More details regarding this will be explored and outlined in the findings found in Chapter Six.

Warrior Spirit Walking Project

The next promising program described is the Youth Alliance Against Gang Violence Project, also known as the 'Warrior Spirit Walking Project' (WSW), which is part of the broader Prince Albert Outreach Program, a not-for-profit organization dedicated to addressing the needs

of high risk youth in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan. This project was funded through Canada's National Crime Prevention Centre for a period of four years, beginning in 2007.

This Warrior Spirit Walking Project is an evidence-based crime prevention program that increases protective factors and reduces risk factors for Aboriginal youth (males and females) aged 12 to 21 who are involved in gangs, as well as those at high risk of joining a gang (Totten and Dunn, 2010b: 5). The foundation of the program is based on Aboriginal scholar Dr. Martin Brokenleg's Circle of Courage model of reclaiming youth at risk (Brentro et al., 2002; Totten, 2009a: 144; Totten and Dunn, 2010b: 11). This model is itself based on Aboriginal traditional teachings and research stemming from child psychology and resilience research (Brentro et al., 2002). The key components of the model are rooted in the four central values found on the four points of the Medicine Wheel: belonging, mastery, independence and generosity⁴⁸ (Brentro, et al., 2002).

The primary aim of the Warrior Spirit Walking Project is to reduce Aboriginal youth gang membership, affiliation, and future affiliation for those at risk of joining, as well as to reduce gang related youth violence and crime (Totten and Dunn, 2010b). The project consists of seven programming components: a cultural school, presentation team, youth activity centre, van outreach, court outreach, counselling and mediation in schools and activity groups.

For example, the cultural school—staffed by four teachers, four counsellors and two Elders—is specifically designed to enable high-risk Aboriginal youth to complete high school training, earn high school credits, increase literary skills, increase life skills, receive employment training and engage in cultural activities and, thus, tackles risk factors which include poor school performance, learning difficulties and low attachment to school (Totten and Dunn, 2009b: 9, 57).

⁴⁸ This Circle of Courage model will be further explained in section 6.3 (a), as this model is the foundation and overall framework for the "Circle of Courage Program," which has been identified as a successful example of crime prevention in Winnipeg.

The presentation team, another major program activity, is a group of youth who are disengaged from gangs, and now act as mentors to the youth in program (Totten and Dunn, 2009b: 10). With staff supervision and support they educate youth about the dangers of youth violence, bullying and gang involvement through a variety of activities based on traditional cultural teachings, including school presentations, hip hop, rap, video production, the sharing of personal stories and recreational activities (Totten and Dunn, 2009b: 10). Thus, this component aims to tackle risk factors which include anti-social attitudes, aggression and violence, as well as low attachment to school (Totten and Dunn, 2009b: 57).

An evaluation report on this project for the period of November 2007 to October 2009 is available, and it shows very promising results (see Totten and Dunn, 2010b). Quantitative data analyses incorporating risk assessment surveys were used to assess outcomes of the project. These surveys provide results from the start state, and 6 month, 12 month and 18 month follow-ups. The initial entry point surveys and all the follow-up surveys were then compared to assess changes. The project has an ongoing intake process, meaning participants enter the project at different points in time (Totten and Dunn, 2010b: 21). Of the 133 youths who are currently in this program, 75 have been enrolled for 6 months, 26 for 12 months, and 13 for 18 months (Totten and Dunn, 2010b: 21).

The survey consisted of twelve basic questions, which sought to determine whether the youths felt the program had changed their attitudes and behaviours in a way that decreases their risk from, or involvement in, gang related activities (Totten and Dunn, 2010b: 37). To this point, key findings have shown that participants have achieved reductions in overall levels of risk. Given that this evaluation has only recorded findings for 18 months on a small sample size, only preliminary results are available. Initial findings include a significant increase in attachment to

teachers, with those who had been in the program for 18 months experiencing the highest increase (Totten and Dunn, 2010b: 39).

There was also a significant reduction in substance abuse among youth who had been in the program for 12 months, and a reduction of the youth's level of involvement in violent crime during the first six months of the program. Finally, youth were also found to be much more attached to the labour force, and there was a clear trend for youth to leave their gangs over time (Totten and Dunn, 2010b).

Regina Anti-Gang Services Project

The last promising example described is the 'Regina Anti-Gang Services Project' (RAGS). This is another evidence-based Aboriginal gang focused crime prevention program from Canada, which has a central objective of increasing protective factors and decreasing risk factors related to Aboriginal youth gang involvement. This program is delivered out of the North Central Community Association, which is a not-for-profit grass roots agency in Regina, Saskatchewan. It has been funded through Canada's National Crime Prevention Centre for a period of four years, beginning in 2008.

RAGS' core services are based on the Wraparound and Multi-Systemic Therapy evidence-based models (Totten, 2009a: 144). The Wraparound process model typically involves the engagement of the family and/or other individuals who are relevant to the well-being of the program participant, as well as service providers and program facilitators; together they develop a plan, implement the plan, then evaluate success outcomes over a period of time. Evaluations of this model showed that youth who received the Wraparound services were less likely to engage in at-risk and delinquent behaviour, less likely to recidivate, and serve less detention time

compared to those not engaged in the process (Carney and Buttell, 2003; Pullman et al., 2006). The Multi-Systemic Therapy model is a pragmatic and goal-oriented treatment model that targets intrapersonal (e.g. cognitive) and systemic (e.g. family, peer and school) factors that are known to be associated with adolescent antisocial behaviour (Borduin et al., 1995: 571). It focuses on enhancing parenting practices and relationships, increasing family support networks and decreasing association with deviant peer groups, through various therapy and treatment options. Once implemented, this model has been found to successfully prevent future criminal behaviour, including violent offending (Borduin et al., 1995).

The RAGS program targets Aboriginal youth and young adults aged 16 to 30, and engages the parents and partners of program participants, as well as key service providers and community partners (Totten and Dunn, 2009a: 7). The primary goal of the program is to reduce gang-related criminal activities committed by young Aboriginal gang members. Its main target group are youth who are either currently gang involved, or assessed to be at high risk for future involvement. For example, of the participants in this current program only three percent had never been gang involved, although they were assessed to be at high risk of gang involvement (Totten and Dunn, 2010a: 3).

The program engages participants in intensive daily services aimed at reducing their involvement in gang life, and facilitates exits from gangs through geographic relocation and support services. It utilizes a harm reduction model and a strength-based philosophy. Cultural and faith-based supports are also provided to participants. These include traditional Aboriginal circle practices, which have a focus on the mental, emotional, physical, and spiritual aspects of life. Participants who choose not to reconnect with their traditional Aboriginal culture are provided with other faith-based alternatives (Totten and Dunn, 2010a:7).

It has four core components: life skills programming for young men, a Circle Keeper program for young women, an outreach program to schools and institutions, and a gang exit strategy (Totten and Dunn, 2010a).

The life skills programming for young men component, for example, includes educational and skill based activities that incorporate medicine wheel teachings, values and beliefs, asset building, literacy, healthy relationship education, parenting and fathering education, problem solving, personal awareness, behaviour modification and life space crisis intervention (Totten and Dunn, 2009a: 7). Thus, this component tackles risk factors which include prior delinquency and criminal behaviour, anti-social attitudes, aggression and violence, and poor school performance and learning difficulties (Totten and Dunn, 2009a: 49-50).

Another core component of RAGS is the Circle Keeper program for young women, which focuses primarily on supporting exits from the sex-trade and gangs through education and life skills training (Totten and Dunn, 2009a: 7). The training concentrates on personal safety, addictions, family, parenting, employment, self-esteem, healthy relationships and literacy, and thus tackles risk factors which include prior delinquency and criminal behaviour, anti-social attitudes, aggression and violence, friends who are gang members and family violence. Ultimately, the RAGS program provides a very high degree of programming to its participants, with an average of 144 hours of programming for each of the 99 youths it served over a 20 month period (Totten and Dunn, 2010a: 3).

An evaluation report on this project for the period of March 2008 to November 2009 is available, and has shown very promising results (see Totten and Dunn, 2010a). To date, 106 evaluation surveys have been completed by program participants over four different periods during their participation in the program. These include an entry questionnaire (69 surveys), and

six month (26 surveys), 12 month (10 surveys) and 18 month (1 survey) follow-ups. The survey questions seek to measure the participant's attitudes and behaviours related to gang related crime, and the risk associated with involvement in such crimes and/or gang affiliation.

Overall, the evaluation shows that RAGS is having success supporting and maintaining exits from gangs. Given the declining response rate for the surveys, and the fact that this program is still undergoing evaluation, only general findings are available thus far. However, some preliminary results have demonstrated significant success, such as participants becoming more detached from gang-affiliation, decreases in substance abuse, declines in the beliefs which support violence and weapons, and decreases in violent and non-violent criminal behaviour (Totten and Dunn, 2010a). For example, in terms of detachment from gang-affiliation, a significant decrease was found from the time participants entered the program (entry questionnaire) to the six month follow-up, with gang affiliation declining for 58% of the participants. And by the 12 month follow-up gang affiliation had decreased for 78% of the participants (Totten and Dunn, 2010a: 46). Given the low participant rates, the equivalent percentage for the 18 month follow-up is not statistically significant. Finally, the evaluation concluded that among the participants who were in the program the longest, 67% were deemed 'high-risk' according to their survey results at intake, but after 12 months of participation this had declined to 25% for this same long-term group (Totten and Dunn, 2010a).

To conclude this section on preventing crime which affects Aboriginal people, it is evident that a growing/impressive body of risk-focused evaluations of general crime prevention exists. This evidence argues that tackling risk factors is both an effective and efficient way to achieve major reductions in crime (Hahn et al., 1994; Olds, et al., 1999; Schweinhart, 2005). Furthermore, a small but growing body of promising research evaluations are beginning to focus

on Aboriginal people. This growing body of “promising” evidence is summarized in Table 4 below and Table 5 provides a comparison of the programs to the risk factors from Chapter Two:

Table 4: Summary of Aboriginal Prevention Projects

Targeting Risk Factor Related to Crime: Substance Abuse		Targeting Child Abuse and Maltreatment	Targeting Gang Related Crime	
'Nemi'simk, Seeing Oneself Intervention'	Project Venture	Aboriginal Triple P	Warrior Spirit Walking (WSW) Project	Regina Anti-Gang Services (RAGS) Project
Early alcohol abuse intervention pilot tested with Aboriginal youth in 4 different schools in 2 Mi'Kmaq communities in N.S	Outdoor development program evaluated on grade 6 students from 2 schools in Gallup, N.M	Culturally relevant parent support and education program pilot tested with Aboriginal families in Australia	Aboriginal youth gang program evaluated with Aboriginal youth in Prince Albert, SK	Aboriginal youth gang program evaluated with Aboriginal youth in Regina, SK
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Targeted Mi'Kmaq youth with at-risk personality types: anxiety sensitivity, hopelessness, and sensation seeking ➤ Provided addictions and educational activities which were cognitively behavioural in nature and culturally relevant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Targeted at-risk Native American youth ➤ Provided classroom-based problem solving activities, skills-focused outdoor experiential activities, adventure camps and treks, and community-oriented service learning. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Targeted at-risk Aboriginal families (i.e., those struggling with child problem behaviour, those at-risk of child maltreatment) ➤ Provided culturally relevant education, training and support ➤ Improved access to local services and opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Targeted Aboriginal youth involved in gangs and those at high risk of joining a gang ➤ Provided 7 programming components: a cultural school, presentation team, youth activity centre, van outreach, court outreach, counselling and mediation in schools and activity groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Targeted Aboriginal youth involved in gangs and those at high risk of joining a gang ➤ Provided 4 core components: life skills programming for young men, a Circle Keeper program for young women, an outreach program to schools and institutions, and a gang exit strategy
<u>Evaluated impacts:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reduced overall binge drinking and alcohol related problems ✓ Impact on crime not evaluated 	<u>Evaluated impacts:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reduced alcohol usage and abuse (as compared to the control group) ✓ Impact on crime not evaluated 	<u>Evaluated impacts:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reduced rates of child problem behaviour ✓ Parents relied less on dysfunctional parenting practices 	<u>Evaluated impacts:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reduced involvement in violent crime ✓ Reduced use of substance abuse ✓ Increased attachment to labour force 	<u>Evaluated impacts:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reduced gang participation ✓ Decreased substance abuse ✓ Declined personal beliefs which support violence and weapons

				✓ Decreased violent/non-violent criminal behaviour
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Table 5: Aboriginal Prevention Programs vs. Risk Factors

Programs	Risk Factors Identified in Chapter Two																																		
	Individual Factors	Interpersonal Skills	Poor Social Skills	Aggressiveness	Dependence/Addictions	Substance Abuse and Addictions	Dependency	Mental Health	Poor Mental Health and Health Related Issues that go Untreated	Hopelessness	Social Factors	Families	Poor Child Rearing and Supervision	Family Violence and Crime	Single Parent Families	Dysfunctional, Disorganized, and Disconnected Families	Employment and Education	Low Education and Poor School Access and Involvement	Unemployment	Social Networks	Few Social Ties	Poor Peer Influences	Social Exclusion and Marginalization	Lacking Cultural Identity and Pride	Community	High Residential Mobility and Mobility Between Reserves and City	Overcrowded, Disorganized and Sub-Standard Living Conditions	Racism and Discrimination	Poverty						
‘Nemi’simk, Seeing Oneself Intervention’						✓				✓															✓										
Project Venture						✓																							✓						
Aboriginal Triple P																✓		✓		✓															
Warrior Spirit Walking Project				✓			✓		✓											✓								✓		✓					
Regina Anti-Gang Services Project		✓	✓				✓										✓	✓		✓			✓				✓	✓		✓					

This evolving and promising Aboriginal-focused prevention research also has identified many prevention activities similar to effective non-Aboriginal crime prevention research, including classroom-based problem solving activities, skills-focused educational activities, educational enhancement training, employment training, mentoring, parent/family involvement and education, healthy relationship education, parenting and fathering education, asset building, literacy instruction, problem solving education, personal awareness instruction, and cultural enhancement activities (Gilchrist et al., 1987; Schinke et al., 1988; Mushquash et al., 2007; Carter et al., 2007; Turner et al., 2007; Totten and Dunn, 2010).

One difference found between the general evidence and the Aboriginal evidence reviewed above, is the focus on culture and/or cultural appropriateness which were adapted into their program models. Meaning that all the Aboriginal programs reviewed utilized a culturally-relevant framework, or employed culturally relevant activities into their designs (Mushquash et al., 2007; Carter et al., 2007; Turner et al., 2007; Totten and Dunn, 2010). For example, The Nemi'simk, Seeing Oneself Intervention' incorporated traditional Mi'kmaq knowledge and teachings; Project Venture was grounded in Aboriginal culture and guided by Native-American traditional values; Aboriginal Group Triple P was a culturally adapted model based off of the mainstream program; the Warrior Spirit Walking Project was modeled off of key components found within the Aboriginal medicine wheel; and the Regina Anti-Gang Services Project' offered Aboriginal cultural based supports, in addition to faith-based alternatives for those not wanting to re-connect to their Aboriginal culture.

Aboriginal people have long argued that solutions which take their cultures into account have been more effective than "solutions" imposed by the majority culture (see Couture, 1987: 184; Poonwassie and Charter 2001: 69). Indeed, there is some research demonstrating that

cultural identity and tradition are important for healing communities.⁴⁹ For example, in an analysis of the variation in suicide rates across Aboriginal communities in British Columbia, Chandler and Lalonde (1998) found that communities which actively engage in preserving and restoring their own culture also experienced dramatically lower suicide rates.

Additionally, in an investigation of the process of adapting programs for Aboriginal youth, and an review of literature and research regarding Aboriginal youth violence prevention, Crooks, Chiodo and Thomas, (2009) found that in addition to the many universal risk and protective factors related to violence, there are also culturally specific protective factors, including: incorporating traditional culture, values and spirituality, access to community Elders, and a need for increased cultural emphasis on specific protective factors such as healthy families and strong community networks. When implementing Aboriginal specific prevention programming, Crooks, Chiodo and Thomas (2009: 7) argue that it is important to address these.

Furthermore, as the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal People (2003: 39) declared:

“Based on the evidence heard, we feel strongly that Aboriginal youth will be best served by culturally appropriate programs, provided by culturally appropriate organizations. The availability of such programs is especially important in urban areas, where youth are most apt to feel cut off from their families, traditions and culture”

⁴⁹ Rather than the alternative of possible further alienation and/or isolation, identity and tradition could be an essential element. This may also be the case with other cultures, for example, the Effective Black Parenting Program (EBPP) is a U.S a culturally sensitive program adapted to meet the needs of African American families. Incorporating Black culture, the program teaches general parenting strategies and deals with several topics, such as: racism, discrimination and prejudice, the strengths of Black families, and unique language and customs of African American people (Alvy, 2002). It has shown success in terms of significantly reducing parental rejection, along with improvements in the quality of family relationships and child behaviours. Furthermore, reductions in rejection and problematic behaviours (i.e., hyperactivity and withdrawn behaviour in boys and sexually problematic behaviours in girls) were demonstrated (Meyers et al., 1992).

The next section now explains a crime prevention implementation model which has been evolving in the crime prevention literature.

3.3 Implementing Collaborative Community Safety Strategies

This section discusses the growing body of knowledge that seeks to define a theory/model of how to apply risk factor reduction findings at the local city level. This evolving model is based on the notion that prevention efforts should be given equal weight alongside enforcement and treatment—thus, providing a highly integrative three-pronged approach combining prevention, treatment and enforcement.

In particular, much of evolving knowledge in regards to this crime prevention model suggests that in order to get results from tackling risk factors, such projects have to be implemented in a way that gets different orders of government, agencies and community people mobilized to execute initiatives that tackle one or more risk factors in a systematic way. This begins with a diagnosis of the crime challenges and risk factors facing a city, the formulation of a plan to tackle those crime challenges and risk factors, and a concerted effort to implement programs to address these risk factors, and finally, evaluation of the outcomes.

Many of the defining elements of a crime prevention implementation process/model have been outlined and described by numerous national and international organizations, including the World Health Organization (2002, 2004), the United Nations (2002), the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (Linden, 2000), the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (Shaw, 2001), as well as individual experts (Waller, 2006), including experts in the analysis of Aboriginal crime prevention (see Doone, 2000; Linden, 2001). Many of these organizations and


others describe similar defining elements necessary for effective crime prevention implementation, and support many of the same following themes:

- **A Permanent Responsibility Centre.** This would be a centre which acts as a leadership and coordination hub for all organizing efforts which would receive sustained funding (Agenda for Safer Cities, 1989: 7; Linden, 2001: 29). It would be led by a central figure, and be conducive to the population it is seeking to serve (i.e. an Aboriginal leader) (Waller et al., 1999: 66; Linden, 2000: 3). For example, the overseer might be someone in an existing regional leadership role, such as the Mayor (Linden, 2000: 3; Waller et al., 1999: 66; Waller, 2006).
- **The Mobilization and Coordination of Many Sectors and Partners.** The responsibility centre would require integrated, localized cross-sectoral coordination involving many agencies, sectors and partners in the city working together to address the multiple factors related to crime (Doone, 2000: 9; Linden, 2001: 29; Totten, 2009a:145). This would need to be backed by political support, the Mayor, police chief as well as the public. This would also include coordination and partnerships between those “working across ministries and between authorities, community organizations, non-governmental organizations, the business sector and private citizens” (UN Guidelines, 2002). And, as Linden (2001: 44) recommends, it should also include representatives of those who would be affected by any programming.
- **Safety Diagnosis of Problems.** This is the research stage, when the city would undergo a safety audit, using data from Statistics Canada, self-reporting surveys and emergency-room data, as well as community consultation. According to the WHO (2004: 21), this is essential because it creates a more accurate profile of the problem, and allows prevention efforts to be targeted at the areas and groups who appear to need it most.

- **The Development of an Action Plan.** This is the strategic planning stage, when the city would develop an action plan based on problems and gaps identified by the statistical data, and through analysis of crime problems unique to certain city neighbourhoods or regions.
- **Implementing the Action Plan.** This is the action stage, when the city—through the coordination and cooperation of the many organizations, sectors and people—would set targets, using knowledge of risk factors for the identified crime problems.
- **Monitoring and Evaluating the Action Plan.** This is the assessment stage, when an ongoing evaluation is conducted to determine whether changes in the initiatives and/or strategy need to be made, along with an impact evaluation to assess whether the strategy is producing the desired effects.

The figure 4 illustrates the interplay between components of the strategy:

Figure 4: Effective Implementation of Crime Prevention Initiatives



Source: Waller et al., (1999) and Waller (2006)

This model is based on a well-established framework in the field of public health (Johnson and Fraser, 2008: 3). The implementation framework has been applied to the field of crime prevention, by borrowing the public health primary foundation of the strategic planning process and its four basic components: diagnose, plan, implement and evaluate (Waller et al., 1999: 70; Linden, 2000: 14; Shaw, 2001: 22; Waller, 2006: 116; Johnson and Fraser, 2008: 3; Chambers et al., 2009: 56). This also usually entails public engagement, and includes public education with respect to prevention knowledge.

Much of the recently published research regarding this model has come from the Institute for the Prevention of Crime in its municipal crime prevention reports (See Johnson and Fraser, 2008; Janhevich et al., 2008), which describe how to best implement municipal-based crime prevention using similar defining elements as those identified above. Their final conclusions were based on in-depth consultations with members from 14 different Canadian municipalities, and information gathered through meetings between members of the municipalities (Janhevich et al., 2008).

Some of the prevention pilot projects undertaken in the past decade, non-Aboriginal and, more recently, Aboriginal projects, have utilized strategic planning as a key component to their implementation process (for example see Totten and Dunn, 2010). Furthermore, partnership approaches which engage many sectors, agencies and organizations, and involve Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, have been utilized in order to achieve meaningful and long-term outcomes to a series of urgent conditions and challenges that face many Aboriginal communities (for example see Finlay et al., 2009).

Mobilization of Neighbours and Collective Efficacy

Some of the first incarnations of organizing people to develop and address local crime problems can be observed in the work of sociologists at the University of Chicago from the 1920s to the 1940s. Some of the most notable sociologists of that time were involved including Shaw and McKay (1942) whose research on the influence of social conditions and neighbourhood characteristics on crime and disorder, concluded how communities are organized has a major influence on delinquent behaviour and various other social problems.⁵⁰

Later research in the 1990s presented similar notions advocating congresses organized around the problems experienced at local levels. One such proposal by Sampson et al. (1997), involves their concept of informal social control, what they termed “collective efficacy.” The authors define collective efficacy as social cohesion among neighbours, combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good. In 1995 Sampson et al. conducted a survey of 8,782 residents in 343 different neighbourhoods in Chicago, Illinois that showed that violence would be reduced if local people came together in order to tackle crime problems in their neighbourhoods. For example, instead of the police enforcing laws, they found that residents monitoring play groups of children, or intervening to prevent acts such as truancy and teenage loitering, was more effective in terms of crime prevention.

Hirschfield and Bowers (1997) investigated similar notions, examining the relationship between crime and levels of social cohesion within disadvantaged areas. By using two methods for delineating areas of disadvantage (geodemographic classifications and the Index of Local

⁵⁰ Shaw and McKay's research does not explain how many persons somehow avoid delinquency in high delinquency areas. Furthermore, the use of official court records used in their work lowers actually the percentage of recognized delinquency, when compared to other data sources of delinquency (Shoemaker, 1996). Although it is not realistic to expect a theory to explain all aspects of delinquency, this theory also lacks of specification of why delinquent rates are concentrated in certain areas of a city (Shoemaker, 1996). Furthermore, since this research was done in one specific geographical location, it is not generalizable to other locations. For example, in some countries, wealthy people live in the centre of cities and poor people live on the fringes.

Conditions which are the official deprivation measures from the British government), they found that levels of crime are significantly lower in disadvantaged areas which have high levels of social cohesion, and vice versa (Hirschfield and Bowers, 1997). They argue that the more a disadvantaged area economically pulls together as a community, the greater the chance they will have in tackling their local crime problems (Hirschfield and Bowers, 1997: 1292).

“Winning” Conditions

There have been several factors highlighted that might support greater use of these approaches discussed throughout this chapter. These factors stem from a growing consensus reached at number of meetings and publications involving intergovernmental agencies, networks of municipalities and others working on implementation.⁵¹ This consensus has stressed the importance of adequate and sustained funding, political leadership, support from the police chief, from city officials, and other key leaders in the city. For Winnipeg, a key leader might an Aboriginal leader given their increasing urban Aboriginal population and high proportions of crime affecting urban Aboriginal people in the city.

Human capacity and public engagement are also key features. The responsibility centre discussed above must be high on the institutional hierarchy, led by the police chief and mayor. It must have the human capacity to achieve outcomes. Outreach and engagement with the public is a key feature for sustainability. Finally, another essential “winning” condition noted is for a balanced approach to reducing crime. This balanced approach will now be outlined more extensively.

⁵¹ For example, see The California City Gang Prevention Network and irvinwaller.org

Three-Pronged Approach: Prevention, Treatment and Enforcement

The emerging model of risk-based crime prevention implementation is based on the notion that prevention efforts should be given equal weight alongside enforcement and treatment—thus, providing a highly integrative three-pronged approach combining prevention, treatment and enforcement.

This argument has stemmed from research which identified these three components working together as being successful in crime reduction efforts. Some commonly cited research evaluations incorporating an approach encompassing these components include: The Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence, The National Institute of Justice Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative, The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy, and The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project. The selection criteria for these projects which are being reviewed were based on whether they utilized an implementation model similar to what was described above, and at the same time utilized a combination of prevention, treatment and/or enforcement activities. Given that these projects were found to have these features they were selected for review. Furthermore, they are the commonly cited projects by crime prevention researchers (for e.g. see Waller, 2006). These projects will now be briefly described in order to provide the research base for which this approach stems from.

The Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence

The first strategy to be described is the Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence.⁵² This strategy was implemented in Boston in response to the epidemic of youth homicides in the

⁵² Given that Aboriginal peoples are more likely than non-Aboriginal people to experience violent victimization as well as to be offenders of violent crime more so than non-Aboriginal people (Perreault, 2011:Public Safety Canada Portfolio Statistics Committee, 2010) this model of effective prevention is especially even more fitting for review.

late 1980's and early 1990's (Kennedy, 1998). This Boston Strategy included a series of initiatives which were implemented as a result of this epidemic.

One of these initiatives included the implementation of "The Youth Violence Strike Force." This was created by the Boston Police Department and involved the creation of an elite youth violence prevention unit. This unit included Boston Police Department detectives and patrol officers who worked closely with front-line practitioners from agencies such as the state police, probation, parole, and youth services (Kennedy, 1998). With the coordination of these people and agencies they focused their enforcement powers to target youth violence; however, they maintained an equal commitment to prevention activities. Prevention activities included helping at risk youth get connected to appropriate social services. It also involved the creation of a Summer of Opportunity youth employment program. The Youth Violence Strike Force also initiated prevention-oriented law enforcement, this involved strengthening relationships between probation and police so that gang related information could be easily shared between these two agencies (Kennedy, 1998).

Another initiative implemented under the Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence, included "Operation Night Light." This is a community program which involved a partnership between probation officers and The Youth Violence Strike Force. It pairs one probation officer with two police officers, and involved these teams making unannounced visits to the homes, schools, and workplaces of high-risk youth probationers during non-traditional hours (7pm to 12 midnight). On these visits they would conduct curfew checks and the enforcement of other probation restrictions (Kennedy, 1998).

Another initiative implemented under the Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence, included The Boston Gun Project. This was a problem-oriented policing initiative aimed at

reducing homicide victimization among youth aged 24 and under (Braga et al., 2001:198). This initiative began with: (1) the assembling of the working group. This group included police, researchers from Harvard University, and frontline practitioners from a variety of agencies; (2) the application of qualitative and quantitative research techniques in order to assess what was driving youth violence in Boston; (3) the creation of an intervention designed to have a considerable impact on youth homicide; (4) the implementation and adaptation of the intervention; and (5) an impact evaluation (Braga et al., 2001:198).

The analysis of the issue showed that the root of the problem was stemming from a few neighbourhoods, involving gang members who were chronic offenders and who had easy access to guns. Based on the working group's findings, a strategy was implemented. This strategy was termed the "Operation Ceasefire" Intervention⁵³. Operation Ceasefire included two main elements. First was a direct law-enforcement attack on illicit firearm traffickers who were supplying guns, and second was a "pulling levels" deterrence strategy, which involved telling offenders that any violence would be met with swift and certain law enforcement action (Braga et al., 2001:199).

The Operation Ceasefire component of the Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence underwent an impact evaluation. Given that Operation Ceasefire was targeted to all areas in Boston experiencing a serious youth violence problem, there were no control areas (or control gangs) (Braga et al., 2001:202). Thus, it followed a basic one-group time-series design (Braga et al., 2001:202). This is in addition to a non-randomized quasi-experiment to contrast youth homicide trends in Boston to youth homicide trends in other large U.S cities (Braga et al., 2001:202).

⁵³ Operation Ceasefire has also been implemented in Los Angeles, Chicago and Sacramento.

The basic one-group time series analysis utilized homicide data provided by the Boston Police Department's Office of Research and Analysis. The outcome variable in the assessment was the monthly number of homicide victims aged 24 and younger (Braga et al., 2001:203). Monthly counts of youth homicides in Boston from January 1, 1991 to May 31, 1998 were collected.

Given that Operation Ceasefire also sought to reduce other forms of nonfatal serious violence, their evaluation also examined monthly counts of citywide shots-fired citizen calls for service data, as well as official gun incident report data for the city (Braga et al., 2001:203). This data was examined for the time period: January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1997 (Braga et al., 2001:203).

In order to measure trends across cities, thirty-nine (39)⁵⁴ of the largest U.S cities were selected.⁵⁵ Monthly counts of the number of homicide victims were collected on all of these cities identified from January 1991 to December 1997 (Braga et al., 2001: 210).

Results from the basic one-group time series analysis revealed a 63 percent decrease in the monthly number of youth homicides in Boston. A statistically significant decrease in the number of citywide gun assault incidents, citywide shots-fired calls for service, as well as youth gun assaults in district B-2 (an area with a very dense population of gangs; 29 of the 61 identified gangs had turf in this area) was also found (Braga et al., 2001:203, 207). The examination of homicide trends across cities showed that Boston had a significant decrease in youth homicide,

⁵⁴ Forty-one (41) were originally selected but 2 cities were excluded because of missing data (Washington and New Orleans) (Braga et al., 2001: 210).

⁵⁵ Boston was ranked 20th in population size of these 41 cities (Braga et al., 2001: 209).

when comparing trends in other large cities, and therefore, this decrease did not seem to be due to a national trend⁵⁶ (Braga et al., 2001:203, 213).

The National Institute of Justice Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative

Based on the successes of Boston's "Operation Ceasefire" (described above), in 1998, the U.S. department of Justice launched the Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) (Roehl et al., 2006). SACSI was implemented in ten U.S cities which were experiencing high rates of violent crime. It was implemented and evaluated in two phases. Phase One took place in 1998 and included: Indianapolis, Memphis, New Haven, Portland, and Winston-Salem (Roehl et al., 2006: 1). Phase Two took place in 2000 and included: Albuquerque, Atlanta, Detroit, Rochester, and St. Louis (Roehl et al., 2006: 1). All of the sites, except for Memphis, targeted homicide and other serious violent crimes, and had a major emphasis on firearms. In Memphis the focus was centered on reducing rape and other sexual assaults.

Similar to the Boston Strategy, this initiative involved a collaborative, data-driven problem solving process. It incorporated community policing, problem-oriented policing, practitioner-researcher partnerships, and included the U.S. Attorney's Offices' leadership in strategic planning. The U.S Attorney's offices took the lead on each local project.

SACSI followed five major stages (and/or problem solving model): (1) an interagency working group was formed, which included a core group of local decision makers and researchers; (2) information about the local crime problems were gathered; (3) once the problem was specifically defined, a strategic intervention to tackle the problem was created; (4) the

⁵⁶ A direct correlation to Operation Ceasefire, in terms of having an impact on crime trends cannot be determined, as changes in crime trends could have been influenced by a myriad of factors, and may not be attributed to simply Operation Ceasefire alone.

intervention was implemented, which, like Boston, this SACSI initiative utilized the “pulling levers” deterrence strategy, which involved telling offenders that any violence would be met with swift and certain law enforcement action; (5) the strategy was then assessed and modified as according to the effects shown by the data (Coleman et al., 1999: 18).

Working groups assisted in the implementation of strategies, and a strategic plan guided enforcement, suppression, intervention and prevention strategies (Roehl et al., 2006: 1). Half of the SACSI core working groups consisted of law enforcement and criminal justice agency representatives, and the other half consisted of more broad based groups, including non-profits, schools, faith based organizations, social service agencies and other agencies in the city⁵⁷ (Roehl et al., 2006: 8).

Probation officers played a key role in prevention/intervention/enforcement strategies. Probation officers were often paired with police officers and were key players in the “pulling levers” deterrence strategy. They were also key players in prevention implementation, and were the primary resources for job referrals, job training and other preventative related assistance (Roehl et al., 2006: 12). Prevention strategies were also provided in partnership by social service agencies, coalitions of churches, other faith based organizations, and community organizations. Prevention/intervention strategies also included: substance abuse treatment, GED assistance, mentoring, family based services, after-school activities, and a school-based rape prevention program in Memphis (Roehl et al., 2006: 13).

Impacts of crime reduction were evaluated at all sites. Impacts were evaluated based on UCR data. Violent crime trends were examined. Comparisons were drawn between national crime trends, regional crime trends, and trends in non-SACSI cities. Thus, there were no control

⁵⁷ Those sites (Portland, Memphis, Winston-Salem, and St. Louis) which had core groups consisting of more broad based agencies were found to have larger decreases in targeted crimes (Roehl et al., 2006: 8).

groups. However, given that Memphis targeted rape and sexual assault, rather than violent crimes and/or homicides like the other sites, it served as a comparison group for the other nine SACSI sites (Roehl et al., 2006: 5).

Results demonstrated that homicide and violent crime in Memphis (the site targeting rape and sexual assault) declined in the mid-1990s to 1999, and then began to rise again after the implementation of SACSI (Roehl et al., 2006: 5). The targeted crimes (rape and sexual assault) in Memphis peaked in 1998 and rapidly declined after the start of SACSI (as based on UCR rape rates) (Roehl et al., 2006: 5).

The national assessment compared crime rates for each SACSI site to similarly sized cities (both in terms of population size as well as being geographically similar) (Roehl, et al., 2006: 5). In terms of this national assessment, it was found that, of the nine cities which were targeting violent crime, six had substantially larger decreases in homicide as compared to their comparison cities (Roehl et al., 2006: 5). In two cases, the comparison cities showed larger decreases in crime as compared to the SACSI sites (Roehl et al., 2006: 5). There was also one SACSI site which had an increase in homicides, while the comparison cities showed steady trends in homicides (Roehl et al., 2006: 5).

In terms of the nine SACSI sites which targeted violent crime, five of those sites had substantial decreases in violent crimes as compared to their comparison sites (Roehl, et al., 2006: 5). Two sites were found to follow roughly the same trends when comparing them to their comparison sites (Roehl et al., 2006: 5). In the other two sites, it was found that the comparison sites had larger decreases as compared to the SACSI sites (Roehl et al., 2006: 5-6).

Ultimately, results found that when the SACSI approach was implemented strongly, it was associated with reductions in violent crime in a community, up to 50 percent for some communities (Roehl et al., 2006: 2).

The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy

The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) commenced in April 1993, and due to lack of funding, in 2002 Chicago began to receive “the bottom-line measure of a city’s commitment to community policing” (Skogan et al., 2002: 1). However, when the initiative was underway, it operated as a community policing initiative. This was a community policing initiative where in which officers were expected to move beyond the traditional policing model, which relied heavily on a reactive approach to crime, such as responding to calls for service, to instead, a more proactive model which encompassed a more preventative perspective towards a series of crime related problems (Skogan et al., 2002: 4).

A problem solving model, similar to the SACSI approach described above was used. This involved: (1) the identification and prioritization of problems; (2) the analysis of such problems; (3) the designing of response strategies; (4) the implementation of response strategies; (5) and finally, the assessment of the success of the response strategies (Skogan et al., 2002: 4).

In order to solve problems which were identified, the authority and accountability of the police was shifted to one where the officers were expected to become more familiarized with the communities they were working in (Skogan et al., 2002: 4). To do this, police districts were divided into 279 beats, 270 of which were residential (Skogan et al., 2002: 4). Each beat had nine or ten officers assigned to it and had a sergeant managing it (Skogan et al., 2002: 4-5). The sergeants also led quarterly meetings that brought together all of the officers. When the beat

teams were out in the neighbourhoods they developed trust and partnerships with residents (Skogan et al., 2002: 5).

Although the beat teams were supposed to focus more time in developing trust and partnerships with neighbourhood residents; they ultimately still had to respond to calls for service (Skogan et al., 2002: 5). Yet, officers were mandated to give special consideration to residents and their neighbourhood's particular problems, and it was mandatory for officers to have knowledge about their beat area. This included having knowledge of where the hot spots were, what the crime trends were, and what community resources were available to residents (Skogan et al., 2002: 5).

Community involvement was another key focus of this Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy. Community meetings with the beat teams were held in places such as church basements and park buildings in the city (Skogan et al., 2002: 8). They would include the participation of neighbourhood residents, police from the neighbourhood beat, including the beat sergeant, beat officers on duty and a few beat members from other shifts (Skogan et al., 2002: 8). These meetings sought to provide a link between residents and police. Another purpose of these meetings was to serve as a forum for exchanging information and developing priorities based on the analysis of crime problems (Skogan et al., 2002: 8). This assisted in getting residents organizing their own problem-solving plans and efforts.

Impacts of the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) were evaluated. Some key findings from this evaluation will be highlighted. When the program grew to encompass the entire city, citywide public opinion surveys were conducted every year from 1993 to 2001 (except for 2000) (Skogan et al., 2002: 17-18). Surveys included questions about police fairness, politeness, helpfulness, and personal concern shown by the police, these questions were

combined to form a police demeanour index (Skogan et al., 2002: 17). The survey also included questions about how effective the police were at preventing crime, helping victims, and maintaining order, these questions were combined to form a task performance index. (Skogan et al., 2002: 17). Survey questions also included how well police dealt with problems that residents were concerned about, how well they worked with residents to resolve these problems, and how well they responded to community concerns, these questions were combined to form a responsiveness index (Skogan et al., 2002: 17).

Trends from these responses, based on these three measures showed that police averaged a positive score at the outset on the police demeanour index, thus not leaving much room for improvement. The demeanour index only rose from 67 percent to 75 from 1993 to 1999 (Skogan et al., 2002: 18). However, the responsiveness and performance index witnessed larger increases. The responsiveness index rose from 38 to 52 percent from 1993 to 1999 (Skogan et al., 2002: 18). The task performance index rose from 37 to 48 percent from 1993 to 1999 (Skogan et al., 2002: 18).

These three measures of police service quality were also combined and then compared among three racial groups: Whites, Latinos and Blacks (Skogan et al., 2002: 19). This was done because another related goal of CAPS was to improve police relations with ethnic minorities, especially with their growing Latino population (Skogan et al., 2002: 18). Overall, it was found that from 1993 to 1999 there were overall improvements for all racial groups. Among Whites, police service quality rose from 51 to 61 percent from 1993 to 1999 (Skogan et al., 2002: 19). Among Latinos it rose from 31 to 46 percent (Skogan et al., 2002: 19). Among Blacks it rose from 24 percent to 40 percent (Skogan et al., 2002: 19).

Perceptions of police in Chicago were also compared with these in other U.S. cities. Statistics from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which surveyed residents in 12 large and mid-sized cities about their views of the quality of police service and police community oriented programs serving their neighbourhoods, were utilized for this comparison (Skogan et al., 2002: 20). The results from this survey actually found that residents of Chicago still ranked their police very low in terms of overall police satisfaction (Skogan et al., 2002: 20). Only 16 percent of the city's residents expressed that they were "very satisfied" with their neighbourhood police (Skogan et al., 2002: 20). In comparison, most other cities had above 20 percent, with up to 31 percent of respondents expressing that they were "very satisfied" with their neighbourhood police (Skogan et al., 2002: 20). Chicago actually scored second worst in terms of overall satisfaction of police services (Skogan et al., 2002: 20).

Another evaluation component explored the relationship between CAPS and recorded crime trends⁵⁸ (Skogan et al., 2002: 20). Using police recorded crime rates; crime trends in Chicago were first examined. Major declines were found with robbery, which was found to decline by 56 percent from 1991 to 2000 (Skogan et al., 2002: 20). Auto theft was also found to decline by 37 percent, rape by 44 percent, and murder by 32 percent during that same period (from 1991 to 2000) (Skogan et al., 2002: 20).

Finally, trends in recorded crime by race were also examined. The 270 residential police beats were divided into areas where specific racial groups predominated. There were 71 predominately white areas (Skogan et al., 2002: 22). There were 121 highly populated black areas (Skogan et al., 2002: 22). There were 32 highly populated Latino areas (Skogan et al., 2002: 22). There were 46 diverse areas (Skogan et al., 2002: 22). Overall results showed that

⁵⁸ A direct correlation to CAPS, in terms of having an impact on crime trends cannot be determined, as changes in crime trends could have been influenced by a myriad of factors, and may not be attributed to simply CAPS alone.

crimes rates decreased in all areas for all crimes examined: auto theft, burglary, murder and robbery (Skogan et al., 2002: 22). However, the most dramatic decreases were found in Black communities (Skogan et al., 2002: 22). Crimes rates were found to decline the least in the white areas, where the rates were lower at the outset as compared to the other areas (Skogan et al., 2002: 22).

The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project

The last example is The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project. This was a strategy focused on preventing neighbourhood burglaries in Kikholt. Kirkholt is an estate located in Rochdale, U.K. In 1984, (before the implementation of the project) rates of recorded domestic burglary on the estate were over double the rate of all burglaries, reported and unreported, as according to the 1984 British Crime Survey (as cited by Forrester et al., 1988: 2).

Similar to SACSI and CAPS, the Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project used a problem solving method. This included conducting a thorough diagnosis of the crime issue, and how to tackle it was researched and examined before the strategy was implemented. The project also adopted a multi-sector approach, and mobilized many sectors and organizations, including the police, who provided support in referring burglary victims to a victim support scheme. The local housing authority assisted with the implementation of tightened security measures. Some neighbourhood members got together to form a “cocoon” neighbourhood watch. A local victim support organization provided support to victims, among others. Finally, this was all followed by an evaluation.

There were also two phases of the Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project, with Phase One covering the period of January 1986 to September 1987, and Phase Two continuing up to March

1990 (Forrester et al., 1990: 1). Phase One set in motion the fundamentals of the strategy and will be outlined below.

First, an extensive diagnosis was completed. This involved interviewing burglars, victims and neighbours of victims. Between January 1st and June 30th 1986 all burglars convicted and sentenced by the Rochdale police were sought out for interviewing (Forrester et al., 1988: 2). Seventy-seven percent of those offenders who were identified were interviewed, which included a total of 77 offenders (Forrester et al., 1988: 2). Of these 77, 15 had committed a burglary in Kirkholt (Forrester et al., 1988: 2). Survey questionnaires administered by probation officers were used to gather data, about the burglaries committed including the following: distance of the burglary from home; modes of transportation used; reasons for choosing the house they burgled; day, time, circumstance of the offence; degree of premeditation; knowledge of the house burgled; planning, reasons and motives etc. (Forrester et al., 1988: 2).

Victims of burglaries which happened between January 1st and June 30th 1986 were also sought out for interviews (and their neighbours) (Forrester et al., 1988: 4). Six to eight weeks after the victimizations were when the interviews took place (Forrester et al., 1988: 4). A total of 305 relevant offences were reported to the police during this period in Kirkholt, and of these, 237 people (76 percent) who experienced victimization as a result were interviewed (Forrester et al., 1988: 4). Information sought through these interviews included: the visibility of the burglars point of entry, a detailed record of the burglar's activities, including movement and action in the dwelling, levels of security hardware in use, insurance details, views on police response, views on the solvability of the crime and recovery of the stolen property, practical problems following victimization, suggestions on how to reduce crime, and willingness to participate in prevention

activities etc. (Forrester et al., 1988: 5). Neighbours were also interviewed, this provided for a comparison between similarly situated houses and similar houses in general, and the differences between those burgled and not burgled (Forrester et al., 1988: 5).

With the extensive knowledge derived from the diagnosis, a plan of action was created. This included a combination of reactive, after-the-fact initiatives, preventative initiatives and intervention initiatives. Some of these initiatives which were part of the action plan included the replacement of pre-payment fuel meters, as they were identified through the analysis as a major target. Improved security, which involved upgrading hardware like window locks etc. was also conducted

A community support team was formed (Forrester et al., 1988: 16). This was a small team made up of eleven community ‘self-help’ workers (Forrester et al., 1988: 16). The primary role of these workers was to visit victims of burglaries, provide them with support and connect them with suitable services (Forrester et al., 1988: 16). The second role of the ‘self-help’ workers team was to take over the security surveys previously conducted, as well as too coordinate neighbours in the formation of a “cocoon” neighbourhood watch (Forrester et al., 1988: 17).

The purpose of the “cocoon” neighbourhood watch was to have close groupings of dwellings share information and support each other (Forrester et al., 1988: 17). They would essentially look out for each other and report any suspicious activity. It also involved neighbours coming together for meetings at the local community centre (Forrester et al., 1988: 17).

Finally, an evaluation was completed. Using data from police records, burglary trends in and around Kirkholt were examined.⁵⁹ It was found that with the implementation of Phase One (1986) burglary fell from 316 in 1986 to 417 in 1987 (comparing January to September each year) (Forrester et al., 1988: 19). In contrast, data for the rest of the sub-divisions in Rochdale showed a slight upward trend in burglaries (Forrester et al., 1988: 19). Ultimately, the rate of burglary fell to 40 percent of its pre-initiative level within five months of the start of the program (Forrester et al., 1988: 19).⁶⁰

Conclusion

This section explained a crime prevention implementation model which has been evolving within the crime prevention literature. This model suggested that when risk factors are tackled in a specific manner—guided by a responsibility centre and multi-sector strategy (diagnosis, plan, implementation and evaluation)—crime can be reduced.

Local city-level crime reduction projects which utilized a similar implementation model, and at the same time utilized a three pronged approach combining of prevention, treatment and/or enforcement activities were reviewed. These examples brought forth the research base for which this three-pronged approach is largely based on.

⁵⁹ A direct correlation to the Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project, in terms of having an impact on crime trends cannot be determined, as changes in crime trends could have been influenced by a myriad of factors, and may be attributed to simply, Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project alone.

⁶⁰ The number of repeat victimizations was also measured. This was measured by counting the total number of burglary victims in each month during 1986 and 1987 (Forrester et al., 1988: 21). For every monthly total, those people who had been burgled previously during the calendar year were identified (Forrester et al., 1988: 21). This number was then expressed as a proportion of the total victims for that month (Forrester et al., 1988: 21). This analysis showed that repeat victimizations fell to zero within five months over the same period (Forrester et al., 1988: 22-24).


The final section of this chapter now provides an outline of the literature regarding the cost effectiveness of crime prevention, and the degree to which Canada invests in this prevention is outlined.

3.4 Cost Effectiveness and Investment in Prevention

The argument that funding be allocated to crime prevention in order to more efficiently and effectively achieve reductions in crime has been advanced in much of the crime prevention literature (Greenwood et al., 1996; Waller and Welsh, 1999; Waller, 2006; Totten, 2009a). The proposals are based on a large body of evidence which demonstrates that reducing crime through prevention is not only more effective in terms of reducing crime, but also more cost effective compared to reactive measures which come into play when the problem happens, rather than getting to the causes before it happens (Greenwood et al., 1996; Waller and Welsh, 1999; Waller, 2006).

This is demonstrated in Table 6 below, which shows the high relative costs of prison and probation (both reactionary responses), compared with parent training and graduation incentives for youth to complete school (both preventative measures), in order to achieve a 10% reduction in crime. A \$228 dollar increase in tax dollars per household would be needed if prison is used to reduce crime and \$118 per household if probation or delinquent supervision is used, compared to \$48 dollars per household to pay for parent training or \$32 per household to pay for graduation incentives for youth (Greenwood et al., 1996; Waller and Welsh, 1999: 213 Waller, 2006: 33).

Table 6: Increases in Taxes for a Ten Percent Reduction in Crime



Source: Waller (2006: 33)

However, rather than increasing taxes, crime prevention researchers and other advocates have suggested getting the funding for crime prevention from the existing criminal justice budgets through a process of reallocation (i.e. from the police, courts and/or corrections budgets) (Horner, 1993; Waller and Welsh, 1999: 219; Waller, 2006: 126). For example, in Canada in 1993 the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, also known as the Horner Committee, evaluated the research available at the time and made several recommendations to reduce crime through prevention. One of these was that within five years at least five percent of the federal criminal justice budget should be re-directed toward crime prevention efforts and that should increase to a further five percent after another five years (Horner, 1993).

However, existing literature also shows that the primary modes of crime control (namely, police, courts, and corrections) have continued to follow increased trends in government

spending, while other methods, such as, crime prevention receive much less in the way of meaningful fiscal support (Waller, 2006).

However, Canada does have a National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC), that allocates monies for pilot crime prevention programs throughout the country, some of which are Aboriginal-focused.

During the NCPC's first three years of operation (1998-2000) it received \$32 million per year as its total operating budget (Monchalin, 2009). It now receives \$70 million per year, more than double its original allocation. When comparing this \$70 million to the amounts allocated to federal expenditures of the criminal justice system, and to the criminal justice system as a whole, it is actually quite minimal. This \$70 million is equivalent to 1.1% of the federal expenditures on criminal justice, which is estimated to be about \$6.18 billion. This includes \$3 billion to federal policing and other RCMP expenditures in 2010 (Burczycka, 2010:19), \$2.28 billion to corrections in 2008/2009 (Public Safety Canada Portfolio Corrections Statistics Committee, 2010: 21), and \$90 million to the courts in 2000/2001 (Taylor-Butts, 2002: 7).

3.5 Towards a Theory of Implementation of Risk-Focused Crime Prevention

Simply put, a theory is an explanation for how two or more events are related to each other. They provide an explanation for the way things are. Theories are tools to help understand and explain a wide array of things in the world in which we live. In criminology, they typically assist in the understanding of crime, criminals, victims, and/or the criminal justice system (Williams and McShane, 1988; Linden, 2009a; Gabor, 2010). Theories can be both concrete and abstract. They can be based on intuition (built on one's personal perspective), or based on empirical knowledge (testing/science). In criminology, a theory that can be tested, and which

best fits with evidence of research, is typically considered to be the most credible (Williams and McShane, 1988: 3). Thus, a credible theory generally reflects systematic observation and/or careful logic (Williams and McShane, 1988: 3).

A theory may attempt to describe and clarify crime in terms of broad social structures or areas (macrotheories), or a theory can try to describe crime at an individual or smaller unit level (microtheories). Macrotheories are broad in scope and are best characterized as those which explain social structure and its effects (Williams and McShane, 1988: 4). They explain the “big picture” of crime. They provide a picture of how the world operates, fit the structure of society into that picture, and suggest how crime is related to that structure (Williams and McShane, 1988: 4). Microtheories focus on how specific groups or individual people may become criminal (etiology). They attempt to explain why some individuals are more likely than others to commit crime.

Beyond a brief outline and description of how colonialism and colonization has played a part in contributing to crime affecting Aboriginal people, any broader social explanation for crime was not extensively investigated in this thesis. Chapter Two provides links between risk factors and Merton’s (1938) theory of “anomie”, Shaw and McKay’s (1942) theory of Social Disorganization, and Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) Differential Opportunity theory, but that is the full scope of macrotheory consideration. The main goals of this thesis were not to theorize about broad social explanations for crime.

Rather, in terms of theory, this thesis primarily invoked microtheories for crime causation. The review of literature provided a framework which describes how to reduce crime affecting Aboriginal people through tackling risk factors (risk-focused prevention). A model for

how to implement that knowledge based on risk factors was also explained. The risk-focused approach to prevention is based on a large body of empirical research.

The second element of the framework which has been illustrated is the crime prevention implementation model. This implementation model has more recently been evolving throughout the crime prevention literature and the experts reached a consensus in regards to this model. The literature review made a concerted effort to bring together an empirical foundation for this implementation model. Its overlap with a public health approach was outlined, research based on the mobilization of neighbors and collective efficacy was explained, and a number of evidence-based projects which were successful in reducing crime while utilizing such a model were outlined.

Given that the risk-focused prevention perspective has already been developed and built up around a large body of empirical knowledge (randomized controlled trials and longitudinal evidence), there was no need to re-test empirical grounds for this theory. In terms of the crime prevention implementation model, it seems to be coming together as a theory to explain how to implement risk-focused crime prevention. However, it has yet to be tested and is still in early stages of development. Given that it is a relatively new and innovative model for how to expand on the existing empirical theory (risk-focused prevention); the testing of whether its elements are actually being implemented in a specific city was a goal of this thesis.

This thesis sought to test whether elements of the crime prevention model were in existence and whether elements of risk factors and programs were in existence. Therefore, this thesis did not question empirical basis of particular theories, but rather, this thesis sought to advance, further develop, and progress the body of literature in relation to these theories—by examining whether elements of them actually exist in practice. This is especially innovative in

relation to the crime prevention model, given that it is still coming together as a theory within crime prevention literature and practice. The examination of whether this model was being implemented in a Canadian city serves to advance knowledge and research regarding this model.

Furthermore, for the first time, this specific crime prevention research and theory has also been applied to a Canadian Aboriginal population. When reviewing the literature on Aboriginal peoples and crime (see Chapter Two), it becomes clear that focus in this area has been lent to discussions primarily focused on reducing punitiveness by tinkering with laws, basically changing the current standard system of criminal justice (policing, corrections, and/or courts) in order to reduce the amount of Aboriginal people entering the criminal justice system. Very little criminological research has looked at how to reduce crime affecting an Aboriginal population through an examination of recent crime prevention research as this thesis does.

Furthermore, this thesis represents the first time elements of risk-focused crime prevention research, as well as this new implementation model, has been tested for existence in a city, while at the same time applying a specific focus on crime prevention directed at a Canadian urban Aboriginal population.

Finally, there is a large body of contemporary criminology literature which focuses on the importance of risk, risk assessment, and risk management. For example, Feely and Simon (1992) are a part of this large body of literature. They put forth a perspective on what they term the “new penology” of crime control which examines implications of developing categories based on assessments of degrees of risk to manage populations deemed to be problematic.

This is in contrast to what this thesis is examining. The risk-focused approaches which this thesis is examining are not equivalent to the “new penology” (or to this other related contemporary criminological literature). Instead, the risk-focused approach in which this thesis

is invoking is a “positive” remedial approach that contrasts with this “negative” management emphasis of the “new penology” logic.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter began by showing the limitations of over-reliance on reactive measures of control crime (policing, corrections, courts or restorative approaches). The overarching argument is that further investment in these reactive strategies is unlikely to make any major differences to the levels of crime affecting Aboriginal people.

A large body of crime prevention evidence is in existence, including evidence derived from rigorous social scientific evaluations of projects. Results from these projects suggest that if risk factors related to crime (such as those outlined in Chapter Two) are tackled, crime can be reduced.

Furthermore, a small but growing body of Aboriginal risk focused crime prevention evidence is evolving, demonstrating that when risk factors related to Aboriginal people’s victimization and offending are tackled in a relevant manner, there are promising results in terms of crime reduction.

Intergovernmental agencies, networks of municipalities and others working on implementation identify that when risk factors are tackled in a specific manner—guided by a responsibility centre (involving multi-sector localized coordinated action from schools, housing, social services, police and families) and a city-wide strategic plan which identifies and addresses gaps—it could serve as an effective way to implement prevention.

For this to happen, a number of other “winning” conditions must be met. These include adequate and sustained funding, political leadership, support from the police chief and mayor,

human capacity and public engagement. It also emphasised a local level three-pronged or balanced approach to crime reduction (combining prevention, treatment and enforcement).

The argument of cost effectiveness in regards to crime prevention was explained. Little money is allocated to crime prevention in Canada, especially when compared to reactionary responses, such as police, court and corrections budgets.

Ultimately, what is missing from the literature is research showing how, and to what extent, this type of knowledge is actually implemented and used in practice. No studies, until now, had examined the actual execution and implementation of a city's crime prevention strategies which are seeking to reduce crime involving Aboriginal people as offenders and/or victims.

Chapter Four: Research Methods

The purpose of this section is to outline the research methods that were used. It begins by presenting the major and minor research questions, followed by the research design (case study), the methods of analysis, the ethical safeguards and, finally, the overall limitations.

4.1 Research Questions

In the past two decades criminological research in the field of risk focused crime prevention has tended to fall into two predominant categories: (1) research inquiries directed at identifying risk factors and evaluating projects that tackle risk factors, and (2) more recently, there has been an additional interest in how this knowledge can be implemented.

Criminologists also want to understand the broader context in which these two processes identified above operate. For example, in determining the effectiveness of a given crime prevention framework, researchers must first appreciate how these initiatives are being implemented and conceptualized. Therefore, the broad overall orientation for this dissertation was to examine how crime prevention programs and initiatives operate in Winnipeg in order to reduce crime that affects urban Aboriginal people (in terms of both victimization and offending.)

According to the existing literature reviewed in Chapter Three, crime prevention that identifies and tackles risk factors is what is needed to reduce crime effectively. There is also a growing body of knowledge emerging that offers suggestions concerned how to implement such knowledge. The growing consensus among experts is that different orders of government must mobilize agencies that can develop programs and/or execute other initiatives to tackle one or more risk factors in a systematic way. These agencies must begin with a diagnosis of the gaps in services, formulate a plan to tackle those gaps, mount a concerted effort to implement programs

to fill the gaps, and finally, evaluate the outcomes (WHO, 2002; Waller, 2006; IPC, 2007). Therefore the goal of this research was to operationalize what is emerging as a standard and compare it to what is happening in practice. Rather than re-inventing the wheel, this research is directed towards a wholly distinct aspect of crime prevention analysis, that is, the implementation process regarding this emerging standard of crime prevention knowledge.

Therefore, the first specific research question of the case study is:

- 1) To what extent do crime prevention programs or initiatives in Winnipeg have a goal of targeting urban Aboriginal risk factors related to crime?

This question stipulates whether evidence-based risk factors arising from empirical research were actually being utilized, opposed to conjectured / speculative risks. This is because the latter are far more common in the history of crime prevention: “charismatic” theories and “heroic” interpretations and conclusions.

A related goal of this question was to provide insight into how, if at all, crime prevention programs utilized knowledge of risk factors in order to reduce crime affecting urban Aboriginal people. Thus, if programs were found, they would be disassembled and reassembled in order to understand their internal workings, and/or to identify any links or connections to the research and theory reviewed in Chapters Two and Three.

Finally, this question investigates whether stakeholders of preventative programs intend or expect to tackle risk factors related to urban Aboriginal people’s victimization and/or offending. Part of the emerging standard in the crime prevention literature is to set in place programs and/or initiatives that have a specific goal of tackling one or more risk factors related to crime.

The second component of this emerging standard concerns implementation of this knowledge to address risk factors (see Section 3.3). This usually involves tackling one or more risk factors in a systematic manner, starting with a diagnosis of the gaps in services, formulation of a plan to tackle these gaps, a concerted effort to implement programs to fill the gaps, and evaluation of the outcomes. This leads to the following additional research question:

2) To what extent do crime prevention programs and initiatives aimed at urban

Aboriginal people use this type of crime prevention implementation framework?

Not only does this question seek to identify what type of framework is used in order to compare it to the emerging crime prevention standard, but it also seeks to uncover exactly which actors are involved in such initiatives and/or strategies. Moreover, the inquiry aims to discover, describe, and clarify what is happening at the level of practice and to help formulate a more complete picture of the role of local agencies in their quest to prevent victimization and offending on the part of urban Aboriginal people. It also aims to determine the degree to which programs and initiatives are part of any type of overall strategic planning strategy for crime prevention in the city. Finally, the inquiry aims to uncover stakeholders' readiness to innovate, their explanations, and the solutions they suggest with regard to the issue of urban Aboriginal crime prevention.

This research focused on the above questions as they pertain to urban Aboriginal crime prevention programming in Winnipeg; a location that was selected because Aboriginal people continue to suffer from high rates of victimization and offending as compared to the non-Aboriginal population (Brzozowski et al. 2006). For example, the most recent 2009 General

Social Survey indicated that Aboriginal people's rates of self-reported violent victimization are double those of non-Aboriginal people⁶¹ (Perreault and Brennan, 2010:10).

Finally, one additional sub-question arises, based on the notion that some of the key stakeholders of the crime prevention programs may themselves be Aboriginal:

- 3) What are the attitudes and expectations of Aboriginal stakeholders compared to non-Aboriginal stakeholders towards Aboriginal crime prevention and its implementation?

This question allowed for a comparison within the stakeholder group itself, as it elicited the particular motives and allegiances of a subgroup of stakeholders with regard to the prevention strategies they espouse. The analysis sought to establish whether or not the Aboriginal stakeholders might be better positioned than their non-Aboriginal counterparts to lead or develop these crime prevention initiatives in the future. It sought to discover how stakeholders felt about and conceptualized urban Aboriginal crime prevention and its implementation; as well as how stakeholders felt the internal workings of Aboriginal focused crime prevention programs/initiatives should be executed. Ideally, the attendant implications of the above analysis would help in the future selection of individuals best-suited to design and lead such group-specific crime prevention initiatives.

4.2 Case Study

Given that this study is focused on local level crime prevention, a single-case, case study design was employed because it gave the researcher the opportunity to investigate one case in-

⁶¹ The question used to identify Aboriginal people in the 2009 victimization survey is different than what was used in 2004 and 1999. Therefore, the 2009 results for Aboriginal people's should not be directly compared with those from previous victimization surveys (Perreault and Brennan, 2010:33).

depth rather than dispersing attention over several cases simultaneously⁶² (Philliber et al., 1980: 63-64; Yin, 2003: 40-41). The case study design type used is referred to as “descriptive” (Yin, 2003: 3; Berg, 2007: 293), which begins with a descriptive theory. In this case, risk-focused crime prevention literature served as the overall framework to follow throughout the study (Berg, 2007: 293).

The use of a case study proved to be an ideal strategy, because when studying a real world issue it allows the researcher to provide meaningful depictions of actual situations, where other methods may be more limited. The case study approach also provided for an ideal strategy as it assisted in the investigation of a current phenomenon within a specific environment.

It is a technique that is very useful for “researching relationships, behaviours, attitudes, motivations and stressors in organizational settings” (Berg, 2007: 296). According to Yin (2003: 2), this method allows the researcher to maintain holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events, as well as organizational and managerial processes. Accordingly, a case study was chosen rather than a broader study because broad information on risk-focused crime prevention already exists, and the intention of this investigation is to place emphasis on a specific location to determine the gaps between theory/research and practice.

When used as a research strategy, a case study is intended to rationalize (i.e. understand the reasoning behind) a decision or set of decisions, including why certain measures were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result (Schramm, 1971, as cited by Yin, 2003: 12). It is an empirical inquiry that examines a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, particularly when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin,

⁶² Case studies are limited in terms of generalization. This study will not be able to be generalized to other cities. Conclusions drawn from a case study cannot provide scientific proof. This is because a case study is limited to one area and does not provide a basis for comparison to other sites (see section 4.4 for further discussion of case study limitations).

2003: 13). Given that the major focus of this study was to highlight decisions made by stakeholders, the organization of programs, and organizations' relationships with other organizations with respect to their implementation process, this research strategy was ideal (Yin, 2003: 12-23).

Furthermore, this case study was completed in a city which has high rates of both violent and property crime, as well as an Aboriginal population suffering from an array of social and economic issues (see Chapter Five). Providing recommendations on how to improve this situation is beneficial.

Other urban sites which are suffering from high rates of crime, as well as those which have many social and economic issues affecting their urban Aboriginal population could have also been chosen. However, after an examination into urban cities in Canada, Winnipeg was identified as the most fitting. Not only does Winnipeg have the highest police-reported rates of violent crime as compared to Canada's ten largest central metropolitan areas, but it also rated the highest in terms of crime severity when compared to all other Census metropolitan areas in Canada (Dauvergne and Turner, 2010: 12; Statistics Canada, 2010, see also Chapter Five for a detailed analysis of Winnipeg).

A single-case study design was chosen rather than a multiple-case study design because according to Yin (2003: 40-41) it is ideal when the study represents a unique case. Winnipeg is unique for the purpose of this particular analysis, as it has a high urban Aboriginal population, and many programs and strategies directed at this population⁶³. Furthermore, by investigating one city in-depth, it provides the opportunity to dedicate more time, energy and intensely examine a single city, which would not have been possible if multiple cities were examined.

⁶³ See Section 4.4 for an outline of case study limitations, as case studies provide very limited possibilities of generalization other than by reasoning or of actual testing hypotheses other than by analytic induction.

Given the time dedicated to one specific city, it provided the opportunity to obtain more intimate details from respondents, and allowed the researcher to gain a much more comprehensive grasp of the city under examination, which would have been limited if multiple cities were examined (especially given the time frame allotted for completing a Ph.D. dissertation in a timely manner). However, by conducting a case study it is recognized that it is limited in terms of scientific generalizability. It is also recognized that it is limited in terms of being representative for Canada.

4.2 (a) Documents

Although interviews served as the key source of data, documents were also examined prior to and throughout the interview process. Examining the documents sought to discover, clarify and outline more in-depth information relating to the programs/initiatives identified through the interviews, as well as to help develop the program theory models for each program and/or initiative.

Annual reports, grant applications, program evaluations and other relevant documentation on crime prevention programs or initiatives directed toward Winnipeg's urban Aboriginal population were examined. These documents were obtained through internet searches which included searching terms including "Winnipeg crime prevention" "Aboriginal crime prevention Winnipeg" and "Aboriginal prevention programs in Winnipeg" through the Google search engine.

When programs/organizations were identified in interviews, wherein more information was needed to fill gaps, documents from the programs/organizations web-sites were consulted and reviewed for any relevant documentation relating the program/organization. Documents

were also obtained through scanning the City of Winnipeg's website and the Winnipeg Police website.

Documents were obtained from the stakeholders who were interviewed. In the majority of all interviews, stakeholders provided documents which had more information regarding programs that they discussed, and/or knew about, and in some cases they wrote down web-sites for me to go in order to obtain further information and/or documents. Some stakeholders also e-mailed documents after the interview was completed⁶⁴.

Reviewing these documents served two purposes, providing background information of use during and after the interview process and providing background information to help with the development of program theory models and descriptions of programs.

The documents were treated as a means of access to information. They were analysed by successive waves of reading, to a point of saturation, and any relevant information relating to the program's design and structure was categorized and compiled into the program theory models, as well as explained when providing a description of the program. Thus, all information relating to the programs/initiatives, primary motives, assets and needs, desired results (outputs, outcomes and impacts), side effects, influential factors, strategies, and assumptions were uncovered and recorded into the appropriate categories for each program/initiative.

Program theory models were developed for each program and/or initiative. Program theory models outline how a program operates, and what it is intended to accomplish (McDavid and Hawthorn, 2006: 41). More specifically, they are a diagram that displays program inputs, activities, intervening variables and outcomes (including observed yet unintended), and thereby

⁶⁴ This might constitute a sort of sample bias, as in "snowball" or referential sampling (funnel vision). Thus, following such a sampling approach one may come across many disconfirmatory sources (confirmation bias). Given this, simply these documents alone were not relied upon. Other documents such as those obtained through internet searches as well as through scanning related websites were utilized (see above description).

provides a better description of how a program functions. The models also seek to understand what a program's theoretical premise is based on (Weiss, 1998: 335, 55; McDavid and Hawthorn, 2006: 45). Therefore, in addition to laying out a visual foundation of a program, this model also seeks to understand the beliefs that underlie the action being taken (Weiss, 1998: 55). According to Weiss (1998: 55), programs are complicated phenomena. Creating a program theory model provides an effective visual representation to help map out and describe a program, as well as a way to more thoroughly understand the theory behind why it functions as it does.

As indicated by Rossi et al. (1999: 157, 160) program theory models are as described in detail within program documents as well as best understood by staff and stakeholders. Therefore, first consulting all available program documents was an effective initial step in developing the models for each program/initiative. This was followed by interviewing, which added to the information, most notably the program's theory which, as according to Rossi et al. (1999: 162) is best represented by stakeholders' actions and assumptions.

4.2 (b) Interviews

Most data were collected through face-to-face, in-depth, semi-structured interviews, with the exception of one interview conducted by phone due to a scheduling difficulty. Face-to-face interviews were chosen rather than surveys, because lengthy descriptions and details of meaning are facilitated by this format. The interviews were in-depth and open-ended, which sought to have the participant reconstruct his or her experiences and conceptualizations of how programs and initiatives actually play out in practice (Seidman, 2006: 15).

The interviews took place from September to November 2009. They each lasted about an hour on average and consisted of informed dialogue (See appendix A and B for interview

formats) for program stakeholders (A) and policy makers/policy development analysts (B). They sought information about the motives, interests and goals of stakeholders, and were conducted with key stakeholders of crime prevention programs or initiatives (anyone responsible for delivery and execution), and/or policy makers/policy development analysts in the city (those working for different levels of government).

In order to ensure enhanced reliability, each interview was conducted in the same manner; that is, identical questions were asked using precisely the same words, including all probes and re-directing phrases and words. In order to avoid imposing personal bias on the interview every attempt was made to have the informant be the primary speaker throughout the interview, and probes and re-directing phrases and words were only used when absolutely necessary.

“Purposeful sampling” was used to select the interview informants (Patton, 2002). Purposeful sampling involves selecting informants purposefully, in order to allow for investigation into, and an understanding of, a phenomenon in depth (Patton, 2002: 46). It involved choosing information-rich cases and sources whose examination will illuminate the questions under investigation (Patton, 2002: 230). There are several different strategies for purposefully selecting information-rich cases, and in this study the type of purposeful sampling strategy used was “criterion” sampling (Patton, 2002: 234-238). This type of purposeful sampling involved the researcher selecting informants who were best able to provide meaningful information about a desired area of study, and it means that the chosen informants were those that met predetermined criteria of importance to the study (Patton, 2002: 238). In this case, the interview informants consisted of key stakeholders of any prevention programs/initiatives directed toward urban Aboriginal victims and offenders of crime in Winnipeg. This sampling

technique served as an ideal tactic for this dissertation, as it enabled the researcher to satisfy specific needs inherent in the research. The threat of confirmation bias exists when relying on this sampling technique, however, because there is the possibility of favouring the selection of people providing information confirming the preconceptions of the researcher. As a result, selecting stakeholders in this manner leaves open the possibility that they are being selected in a biased way. Given this, an awareness of this bias was taken into consideration when selecting informants for interviewing, and only those informants directly related to reducing crime affecting urban Aboriginal people through prevention in Winnipeg were chosen.

Interviews were conducted with 31 stakeholders in 27 separate interviews, of which 24 interviews were one-on-one, two interviews were two-on-one, and one was three-on-one. Of the 31 interviewed, 18 persons identified as non-Aboriginal, 12 as Aboriginal, and one as both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal.

Both urban Aboriginal crime prevention program stakeholders, and policy development analysts and planners were interviewed. These included key members from major Aboriginal organizations in Winnipeg (e.g. the Aboriginal Council of Winnipeg, the Indian and Métis Friendship Centre of Winnipeg, Ndinawe, Strong Heart Teaching Lodge, Ka Ni Kanichihk, Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre and the Winnipeg Aboriginal Sports Achievement Centre). Key members from many other organizations and initiatives were also interviewed (e.g. the Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy, West Broadway Development Corp, the Winnipeg Committee for Safety, Healthy Child Manitoba, the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, the Winnipeg Police, the Boys and Girls Club, the YMCA, the City of Winnipeg Community Services Department, the Mount Carmel Clinic, Manitoba Family Services and Housing, Manitoba Justice and the National Crime Prevention Centre, among others).

Any additional key stakeholders who were deemed relevant were also interviewed throughout the on-going analysis of the research, until a point of saturation was reached. Interviewing key stakeholders served as an effective data gathering method, because it provided an opportunity to discover essential aspects of the crime prevention programs/initiatives from the perspective of the deliverers themselves.

Many key stakeholders were known to the interviewer, having already been met at the Search Conference on Crime Prevention, held in Winnipeg (which will be further outlined and explained in Section 8.1). A number of the contributors at the conference provided their contact information, including the Executive Director of the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, the Director of Winnipeg's Community Services Department, the Chief of Police, and the Executive Director of the Boys and Girls Clubs of Winnipeg and others.

Interviewing a small sample of thirty-one participants was ideal for this study, because the sample group was a fairly similar collection of individuals, with little variation. This similarity is also why a 'purposeful sample,' rather than a random sample, was ideal for this research. The interviews took place in a location where the informant felt comfortable; usually in the informant's office and/or place of work, or a public location such as a coffee shop. One interview was done in a community member's home. All interviews were conducted in Winnipeg, except two; one was conducted in Ottawa when the person was there for another activity, and one interview was conducted over the phone.

Interviews were chosen as a mode of data collection because, as Seidman (2006: 9) proposes, they are an ideal way of knowing and understanding. At the root of in-depth interviewing is an interest in comprehending the lived experience of other people, and the meaning they cultivate from that experience (Seidman, 2009: 9). In-depth interviews provide a

pathway to empathetic learning through the sharing of personal stories (Seidman, 2009). Since the goal of this research was to identify how programs and initiatives—and the efforts to implement them—actually play out in practice, interviewing people who implement the programs and/or strategies was an appropriate method of acquiring the information necessary for this inquiry.

Interviewing stakeholders served as an effective mode of data gathering because they were able to provide in-depth information and/or insight into how these actual strategies are conceived or experienced by the deliverers/decision makers themselves. In order to understand the stakeholders' behaviour, one has to gain access to their "subjective understanding;" that is, endeavour to comprehend the meaning that they themselves construct around what it is they are doing (Seidman, 2006: 10).

Interviewing provides access to the context of people's behaviour, and thus offers a way for researchers to understand the implications of that behaviour (Seidman 2006: 10); it helps put behaviour and actions into context and therefore provide access to understanding one's actions. According to Seidman (2006: 10), the primary way a researcher can investigate an organization, institution or process is through the experience of individual people—those who constitute the organization or who carry out its functions or activities.

Although I could have used surveys as a data gathering method, I felt that interviews would be more useful method for this type of research because they are more flexible and personal. They provided an opportunity for further explanation and I was able to clarify any misunderstandings of questions. They allow greater understanding of the intricacies of crime prevention programs, and implementation of these programs, which many stakeholders are highly invested in. They also allow interviewees to ask any questions about the researcher

(motivations and intentions), and the motives behind the research (which was common). Finally, interviews also allowed the researcher to observe the subject as questions were asked, which assisted in understanding given that facial expressions and tone of voice assisted in further clarification of people's answers to questions.

4.3 Analysis

The interviews were transcribed verbatim, and included all pauses and overlaps because, as noted by Silverman (2006: 287), the reliability of the interpretation of transcripts is seriously weakened by a failure to transcribe what may seem to some as trivial, and these pauses and overlaps are a crucial part of the documentation process. Locke et al. (2000: 104) note that recording data adequately is essential for ensuring one does not lose any important information.

Given that this research sought to better understand crime prevention programs and initiatives, the interview responses (transcribed interviews) from key stakeholders of these programs/initiatives served as the units of analysis.

Data were analysed by way of content analysis. Although it is essentially a coding operation, content analysis refers to the study of human communications (Babbie, 2001: 304-309). Both the manifest and latent content from the interview transcripts was analysed. Manifest content represents those elements that are physically present and countable (the visible surface content), and latent content is extended to an interpretive reading of the symbolism underlying the physical data (the deep structural meaning that is conveyed) (Berg, 2007: 308).

Fundamentally there are seven steps to content analysis (see Berg, 2007: 326), beginning with the identification of the research question. In this case, the two major research questions sought to discover whether urban Aboriginal crime prevention programs and initiatives in

Winnipeg have a goal of targeting risk factors related to crime, as well as whether or not a crime prevention implementation model/framework is utilized (see the crime prevention implementation model in Section 3.3).

Next, a number of analytic categories (sociological constructs) were developed by sorting themes or category labels not only from crime prevention literature, but also from the research questions themselves. These preliminary analytic categories were then identified and entered into a data management software program called “NVivo.” The risk focused crime prevention literature as the point of departure to interpret risk factors and risk-focused crime prevention research in general. Thus, the analytic categories were developed within this conceptual framework, and informed by this risk-focused approach to prevention. The process was conducted to the point of saturation and, as a result, all major concepts from the crime prevention literature were accounted for by one analytic category or another.

After these analytic categories were established, the next step was to read through all of the data (interview transcripts) and establish grounded categories from the relevant information. While reading the data, applicable themes and category labels that appeared on the surface were noted and entered into “NVivo.” According to Berg (2007: 325), during this process it is likely that some of the analytic categories already identified in the previous stage (or similar versions) may reappear. During this segment of the analysis, only the categories that had some relationship with the research question were noted and entered, and not merely random words that might have been occurring with some frequency (Berg, 2007: 325). However, coding was conducted until a point of saturation was achieved, through successive waves of thoroughly reading the data. As a result, each declaration of data was accounted for by an analytic/grounded category, and the possibility that major conceptions had been left un-coded was taken into

consideration. Overall, virtually all the major concepts from the literature, and related information from the interviews and reviewed documents, were represented by one analytic/grounded category or another.

Once these analytic and grounded categories were established, objective criteria of selection for sorting data chunks/segments into the analytic and grounded categories were established. This means that explicit coding rules were created for each category. A comprehensive description comprising inclusion and exclusion criteria for each of the analytic and grounded categories were created. These coding rules corresponded to the body of crime prevention literature examined. For example, one analytic category used was 'targeting risk factors'. Whenever an interview informant identified their program or initiative as targeting risk factors (as indicated by the interview transcript), that information was sorted into this category.

After the selection criteria the various categories were established, the next step was to sort the data chunks/segments into the various categories. Interview transcripts (data) were thoroughly and successively read through and sorted, and the computer software program (NVivo) was used to assist in sorting the data chunks/segments. Using NVivo allowed the transcripts to be imported directly into the program, and data chunks/segments were matched and situated within their respective categories. During this stage, after several cases were completed categories or selection criteria were revised as necessary.

Once the data segments and chunks were assigned to their various categories, the data underwent a surface reading in order to count the number of entries (data chunks/segments) that had been put into each category. The purpose of this assignment and reading was to demonstrate magnitude (the proportion of the sample that made similar comments or statements) (Berg, 2007: 327). The completion of this step assisted in identifying where to look for patterns; for example,

if there are several data chunks/segments that identified similar criteria related to the establishment of a particular pattern, this allowed for the identification of magnitude. According to Berg (2007: 327), a frequent rule of thumb is that a minimum of three occurrences of something can be considered a pattern, thus three or more occurrences of data chunks/segments in a category were considered a pattern. Also, according to Berg (2007: 309), presenting descriptive statistics allows more convincing conclusions to be drawn from observational findings. For example, findings can be more convincing when they can demonstrate that the appearance of a claimed observation occurred within a large proportion of the material (e.g. “6 out of 30 interviews said this,” or “a large majority were found to”) (Berg, 2007: 309).

Finally, after all the thematic (categorical) patterns had been identified, they were explained. At this point, the body of crime prevention literature discussed earlier was revisited and consulted, and pattern findings were considered in light of this literature and existing theory. Furthermore, possible links to theory and the crime prevention literature were also identified and explained, and cause and effect hypotheses based on thematic (categorical) patterns were formulated and considered in light of the previous existing theory and crime prevention literature.

In order to assess and verify the validity of a proposed hypothesis, “analytic induction” was used; once a cause-and-effect relationship hypothesis had been established from the data analysis, a thorough search of the data was conducted in an attempt to discover an instance that would refute the hypothesis. When and if a new hypothesis was formulated, and a new or different cause was established, this cycle continued until the hypothesis could not be refuted (United States General Accounting Office, 1991: 44).

Since this research was endeavouring to uncover the conceptualization and operation of prevention initiatives by key stakeholders, the use of content analysis methodology was appropriate. Analysing both the latent and manifest content provided and built upon information related to the organizing efforts and implementation of these programs/initiatives, as well as the characterization of stakeholders' expectations and goals in relation to them. This offered multiple separate points of comparison, and also allowed for differences and/or similarities to be brought to light. Overall, this mode of analysis allowed for more detailed descriptions of meaning to be brought forth, which is something that would not have been possible while utilizing other forms of analysis.

4.4 Limitations and Considerations

When a case study is used as a research method, a common concern is that it provides little basis for scientific generalization (Yin, 2003: 10). However, even though this particular study may not have the capacity to be generalized to all other urban Aboriginal locations, the overall intention is to expand and generalize theories within this area of study (Yin, 2003: 10). As Silverman points out (2005: 134), one can look at any case and find the same order, and as these results may not necessarily have the capacity to be generalized as descriptions of what stakeholders *should* be doing, they will be able to offer possibilities of what they *can* do.

Another concern with the case study method is lack of rigor (Yin, 2003: 10). An on-going awareness of this potential limitation was noted, and every attempt was made to follow systematic procedures and to avoid equivocal evidence or biased views that might influence the direction, the findings or the conclusions (Yin, 2003: 10). An additional concern with case study research is that analyses of this kind take too long, and result in masses of unreadable

documentation (Yin, 2003: 11). In light of this, everything possible was done to avoid superfluous information, and a strict time schedule was applied to the project.

The researcher's theoretical orientations and the characteristics of the phenomena being studied both influence what the researcher is likely to find (Ryan and Bernard, 2003: 781). Furthermore, although formal social research methods serve as an ideal foundation for the research investigation process, such methods may inherently exclude Aboriginal perspectives. Thus, due caution was exercised when using a research process that was not explicitly created for use with or by an Aboriginal population. One might also argue, that gathering and searching for meaning in oral "stories" are a good fit to the culture.

The notion of traditional research—or the theoretical framework being employed herein—could cause significant biases against the Aboriginal population being studied, and vigilance was taken to ensure this was not the case. On-going awareness of this limitation was carefully considered in the context of the research design itself, in the interactions with key stakeholders (some of whom were Aboriginal), and in the implementation and ultimate interpretation of the data obtained.

When using a case study as a research strategy, the nature of interviews with key stakeholders tends to follow an open-ended format, and the interview informant may not necessarily cooperate fully when answering the questions (Yin, 2003: 72). The limitations of using interviews for data collection have been considered in this study. According to Fontana and Frey (2005: 699), "each interview context is one of interaction and relation, and the result is as much a product of this social dynamic as it is the product of accurate accounts and replies." Furthermore, informants could be trying to please the interviewer, or they might omit certain pertinent information. There is also the potential for error and bias by the interviewer, whose

characteristic questioning techniques may obstruct proper communication of the question (Fontana and Frey, 2005: 702).

4.5 Conclusion

This study is asking three key questions:

- 1) To what extent do crime prevention programs or initiatives in Winnipeg have a goal of targeting urban Aboriginal risk factors related to crime?
- 2) To what extent do crime prevention programs and initiatives aimed at urban Aboriginal people use this type of crime prevention implementation framework?
- 3) What are the attitudes and expectations of Aboriginal stakeholders compared to non-Aboriginal stakeholders towards Aboriginal crime prevention and its implementation?

These questions seek whether evidence-based risk factors arising from empirical research were actually being utilized. They investigate whether stakeholders of preventative programs intend or expect to tackle risk factors related to urban Aboriginal people's victimization and/or offending.

The emerging standard concerning implementation is also being investigated in this study. The inquiry aims to discover, describe, and clarify what is happening at the level of practice on the part of urban Aboriginal people.

The sub-question allowed for a comparison within the stakeholder group itself, as it eliciting the particular motives and allegiances of a subgroup of stakeholders with regard to the prevention strategies they adopt.

Although a case study provides little basis for scientific generalization, it was used because it gave the researcher the opportunity to investigate one case in-depth rather than dispersing attention over several cases simultaneously.

Utilizing both documents and interviews as part of the data collection process was ideal as it did not limit the researcher to only one mode of investigation.

Interviewing a small sample of thirty-one participants was best for this study, because the sample group was a fairly similar collection of individuals, with little variation.

Interviewing stakeholders served as an effective mode of data gathering because they were able to provide in-depth information and/or insight into how actual strategies are conceived or experienced by the deliverers/decision makers themselves.

Although surveys may have been useful for this study, it was felt that interviews were more useful because they provide the opportunity for further explanation to be provided when needed. They allow clarification on part of the interviewer. Interviews also simply provided greater flexibility than a more rigid questionnaire.

Given that this study classified the stated goals and expectations of crime prevention stakeholders and compared it to the standard set forth in the body of risk-focused literature examined for this dissertation, it offers the possibility to have practical recommendations which can be of use to an actual city. While this study was based in Winnipeg, and thus cannot be generalized to other cities, it likely has similar implications for other highly populated urban Aboriginal cities.

Chapter Five: Crime Affecting Urban Aboriginal People in Winnipeg

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a picture of the population of Winnipeg, including an in-depth look at crime and related factors affecting Aboriginal people in the city. The chapter is divided into three sections: an outline of Winnipeg's urban Aboriginal population characteristics, followed by an investigation into factors related to social and economic marginalization which affect Winnipeg's urban Aboriginal population and finally, an overview of the city's crime trends.

5.1 Urban Aboriginal Population in Winnipeg

Winnipeg has the highest percentage of Aboriginal people, as well as the largest total number of Aboriginal people, of any major city in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2006). In 2006, Winnipeg's total population was 694,668 (Statistics Canada, 2006). Its total Aboriginal population was 68,385 which comprised over 9% (Statistics Canada, 2006). Of this Aboriginal population, 40,980 identified themselves as Métis in the 2006 census, accounting for 60% of the city's Aboriginal population (Statistics Canada, 2006; Statistics Canada, 2010: 6), followed by North American Indian at 25,900, Inuit at 350 and persons with multiple Aboriginal identities at 375 (Statistics Canada, 2006).

As in the rest of Canada, Winnipeg's urban Aboriginal population has continued to grow (Statistics Canada, 2006). Aboriginal people moved to cities from reserves in increasing numbers throughout the 1990's and 2000's, and Winnipeg is a prime example of this, as demonstrated in Table 7.

Table 7: Aboriginal Residents in Winnipeg 1951-2006

1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	1996	2001	2006
210	1082	4940	16,575	35,150	45,750	55,760	68,385

Source: Statistics Canada Census Data 1951-2006, adapted from Silver (2006: 13)

Figures from 1991 to 2006 are for those who self-identify as Aboriginal

When relocating from the reserve or remote communities to the city, many people moved to Winnipeg's inner city, attracted there by lower housing prices and the presence of members of their family and community (Silver, 2006: 16). Unfortunately, moving to the inner city is usually a move from one marginalized community into another (Silver, 2006: 17). Currently, Aboriginal people are disproportionately located in the economically and socially disadvantaged inner city area, with approximately 44%⁶⁵ of Winnipeg's Aboriginal population residing there (Carter, 2009: 1; Silver, 2006: 17). The inner city has approximately 120,000 people in total, and Aboriginal people constitute 20% of this, compared to a concentration of only 6% in the remainder of the city⁶⁶ (Carter, 2009: 1).

Many neighbourhoods in and around Winnipeg's inner city have high concentrations of Aboriginal residents. In some neighbourhoods, Aboriginal people constitute more than 50% of the population (Carter, 2009; Carter et al., 2003). For example, Carter et al. (2003: 2), in a study using 2001 Census data, examined the residential segregation patterns for Aboriginal people, and showed that Winnipeg had seven dissemination areas⁶⁷ which have Aboriginal populations

⁶⁵ This percentage is derived from a Statistics Canada custom tabulation based on 2001 census data, as cited from Carter (2009:1).

⁶⁶ These numbers are derived from a Statistics Canada custom tabulation based on 2001 census data, as cited from Carter (2009:1).


⁶⁷ "The dissemination area (DA) is a small, relatively stable geographic unit composed of one or more blocks. It is the smallest standard geographic area for which all census data are disseminated. DAs cover all the territories of Canada" (Statistics Canada, 2010).

exceeding 50%. For example, the Burrows-Keewatin neighbourhood has an Aboriginal population of 70%, Lord Selkirk Park has 68%, South Central William Whyte 64%, East Centennial 62.5%, Central Centennial 61.1%, and southeast St. John's 55% (Carter et al., 2003: 2).

Aboriginal people also comprise a minimum of 20% of the population of at least 25 census tracts⁶⁸ in Winnipeg located in and around the inner city (see map below). Seven census tracts, including Lord Selkirk Park, the east half of Dufferin, and the south half of William Whyte, have concentrations of Aboriginal people of over 40%. Eight census tracts (almost five percent) have concentrations of 30 to 40%, seven of which are located in the inner city, including Spence, North Point Douglas, southeast St. Johns, northeast William Whyte, Centennial, and the east half of West Alexander neighbourhoods (Carter et al., 2003: 2). Ten census tracts (6%) have slightly lower concentrations of Aboriginal people, with 20 to 30%, and the remaining 146 census tracts (88.5%) have concentrations of 20% or less (Carter et al., 2003: 2).

⁶⁸ "An area that is small and relatively stable. Census tracts usually have a population of 2,500 to 8,000. They are located in large urban centres that must have an urban core population of 50,000 or more" (Statistics Canada, 2003).

Figure 5: Percentage of Winnipeg's Total Aboriginal Population in Each Census Tract



Source: Carter, Polevychok and Sarget (2003: 4)

Finally, many Aboriginal people in Winnipeg also tend to move frequently (Statistics Canada, 2006). For example, about 20% (or 13,420 people) of the Aboriginal identity population in Winnipeg changed their address at least once in the year preceding the 2006 Census, and of this 20%, about 18% (or 2,410 people) moved from a different Census subdivision. Of this latter group, it is likely a considerable number came from economically failing remote settlements. This is also true of non-Aboriginal migrants, who often wind up in the same urban neighbourhood.

5.2 Winnipeg's Major Social and Economic Issues

Many studies have shown that urban Aboriginal people fare worse on nearly every social and economic indicator, compared to the non-Aboriginal population (La Prairie, 1994; Hanselmann, 2001; Jaccoud and Brassard, 2003). The City of Winnipeg is a prime example of this, as large portions of the city's Aboriginal population are much worse off than its non-Aboriginal population with respect to these social and economic indicators (Carter et al., 2004). Many of these indicators have been linked to being affected by crime, as either or both a victim or offender (Farrington and Welsh, 2007).

Similar to Canada's total urban Aboriginal population, Winnipeg's urban Aboriginal population experience high rates of unemployment, homelessness, poverty and health issues, and tend to have lower levels of educational attainment compared to the non-Aboriginal population (Hanselman, 2001; Carter et al., 2004; Distasio et al., 2004; Mendelson, 2004, 2006; Statistics Canada, 2006).

For example, using 2006 census data to calculate educational attainment rates, it was found that about 30% of Aboriginal people in Winnipeg between the ages of 25 and 64 do not have a certificate, diploma or degree, compared to only 13% of the non-Aboriginal population in the same age group (Statistics Canada, 2006). Furthermore, also in 2006, Aboriginal youth aged 15 to 24 living in Winnipeg had lower school attendance rates compared to non-Aboriginal people, with a 58% attendance rate for Aboriginal youth, compared to 66% for non-Aboriginal youth (Statistics Canada, 2010: 9).

In 2002, Silver et al. investigated the educational circumstances of Aboriginal students in Winnipeg inner-city high schools, and provided a clear explanation to why the Winnipeg school system seems to be failing Aboriginal people. After interviews with 47 Aboriginal students in the

inner-city high schools, 50 Aboriginal school leavers, 25 adult members of the Aboriginal community and 10 teachers, 7 of whom were Aboriginal, Silver et al., (2002) concluded that this school system marginalizes Winnipeg Aboriginal students, as it does not adequately reflect their cultural values or their daily realities, and feels alien to many Aboriginal people. Furthermore, it was also shown that the prevalence of institutional forms of racism and evident racism, including name calling and stereotyping, was very high (Silver et al., 2002). The school system was found to be very non-Aboriginal, overly Euro-centric, and even colonial. For example, there were very few Aboriginal teachers, and very little Aboriginal content in the curriculum (Silver et al., 2002). Textbooks were still being used which explained history in terms such as “we” (i.e. persons of non-Aboriginal ancestry) settled in the West, which implicitly portray Aboriginal students a less desirable “other” category (Silver et al., 2002: 26).

Silver et al. (2002) also found that the schools still operated on dated, ineffective ideas similar to those that were used in the residential schools; assumptions that Aboriginal culture is inferior, and that Aboriginal students must be “raised” to the level of the superior culture, an approach which Silver et al., (2002) declared has obviously not worked. Given these findings, it was argued that Aboriginal students will continue to resist these assumptions, and the associated actions seen in Winnipeg’s inner-city school systems.

Thus, it is no surprise that many Aboriginal people in Winnipeg have high rates of unemployment and poverty. For example, according to the 2006 census the unemployment rate is 5.7% higher for Winnipeg’s Aboriginal core working population (aged 25 to 54), with unemployment for Aboriginal people’s at 9.1%, compared to 3.4% for non-Aboriginal people (Statistics Canada, 2010: 10).

In an examination of the state of Winnipeg's inner-city poverty using Statistics Canada Census (2006) data, MacKinnon (2009: 30) showed that poverty (based on before-tax LICO) among Aboriginal people in Winnipeg is double the rate of the non-Aboriginal population (MacKinnon, 2009: 30; Statistics Canada, 2006). With regard to children, it was found that in 2006 Aboriginal children living in Winnipeg under the age of six had a poverty rate (based on before-tax LICO) of 65%, compared to 23% for non-Aboriginal children in the same age group (MacKinnon, 2009: 30). Overall, Aboriginal children in Winnipeg were found to be almost three times more likely to be poor than non-Aboriginal children (MacKinnon, 2009: 30).

Not only was it found that Aboriginal people in Winnipeg were more likely to be poor compared to non-Aboriginal people, but it was also determined that Aboriginal people living in the inner city were more likely to be poor than Aboriginal people who did not live there (MacKinnon, 2009: 30). Of all Winnipeg Aboriginal households, 46% were poor, compared to 65% of Aboriginal households in the inner city (MacKinnon, 2009: 30).

Furthermore, a relatively recent Aboriginal mobility study (Distasio et al., 2004: 17-18) found that of 1,350 interviews with Aboriginal persons who had recently moved to Winnipeg 50% were homeless, and forced to live temporarily with friends and family. As Silver (2006: 16) points out, this is a result of Winnipeg's chronic shortage of housing, especially low-income rental housing. For example, urban Aboriginal housing groups in Winnipeg have over 2,400 people on their waiting lists for the 800 units of housing that they manage (Carter et al., 2004: 9), and the Manitoba Housing Authority has more than 3,000 people on waiting lists for its 8,000 subsidized housing units in Winnipeg (Miko and Thompson, 2004: 8).

In 2006, about 16% of Aboriginal people with housing were living in a home requiring major repairs; this is unchanged from 2001 (Statistics Canada, 2010: 14). At the same time, 8%

of non-Aboriginal people with housing were living in homes that needed major repairs; down from 9% in 2001 (Statistics Canada, 2010: 14). The prevalence of housing overcrowding, when the number of people exceeds the number of rooms, is the single best predictor of criminality in an area.

Finally, Aboriginal children in Winnipeg are also more likely to live in a single parent household compared to non-Aboriginal children, with 43% of Aboriginal children living with a lone mother in 2006, compared to 16% of non-Aboriginal children (Statistics Canada, 2010: 8).

5.3 Winnipeg's Crime Trends


Given these major social and economic issues in Winnipeg, it is no surprise that crime rates are high for both property crime and crime against persons (Fitzgerald et al., 2004; Perreault and Brennan, 2010: 21). The crime rate in Winnipeg is higher than the national average for many crimes, and also higher when compared to other similarly sized CMAs (Statistics Canada, 2010). For example, Winnipeg has a higher rate of violent crime compared to Canada's national average (per 100,000 of the population; see Table 8 below). Winnipeg also has the highest rate of violent crime when compared to the other nine CMAs that are considered to be in the top ten in Canada (see Table 9 below). In 2010, Winnipeg recorded 1,429 total violent criminal code violations per 100,000 (Statistics Canada, 2010), and according to Fitzgerald et al. (2004:20) its reported crime rates have been among the highest in the country since the mid-1990s.

Furthermore, according to the Crime Severity Index, in 2009 the severity of violent crime in Winnipeg was the highest when compared to all other CMAs (see Table 10 below) (Dauvergne and Turner, 2010: 12). The Crime Severity Index tracks changes in the severity of

police-recorded crime from year to year (Wallace et al., 2009). Each type of offence is assigned a seriousness “weight” (Wallace et al., 2009). Weights are derived from actual sentences handed down by courts (Wallace et al., 2009). More serious crimes are assigned higher weights, less serious crimes are assigned lower weights (Wallace et al., 2009). To make the Index easy to understand it is standardized to “100” (a system that is comparable to the Consumer Price Index), using 2006 as a base year (Wallace, 2009: 10).


In 2007, Winnipeg (153) was third in terms of violent crime severity; behind Regina (189) and Saskatoon (159) (Wallace et al., 2009: 13). In 2009, Winnipeg experienced a 15% increase in violent crime severity since 2008 (Dauvergne and Turner, 2010: 12).

Table 8: Violent Criminal Code Violations Recorded by Police: Canada and Winnipeg




Source: Statistics Canada 1998-2010

Table 9: Violent Criminal Code Violations Recorded by Police in Canada's Ten Largest CMA's



Source: Statistics Canada 1998-2010

Table 10: Police-Reported Violent Crime Severity Index, by Census Metropolitan Area, 2009



Note: The Oshawa census metropolitan area (CMA) is excluded from this table due to the incongruity between the police service jurisdictional boundaries and the CMA boundaries.

Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Uniform Crime Reporting Survey.

Source: Dauvergne and Turner (2010: 12)


Statistics Canada has released a series of studies which examine the geographical distribution of reported crime by police in large Canadian cities.⁶⁹ One such study was conducted in Winnipeg by Fitzgerald et al., (2004). The study used police-reported crime data from the 2001 Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR2), the 2001 Census of Population, and City of Winnipeg land-use data (Fitzgerald et al., 2004). One of the major findings showed that crime in Winnipeg is not randomly distributed; rather it is concentrated in certain areas. It showed these

⁶⁹ It must be noted that many Statistic Canada studies are quite constrained in what they are permitted to examine and conclude.

areas to have reduced access to social and economic resources, decreased residential stability and increased population density and land-use patterns (Fitzgerald et al., 2004). For example, Winnipeg's highest crime neighbourhoods included those that suffered from economic disadvantage, had less-educated people, usually had higher rates of female single parent families, tended to be more populated by Aboriginal residents and/or recent immigrants, and had much higher rates of residentially mobile people (see Table 10, below)⁷⁰ (Fitzgerald et al., 2004). As well, males aged 15 to 25 years represented the highest offending age group in the City of Winnipeg (Fitzgerald et al., 2004: 22). In 2001, about 35% of all identified accused males who were between the ages of 15 and 24 were responsible for 26% of the reported violent offences, and 43% of property crimes (Fitzgerald et al., 2004: 13).

⁷⁰ This finding could also be due to an ecological fallacy. A type of error in the interpretation of statistical data in which conclusions are drawn about specific individuals based on aggregate statistics collected for the group to which those persons belong.

Table 11: Population Characteristics in Neighbourhoods with High and Lower Rates of Violent Crime, Winnipeg, 2001



1. High-crime = NCAs falling into the highest 25% of violent crime rate neighbourhoods; lower-crime = remaining 75%. Rate per 1,000 residential and employed population.

2. Differences between high-crime and lower-crime means are statistically significant at: $p < 0.001$.


N = 175 Neighbourhood Characterization Areas

Sources: Statistics Canada, 2001 UCR2; Statistics Canada, 2001 Census.

Source: Fitzgerald et al. (2004)

Overall, Fitzgerald et al. (2004) concluded that crime (both property and violent) in Winnipeg is concentrated in the city's core and north of the core, which represents a relatively small segment of the total geographic area of the city (for example, see distribution of violent crime in Winnipeg below). Similar to La Prairie (1994) and others mentioned earlier, Fitzgerald et al. (2004) stressed that socio-economic disadvantage of a neighbourhood's residential area is strongly linked to high rates of both violent and property crime.

Figure 6: Distribution of Violent Crime in Winnipeg




Based on 9,727 violent crime incidents.

Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 UCR2.

Source: Fitzgerald et al. (2004)

Figure 7: Distribution of Property Crime in Winnipeg



Based on 54,775 property crime incidents.

Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 UCR2.

Source: Fitzgerald et al. (2004)

As seen in the maps above, of Winnipeg's 230 neighbourhoods (or Neighbourhood Characterization Areas), much of the police-recorded violent and property crime was clustered in neighbourhoods in the city's core, and just north of the core. The dark blue represents the neighbourhoods with the highest occurrences of violent crime; as shown, these crimes are clearly not evenly distributed throughout the city, but concentrated in and around the downtown area. About 30% of police-recorded violent crimes incidents occurred in only 3% of the neighbourhoods, and about 30% of police-recorded property crime incidents occurred in 7% of the city in 2001 (Fitzgerald et al., 2004: 22).

Crime recorded by police does not accurately represent the entire crime situation, due to the unwillingness of people to report crimes to the police, reporting by the police themselves, changes in legislation, and/or policies and enforcement practices. Victimization surveys can serve as a useful adjunct to help remedy this problem. For example, the Statistics Canada 2004 General Social Survey (GSS) showed that in the province of Manitoba, only 35% of all violent victimization incidents were reported to the police (Gannon and Mihorean, 2005: 12). The GSS victimization surveys found that a high number of people had reported being victimized by crime in Winnipeg (Gannon and Mihorean, 2005: 22). For example, about 155 persons⁷¹ per 1000 in Winnipeg experiences violent victimizations,⁷² 487 Winnipeg households per 1000 experience household victimization⁷³, and 135 persons⁷⁴ per 1000 experience theft of personal property⁷⁵ (Gannon and Mihorean, 2005: 22).

5.4 Conclusion

Winnipeg has a total population of 694,668, of which 68,385 or 9% percent were Aboriginal people. This Aboriginal population has been on the increase, growing significantly in the city of Winnipeg since 1951. Most of the Aboriginal population is concentrated in and around the inner-city. Winnipeg's urban Aboriginal population fares poorly in terms of many

⁷¹ Aged 15+

⁷² For example, compare this to other large cities such as Toronto, which has 107 per 1000 persons who experience violent victimizations, or Vancouver which has 107 per 1000 who experience violent victimizations, or Montreal which has 64 per 1000 persons who experience violent victimizations (Gannon and Mihorean, 2005: 22).

⁷³ For example, compare this to other large cities such as Toronto, which has 222 households per 1000 which experience household victimizations or Vancouver which has 462 households per 1000 which experience household victimizations or Montreal which has 175 households per 1000 which experience household victimizations (Gannon and Mihorean, 2005: 22).

⁷⁴ Aged 15+

⁷⁵ For example, compare this to other large cities such as Toronto which has 107 persons per 1000 who experience theft of personal property, or Vancouver who has 136 persons who experience theft of personal property, or Montreal who has 72 persons per 1000 who experience theft of personal property (Gannon and Mihorean, 2005: 22).

social and economic indicators, such as suffering from unemployment, homelessness, poverty, and low levels of educational attainment.

Winnipeg's police recorded crime trends show that it has higher rates of both property and violent crime, compared to the national average, and also compared to many similarly sized CMAs. Winnipeg's police recorded crime (both property and violent) is concentrated in and around Winnipeg's city centre, representing a relatively small proportion of the total geographic area of the city. Furthermore, high crime areas tend to be more populated by Aboriginal residents.

Chapter Six: What are the Perceptions of Crime and Risk Factors Affecting Urban Aboriginal People in Winnipeg?

This chapter outlines the results from the interviews with stakeholders on their perceptions of crime and risk factors affecting urban Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.

6.1 Perceptions of Crime Affecting Winnipeg's Urban Aboriginal Population

Before seeking stakeholders' perceptions of risk factors for crime, it was necessary to first identify their perceptions of the crime issues in Winnipeg. Given many people's intimate knowledge of their communities and/or city, this question also served an additional function: it created a more intricate understanding of the crime situation according to community members/crime prevention stakeholders themselves.

The stakeholder informants were asked first, what were the primary crime problems that affect urban Aboriginal people in their city. Table 12 presents all the crime issues which were discussed in the interviews (inserted into an associated grouping), as well as the number of interviews each issue was mentioned in (for a full description of these categories, including inclusion and exclusion criteria, see the Code Book in Appendix D).

Table 12: Perceptions of Crime Affecting Urban Aboriginal Population in Winnipeg

Crime Problem Affecting Winnipeg's Aboriginal Population	Numbers of Interviews
Family Related Crime	
Family violence	1
Violence against women	4
Interpersonal crime	1
Defaulting on parental obligations	1
Domestic violence and abuse	4
Street Related Crime	
Involvement with the sex trade/prostitution	5
Sexual exploitation of children	3
Crimes committed by young men	3
Petty theft	3
Break and entering	2
Muggings	1
Vandalism	1
Automobile theft	4
Gun related crime	2
Alcohol and addiction related crimes	4
Organized/Gang Related Crime	
Gangs and gang related crime and violence	19
Drug related crime, including drug trafficking and illegal drug trade	10
Scamming and conning	1
Violent Crime Against Persons	
Stabbing	2
Assaults	2
Murder/homicide	3
Crimes of violence and violent crime	7
Missing and murdered women	2
Crime by the State	
Poverty as a crime in itself	4
Racism as a crime in itself	1
Marginalization as a crime in itself	1
Racism by the police	1
Continued colonialism	2

As shown above, there were many different crimes and crime themes mentioned by respondents when they were asked what they thought were the primary crime problems that

affect urban Aboriginal people in their city. These included people citing a number of specific crimes and crime related issues. For example, one stakeholder stated:

“The current crime problems, drugs, guns and I would say mainly the drugs, guns, gangs are the biggest thing right now that affect Winnipeg.”

Another stakeholder stated:

“Well I mean obviously in Winnipeg we’re dealing with a significant problem as its related to auto theft⁷⁶ also as it relates to gang activity, drugs, prostitution, gang related violence are significant issues for inner city people.”

Thus, they stated directly what they felt were primary crimes they are aware of. Some stakeholders also discussed crimes with which they had firsthand experiences, such as the death of a family member from a gang shooting, and/or witnessing “crack runners” outside their homes.

In addition, there were also interrelated crime issues/factors that some participants identified as being crimes in and of themselves, such as continued colonialism (discussed in 2 interviews), marginalization (discussed in 1 interview) and poverty (discussed in 4 interviews). These stakeholders interpreted and answered this question differently than the majority. For

⁷⁶ According to Statistics Canada (2010), the rate of auto theft in Winnipeg is 629 per 100,000 population, putting Winnipeg as the CMA with the third highest rate of auto-theft per 100,000 in 2010. Brantford has the highest rate of auto theft, with 686 per 100,000, and Kelowna is second with 659 per 100,000. Winnipeg has experienced a substantial decrease in auto theft since 2004 (76% decrease) (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 3). This is largely due to the implementation of the Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy which will be explained in Chapter Eight.

example, as this Aboriginal stakeholder explained when discussing crime that affects Aboriginal people:

“So the crime, to me the real crime is putting all these people in to these circumstances of poverty and then administering them in such a way as that there’s really very little escape routes and if they don’t comply in certain ways they actually are breaking the law.”

This stakeholder was implying that poverty is ultimately a crime in and of itself, and the result from an unequal system that Aboriginal people are unfortunately caught up in. Essentially, the underlying structural meaning that was conveyed identified government and government systems as perpetuating colonialism and ongoing racism—which has been in existence since the initial arrival of Europeans—and continuing to commit these crimes which impact Aboriginal people. Therefore, there is a feeling that many historically embedded belief systems within Canadian governments continue to frame Aboriginal people as criminal and, as such, perpetuate the crime that affects them. For example, another stakeholder discussed how the government upholds “white supremacy, racism, classism and continued colonization,” and thus, are the real criminals and/or the ones perpetrating the actual “crime.”

However, the most common response to the category of “crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg” was Aboriginal gangs and gang related crime, with 19 of the 27 interviews including a mention of gang related crime. Many program stakeholders discussed gang related crime that they became aware of due to the presence of gang involved youth in the programs they were involved in (or through other programs offered through other associated organization(s)). Some program stakeholders also made reference to gang activity that they have witnessed and/or experienced themselves. For example, one stakeholder discussed what they had

gone through when they lost a family member to a gang shooting, and another described a confrontation with gang members in which they suffered physical injury.

The next most common crime issue discussed was drug related crime that affects Aboriginal people in Winnipeg; it was mentioned in 10 of the 27 interviews. The discussions included the use of harmful substances (such as crack), as well many persons' involvement with the illegal drug trade. It was typically reported that there is a lot drug trafficking going on, and it is being done by Aboriginal gangs, using crack houses for distribution. And similar to the above, program stakeholders tended to discuss drug related crimes which they had first-hand knowledge of from the youth who attend the centres they work at, as well as awareness due to friends and/or family involvement, or from witnessing the people living in their neighbourhoods. For example, two program stakeholders discussed the many crack houses in their neighbourhood. They described the drug trafficking trade they witnessed from their own home windows, and discussed the "crack runners" who they saw going to and from the crack houses delivering drugs for the dealers.

The third most common category of crimes discussed were those that were violent in nature, with 7 of the 27 interviews including mention of violent crime affecting Aboriginal people. This category also included reference to crimes that involved physical injury; so a reference made to stabbings and murders could overlap with other categories. However, this category specifically referred to crimes related to violence and violent crimes as a major crime issue in Winnipeg.

Thus, many different crimes were discussed by stakeholders. These included specific crimes, those related to offending and victimization, as well as other interrelated crime problems such as those which were felt to be crimes in and of themselves, which included poverty,

marginalization and/or continued colonialism. The following section provides an outline of what stakeholders felt were the risk factors for these crimes.

6.2 Perceptions of Risk Factors

When stakeholders were asked what they believed to be the risk factors and/or causes of crime that affect Aboriginal people in Winnipeg, many mentioned a number of the same risk factors and/or causes identified in the review of literature in Chapter Two. The most common choice was poverty, which was discussed in 19 of the 27 interviews. For example, as this policy stakeholder simply stated:

“Well I think they’re all rooted in poverty”

Also similar is this response from a program stakeholder, who also simply stated:

“it’s all basically tied into poverty”

The second and third most commonly identified risk factors (equally discussed throughout the interviews) were low education and poor school access and involvement, and poor peer influences, both of which were discussed in 13 separate interviews. For example, when identifying risk factors for crime affecting Aboriginal people with regard to low education and poor school access and involvement, this policy stakeholder stated:

“There’s a lack of appropriate programming and education, I would suggest, relative to the Aboriginal community. There’s, there’s a lack of follow-up after school”

This comment points out that there is not only a lack of appropriate education available, but there are also not enough people assisting children throughout their educational life cycle, something they felt was a causal factor with regard to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.

Similar comments were also outlined by other stakeholders, for example, this program stakeholder explained:

“I think too you know the lack of education, people not actually you know not only not finishing school but not the opportunity to go onto post-secondary and proper training and things.”

Discussion of poor peer influences as a risk factor identified those who have minimal positive influence and/or mix with antisocial peers and/or have other negative influences such as joining a gang. For example as this program stakeholder explained:

“you know there is that saying if there’s no team to join they’ll join a gang and that’s, that is unfortunately the case.”

Similarly, this policy stakeholder stated:

“they’re looking for a place to belong. They’re looking for safety and they wrongly assume that being in a gang”

Finally, in all 27 interviews, only three of the risk factors which were identified by the extensive examination of risk factors and root causes for crime affecting Aboriginal people went unmentioned, namely poor social skills, aggressiveness and family violence and crime. This shows that both program stakeholders and policy planning stakeholders interviewed seem to be aware of the majority of risk factors in the crime prevention literature.

Table 13 identifies the number of interviews in which each of the risk factors from the literature was discussed. For a more detailed description of the risk factors, including inclusion and exclusion criteria, see the Code Book in Appendix D.

Table 13: Stakeholders Perceptions of the Main Causes (Risk Factors) for Crime Problems Affecting Urban Aboriginal People in Winnipeg

Risk Factors Identified in Chapter Two⁷⁷	Number of Interviews Identifying Specific Risk Factor
Individual Factors:	
Interpersonal Skills:	
Poor social skills	0
Aggressiveness	0
Dependence/Addictions:	
Substance abuse and addictions	8
Dependency	2
Mental Health:	
Poor mental health and health related issues that go untreated	5
Hopelessness	4
Social Factors:	
Families:	
Poor child rearing and supervision	8
Family violence and crime	0
Single parent families	2
Dysfunctional, disorganized, and disconnected families	7
Employment and Education:	
Low education and poor school access and involvement	13
Unemployment	2
Social Networks	
Few social ties	5
Poor peer influences	13
Social exclusion and marginalization	2
Lacking cultural identity and pride	5
Community:	
High residential mobility and mobility between reserves and city	7
Overcrowded, disorganized and sub-standard living conditions	8
Racism and discrimination	4
Poverty	19

⁷⁷ This examination of risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people was compiled through an extensive examination of the literature. See Chapter 2 for an overview of some of the major research studies, knowledge and other literature which identified many of these risk factors/crime correlations.

Interrelated Risk Factors

Similar to the literature examined in Chapter Two, stakeholders also explained the interconnectedness and/or interrelatedness of many of the risk factors which they identified. This is apparent in this program stakeholder's comment:

“Obviously there's like a huge disparity in, in wealth in the city and largely most of the you know unemployment and whatnot is coming from that, that one group, and a lot of it from, is coming from the reserves, they're moving from the reserves and not having the support.”

Similar to many respondents, this stakeholder outlined the interconnection between poverty and other related factors. In this example specifically, the stakeholder drew the connection between poverty, unemployment and lack of support when moving from a reserve to the city.

Although not all participants saw the same connections between risk factors, a large majority discussed many interrelated factors and issues in their interviews. For example, the following policy stakeholder also explained the interconnectedness between risk factors, however discussed different issues:

“Well, the risk factors in many cases for the young people is the, you know, the area they live in, the people that ...[you]... are forced to associate with and what I mean by that is maybe because of little family support”

In this case, the participant not only felt that crime is a result of poor peer influences, but that this factor also has ties to other interconnected factors, such as little family support.

Some stakeholders also explained how many of these risk factors are connected by being passed down through generations. For example, as this program stakeholder explained:

“So really if you want to get to the root of it, that's my philosophy, it goes way back then. And, so now, what you have is you have a whole generations of, of people, human beings who have lost that ability to parent and lost their traditional ways of doing it and don't know any better I think is where it comes down to, I know that sounds kind of harsh but they just don't understand the right way to do things, and it's not their fault, I really don't believe that. And what happens is you get all these young people, babies having babies kind of thing and there's no structure, you know the kids are easily taken away and put into foster care and there really is no sense of family and anyone that knows anything about human beings understand that human beings have a need for family and they have a need for that as part of, it's part of human nature.”

As this stakeholder explained, risk factors are connected to impacts experienced by previous generations, and how this can cause the next generation to experience similar circumstances (such as having children at young ages). Connections were also drawn to loss of parenting abilities and loss of tradition which are either passed down generationally, or, are tied to other related factors.

Finally, these findings which identify stakeholders as being aware of risk factors, in addition to having multi-casual explanations for crime is similar to what has been found in

previous studies and surveys which asked participants their perceptions of risk factors related to crime. For example, in June 2007 The Alberta Crime Reduction and Safe Communities Task Force conducted numerous community consultations with Albertans. Over five weeks, with 14 different communities, and after talking with hundreds of Albertans, the task force found that many community members were well aware of many of the major risk factors related to crime. For example, and similar to the findings herein, they found that “poverty was consistently raised as an underlying factor affecting crime and safety” (Alberta Crime Reduction and Safe Communities Task Force, 2007: 15).

In terms of Aboriginal communities, the Alberta Crime Reduction and Safe Communities Task Force (2007: 17) identified that they “heard about the impact of generations of abuse and trauma on families and children.” They also heard that “families are breaking down and gangs are taking over from families to provide a sense of belonging” (Alberta Crime Reduction and Safe Communities Task Force, 2007: 17). These are findings which are very similar to the findings found and described in this chapter.

Furthermore, a survey from the United Kingdom also came to similar conclusions, finding that the public were aware of risk factors for crime. The 2009/10 British Crime Survey (BCS) asked participants their perceptions of crime.⁷⁸ The BCS is a nationally representative sample survey (based on more than 45,000 respondents) of household residents in England and Wales (Flatley et al., 2010: 1). In line with previous years, the two most commonly perceived

⁷⁸ Asking participants their perceptions of crime could possibly lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this case, lack of discipline from parents and drugs were identified as the two most commonly perceived causes of crime. This could lead people to adapt such a label to themselves and readily become actors in the “self-fulfilling prophecy” of poor parenting or drug use.

causes of crime identified were lack of discipline from parents⁷⁹ (27%) and drugs (26%) (Parfremment-Hopkins and Green, 2010: 109-110).

Broader Causal Factors: Poor Social Policy Systems and Historical Effects

Although there was no question about why these risk factors are so dominant with the Aboriginal population, many stakeholders also stressed other broader causal factors which they felt contribute to Aboriginal people multiple and interconnected risk factors related to crime. These included Canada's poor and dysfunctional social policy and social systems⁸⁰, which was identified and discussed in 13 of the 27 interviews, and the historical effects and impacts of colonialism, colonization and assimilation, identified in 12 of the 27 interviews (see Code Book in Appendix D for a detailed description of these categories).

When discussing Canada's poor and dysfunctional social policy and social systems reference was made to poor government policies and/or the poor westernized social systems.⁸¹ For example, as explained by this program stakeholder:

⁷⁹ Harris (1998) completed a review behavioural genetic research. Her study showed that about half of a person's adult personality is determined by heredity. She argues that there is no research to support the idea that parenting is an essential factor in child development. She further argues that parenting does not have an impact on a child's adult personality.

⁸⁰ In comparison to other countries, such as developing countries or countries at war, Canada's social policy and social systems fare much better. However, in this context, discussion of Canada's poor and dysfunctional social policy and social system is in reference to specifically the Aboriginal population in Canada.

⁸¹ Durkheim (1893) first described anomie as a condition of deregulation occurring in society, meaning that when the procedural rules of society break down people no longer know what to expect from each other. This deregulation, or normlessness, then leads to deviant behaviour. Thus, in this case Canada's dysfunctional social policies and systems could be considered as a state of normlessness, thus, resulting in deviance and/or crime. However, when looking at this through another lens, such as the Sykes and Matza's (1957) neutralization theory. This may also be the case that people are simply justifying their deviant behaviours by providing alternative explanations (to themselves and others) for involvement in crime in order to transfer responsibility for crime onto someone (or something else). For example, related concepts include, "condemnation of the condemners" where one blames enforcement figures as being corrupt, or, "denial of responsibility" where one contents that they were defencelessly pushed into deviance.

“So all the research I mean it’s there, like we know, we know all of that stuff but we failed, our governments, our social policy failed to address it.”

When discussing factors related to crime affecting urban Aboriginal people in Winnipeg, this stakeholder cited above clearly identifies social policy and governments as failing. Similarly, another program stakeholder outlines a parallel situation with a bit more detail:

“I think for the last thirty years social policy in Canada has just gone down, down, down. I mean the leanings of the governments, whatever stripe they wear were more towards the economic spectrum than they were to the social spectrum. So, so when you ignore things, good social policy then yeah you get these outcomes, and you know the Aboriginal people, poverty, lack of education, they moved from the reserve to the city, they can’t survive here, your families are in poverty for years and years and so you need money so opportunities arise.”

Thus, not only does this stakeholder state their dissatisfaction with social policy in Canada, but at the same time directly states the link with the specific risk factors they feel arise from such ineffective social policy systems, which includes, poverty, lack of education, moving from reserve to the city etc.

When discussing the historical effects and impacts of colonialism, colonization and assimilation reference was made to residential schools and the many after-effects which are now impacting future generations—similar to discussions outlined in Section 2.1.

For example, as this program stakeholder described:

“it’s social issues that causes these things to arise but I think with the Aboriginal community its different. I think all of this is, emanates from the, the segregation of our people on reserves and the you know all of that, the residential schools.”

As identified above, this stakeholder made reference to causal factors as emanating from segregation on reserves and residential schools. Similarly, another program stakeholder describes related causal factors in a similar way, but at the same time provides additional insight in regards to colonization and assimilation:

“I mean we’re still recovering from the effects of colonization, defragmentation of our community, our way of life, and I’m not talking about you know how we used to live off the land, which we still do today all of us, we just seem to have forgotten that connection. But just you know the residential school, relocation, you know lost way of life, negative self-imagery...”

Similar to the other stakeholders who brought up this issue, this stakeholder felt that residential schools, relocation, as well as colonization and defragmentation were all related causal factors⁸². However, this stakeholder in particular also mentioned the loss of connection to the land.

⁸²Although it is difficult to calculate direct effects, the accumulated negative outcomes of residential schools which have been well documented may provide a partial explanation to why many Aboriginal people suffer from multiple risk factors related to crime (see Chapter Two for an outline of research). Furthermore, ChrisJohn et al., (2006) in his discussion of residential schools draws connections between residential schools and the experience of the Jews during the holocaust, and describes the many similarities in terms of implementation and affects (see ChrisJohn et al., 2006).

Although loss of connection to the land was not something specifically brought up by others who described these issues, suffering losses resulting from colonization was mentioned by others. This included loss of belief systems, loss of Aboriginal people own rules and own ways to organize families and teach children. For example, this is prevalent in the following program stakeholder's statement:

“Okay well my view on this subject is it goes back to if you look at, you look back in history before Canada became a country, the Aboriginal people, the first nation that lived here they had their own rules, they had their own families, they did things very much in a communal way, everyone did it a little different depending on where they were, but what happened was when the Europeans came over and started basically taking their culture away and saying that this is the way you have to go, what you've done is you've created an entire race of people and you've taken all their belief systems away from them and you've put them in a position where all their traditions, their customs, the way they did things, the way they taught their children and taught their children to parent and be parents, a lot of that was lost. And then you have you know the European people telling you to do it this way but yet the Aboriginal people couldn't do it that way because they were at a disadvantage from the get go, they didn't have the same backing, they didn't have the same support that they would get from other people and they were basically told, no your way sucks, you've got to do it this way and good luck with that, you know to the point where people where people were getting killed and put in jail for trying to practice their own cultures and not conforming to the European way of life.”

Policy Makers Lack of Knowledge of High Crime Areas

Furthermore, although it was not an interview question, four separate interviews indicated that many of the policy makers and/or government workers, and others who make decisions regarding crime policy, do not live in or ever go to the areas which are affected by the high rates of crime, such as the North End and/or inner city. They felt this meant that these leaders and policy makers have little real knowledge of many of the “root causes” and/or “risk factors” specific to certain communities and high crime areas in the city, and thus felt that governments are creating policy which does not address the actual needs of specific communities affected by crime.⁸³ For example, one Aboriginal stakeholder/program deliverer stated:

“Our leaders are out there making decisions on you know people that are living in the north end and you know in all these areas where a lot of violence is, some of these people and our leaders don’t live in the areas where we are, so they’re up there making decisions where they don’t even know what’s going on, half of what’s going on. They should be out in the community and seeing firsthand of what our people are dealing with in order for them to make the proper decisions. Cause it’s easy to say okay we’re going to put ten more officers on the street to help stop the gang violence, that’s not going to do it.”

Similarly, another program stakeholder explained:

⁸³ However, there is no scientific basis for the concept of “if you walk in my shoes then you would understand” argument. In fact, some have noted that concept as being a fallacy (for e.g. this connection has been drawn in relation to sports coaching, where some of the best coaches in sports history were never superstars themselves).

“They’ve got all these community development workers who are afraid to come in the inner city at night, and I’m saying you know you’re paying them eighty thousand bucks a year, get them doing their job you know.”

These comments show some program stakeholders’ discontent with the way crime prevention and crime reduction policies are being implemented and/or decided. In fact, even though this was not an interview question, in most of the interviews which were conducted with program stakeholders, concern was expressed regarding policy makers, governments and/or other officials’ failure to adequately support “what works,” and/or to put forth a coordinated effort toward prevention that incorporates Aboriginal people’s needs and major concerns. For example, one program stakeholder stated that the municipal government is simply “out to lunch” when it comes to implementing knowledge of risk factors. A small number of policy makers also explained that they (themselves) don’t always implement programming and/or direct policy which correctly addresses Aboriginal people’s needs and major concerns. As one policy maker stated:

“As a mainstream government worker ... I sometimes think we’re replicating the very same [colonialist] policies, maybe we’re politer, maybe we’re more understanding, but we are still making decisions for another group in society, and if we really listened to First Nations people and what they’re asking us for, we very rarely ever deliver that.”

Thus, a large majority of program stakeholders, and a few policy planners,⁸⁴ expressed the concern that policy and programming which is known to be effective, and incorporates Aboriginal people's risk factors, needs and major concerns, is not always what ultimately gets implemented.

Furthermore, as seen in the above comment, it was even indicated that policies with colonialist undertones are still being implemented. Thus, not only are Aboriginal people's needs and/or major concerns not being addressed, but, as indicated from the above policy stakeholder, the same colonialist policies are being imposed on Aboriginal people, without actually listening to what Aboriginal people really need and/or want.

Finally, although these stakeholders felt that "risks" and "needs" might not be fully taken into consideration by governments, does not necessarily mean that governments do not consider this at all, because as it was demonstrated earlier, both program stakeholders and policy planners are well versed in the knowledge of "risk factors" (see table 13). At the same time this also demonstrates that the "discourse" of risk is existent, as stakeholders clearly indicated their knowledge and awareness of risk in their responses.

However, this analysis does not show the degree to which actual implementation of such risk-focused knowledge is executed in practice. Therefore, this is something that will be explored more thoroughly in the following two findings chapters (Chapters Seven and Eight) through an analysis of actual practice and implementation.

6.3 Conclusion

The stakeholders pointed to many crimes—ranging from specific crimes such as those related to gangs and drugs, to non-official criminal code offences, like continued colonialism—

⁸⁴ The actual numbers are not being disclosed in order to protect confidentiality.

as crimes affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg. Many stakeholders described crimes which they had first-hand experiences of, such as the death of a family member from a gang shooting, or witnessing “crack runners” outside their home.

Many stakeholders were aware and in agreement with the numerous socio-economic risk factors identified in the crime prevention literature relating to Aboriginal people victimization and offending, with only three of the 20 risk factors compiled from the literature not being mentioned.

Stakeholders identified other broader causal factors which contribute to Aboriginal people multiple and interconnected risk factors related to crime, such as poor and dysfunctional social policy and social systems, and the historical effects and impacts of colonialism, colonization and assimilation; similar to the discussion in Section 2.1.

Several stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction with the degree to which risk factors and needs are recognized by policy makers. They suggested that policy makers do not live in these areas, or they are afraid to go into them. Therefore, the stakeholders felt that policy is not directed effectively, and does not address the actual “needs” of specific communities affected by crime.

Chapter Seven: Do Prevention Programs in Winnipeg Target Urban Aboriginal People Risk Factors Related to Crime?

This chapter begins by identifying stakeholder's responses in regards to program(s) they felt were in place to tackle urban Aboriginal people's risk factors related to crime. Programs which were found to have overlaps with research evidence reviewed in Chapter's Two and Three are then described. The purpose of examining whether risk-focused programs exist is to assist in the determination of whether knowledge of risk-focused prevention is actually influencing crime prevention implementation and practice in terms of crime prevention focused on reducing crime affecting urban Aboriginal people.

For ease of understanding, programs identified through this analysis were categorized into four different categories. First there is an outline of programs which are specific to reducing risk factors for crime affecting Aboriginal people (as well as other populations). This is followed by Aboriginal-focused programs not targeting crime but tackling risk factors related to crime. Programs specific to reducing general risk factors for crime are outlined, followed by an examination of programs not targeting crime but tackling general risk factors for crime.

Healthy Child Manitoba

When stakeholders were asked whether any of the causes (risk factors) they identified were being tackled or addressed through prevention programming, there were multiple and overlapping responses provided. This included the identification of: (A) Healthy Child Manitoba, (B) a listing or mention of various Aboriginal and/or other non-government organizations, and/or (C) a listing or mention of a specific program(s).

Three stakeholders mentioned Healthy Child Manitoba (HCM)⁸⁵. HCM is a government agency with services for children, youth and families. When HCM was mentioned, stakeholders were stating that they were aware that this government agency provides evidence-based programming. For example, as this stakeholder simply stated:

“Healthy Child in Manitoba programs ... I think are extremely important in terms of getting at the root causes of some of the challenges.”

Thus, these stakeholders who identified HCM were not stating a specific program which HCM implements, instead they were relaying that they knew HCM offered such programming. And as will be further revealed in the descriptions of programs later in this chapter – they do in fact offer prevention programs which were found to overlap with the research evidence.

Aboriginal and other non-Government Organizations

Thirteen interviews mentioned and/or listed various Aboriginal and/or other non-government organizations stating that they knew these organizations offered related programming. Many interviews mentioned more than one organization. Four different organizations were mentioned with some frequency: The Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre, Ndinawe , Ka Ni Kanichihk and the Boys and Girls Club.

The Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre was identified in 10 interviews. This is an organization dedicated to supporting and rebuilding Aboriginal families. They offer a wide range of family support programs, including parenting programs, community kitchens,

⁸⁵ Healthy Child Manitoba offers 6 different programs to women while pregnant, 9 programs for early infancy to 3 years of age, 9 programs for children 3 to 6 years of age, 12 programs for those 6 to 12 years of age, and 9 programs for those aged 13 to 18 years of age.

traditional craft workshops, family movie nights, among other Aboriginal specific family programming. It also offers a prevention program (Spirit of Peace) which was identified as having overlaps with the risk-focused research evidence and will be explained in depth later in this chapter.

Ndinawe was identified in 7 interviews. This is an Aboriginal organization which offers outreach programs for youth, provides meals to families, sports and recreation, cultural activities, a youth gang program, among other Aboriginal support programs for people of all ages. Although they offer many supports and programs for Aboriginal people in Winnipeg, when their programs were reviewed in more depth, none were identified which overlaps with the research evidence reviewed.

Ka Ni Kanichihk was identified in 3 interviews. This is an Aboriginal organization which also offers support programming for youth, provides culturally safe women's support programming, child care, programming to help people advance their education, among other Aboriginal support programs for people of all ages. It also offers a crime prevention program (Circle of Courage) which was identified as having overlaps with research evidence and will be explained in depth later in this chapter.

The Boys and Girls Club was only identified in 2 interviews. However, it is worth noting because it offers the prevention program called the Community Schools Investigator (CSI) Summer Learning Enrichment Program which was identified as having overlaps with research evidence and will be explained in-depth later in this chapter. The Boys and Girls Club is a community based youth serving organization offering a variety of sports and recreation programming, arts and cultural programming, education and career exploration programming,

health awareness and life skills development as well as leadership and community service activities.

Specific Programs

Twenty interviews mentioned specific programs when asked whether any of the causes (risk factors) they identified were being tackled or addressed through prevention programming. Programs which were mentioned with some frequency included the Winnipeg Aboriginal Sports Achievement Centre Programming, and The Ka Ni Kanichihk: Circle of Courage Program which were both equally mentioned in 4 interviews. Both of these programs were found to have overlaps with the research evidence reviewed in Chapter Two and Three and will be explained in-depth later in this chapter.

All other programs were only mentioned once or twice. However, three of the programs which were mentioned twice included programs that were found to overlap with the research evidence reviewed in Chapter Two and Three and will be explained in depth later in this chapter. This included the Community Schools Investigator (CSI) Summer Learning Enrichment Program, The Healthy Babies Program and the Triple P Program.

Programs only mentioned once which were found to have overlaps with the research evidence reviewed in Chapter Two and Three include Strong Heart Teaching Lodge: Seeing Oneself Program and the Roots of Empathy Program, which will also be explained in depth later in this chapter.

Finally, though there were other programs identified in the interviews (identified only once), and others identified through documentation analysis that are seeking to make impacts on crime in both direct and indirect ways. After a thorough examination of these programs—

conducted through successive waves of data analysis of both the interviews and document review—these eight mentioned above stood out as employing major components of what has been deemed effective, based on the large body of pre-existing risk-focused crime prevention literature and evidence. Thus, at least eight programs in Winnipeg were targeting urban Aboriginal people’s risk factors related to crime. See Table 14 for a list of these programs in their corresponding categories.

Table 14: Prevention Programs in Winnipeg Tackling Risk Factors Related to Crime

Programs Specific to Reducing Risk Factors for Crime Affecting Aboriginal People:
1) Ka Ni Kanichihk: Circle of Courage Program
2) Strong Heart Teaching Lodge: Seeing Oneself Program
3) Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre : Spirit of Peace Program
Aboriginal Programs Not Targeting Crime but Tackling Risk Factors Related to Crime:
4) Winnipeg Aboriginal Sports Achievement Centre (WASAC) and Innovative Learning Centre (ILC) Programming
Programs Specific to Reducing General Risk Factors for Crime:
5) Triple P Program
6) Roots of Empathy Program
Programs Not Targeting Crime but Tackling General Risk Factors Related to Crime:
7) Healthy Baby Program
8) Community Schools Investigator (CSI) Summer Learning Enrichment Program

Although these program might not have entailed exactly what previous research outlined, they all tackled one or more risk factors, and did so using basic, evidence-based logic involving a clear target group, inputs, activities, outputs, intended outcomes and expected impacts.

Using data derived from both interview responses and documents, a detailed picture of each program has been provided. All of the programs selected were initially identified through the interviews with stakeholders. Analysis of documents assisted in providing more detailed information and/or filling in any gaps which were not explained in the interviews.

Table 15 compares these eight programs to the evidence for risk factors identified in Chapter Two in order to bring to light which risk factors are being tackled by these selected programs, as well as which risk factors lack a program tackling it. In order to determine if the program tackles one or more of the identified risk factors, interview and document data was consulted. At least one of these data sets had to indicate that it tackled the specific risk factor in order to be identified as tackling that risk factor in the chart below. These programs are described in detail throughout this chapter, and their accompanying program theory models are provided at the end of each description.

Ineffective Programming

Furthermore, the fact that some risk factors are not being tackled by one of the eight programs selected does not mean that they are not possibly being tackled by another program or service offered in Winnipeg. However, given that these above mentioned eight programs were selected based on their similarities with the crime prevention research evidence, shows a possibility that even if other programs not identified are tackling these factors, they may not be doing so using an risk-focused evidence-based logic, and therefore may not be “effectively” doing so as according to the risk-focused literature and research.

However, there was one crime prevention program (the Winnipeg Police Neighbourhood Watch program) that stood out as being particularly ineffective, based on its lack of research supported operations and evidence-based processes, not placing primary emphasis on tackling risk factors for future offending and victimization, not being targeted, and lacking coordination. This was in addition to the many overlaps with research evidence that identified what clearly does “not work,” based on crime prevention evaluations, and comprehensive reviews of such evidence (see Rosenbaum et al., 1985; Rosenbaum, 1987; Pate et al., 1987; Sherman et al., 2002).

There have been several research evaluations highlighting their ineffectiveness (for examples see Rosenbaum et al., 1985; Rosenbaum, 1987; Pate et al., 1987). The Winnipeg Neighbourhood Watch Program has a number of the ‘ineffective’ features identified by this research, including a uniformed police officer giving a lecture to community residents, encouraging them to install dead bolt locks on their doors, put identifiers on their valuables and install “Neighbourhood Watch” signs in their windows.

Rosenbaum et al. (1985) produced an evaluation of commonly cited Neighbourhood Watch programs, which showed very mixed results. The trend from most evaluations shows that Neighbourhood Watch fails to reduce burglary or other targeted crimes, particularly in higher crime neighbourhoods where voluntary participation frequently fails to meet its desired goals (Rosenbaum et al., 1985; Rosenbaum, 1986; Pate et al., 1987). Many police agencies continue to roll out programs such as Neighbourhood Watch in their “prevention” efforts, while overlooking the root causes of crime and the need for targeted intervention, which much of the evidence-based crime prevention literature supports (Waller, 2006; Muller-Cheng, 2009). The remainder of the chapter outlines the eight programs which have been identified as having many overlaps with the evidence-based research.

7.1 Programs Specific to Reducing Risk Factors for Crime Affecting Aboriginal People

Ka Ni Kanichihk: Circle of Courage Program

The first program is the Ka Ni Kanichihk: Circle of Courage Program, also simply referred to as The Circle of Courage Program.⁸⁶ This is a prevention and intervention program targeting Aboriginal male youths from 12 to 17 who are at-risk of gang involvement and/or gang related crime and/or those already involved in gangs. The program has two overall objectives; first, to decrease Aboriginal male youth engagement/involvement and/or membership in youth gangs, and second, to empower Aboriginal male youth to develop pro-social competencies, attitudes and behaviours, thereby reducing the risk of gang involvement, affiliation and activity. As this stakeholder explained:

⁸⁶ See end of section for the accompanying Program Theory Model.

“what they’re doing at Circle of Courage is they’re trying to help youth get more in touch with their inner self to find a better healing for themselves and also to set our youth on a better path, other than you know turning to crime, criminal activity, gangs, because a lot of our young people fall astray and they automatically like you know when they’re out there they’re so vulnerable and they become victims of gang. You know the violence that’s out there or else they are the ones who are doing the violence or crimes themselves against these innocent victims. So they’re trying to help these youth exit the gangs.”

Circle of Courage is a community program based on Aboriginal values, delivered by and for Aboriginal people, and operating out of the Aboriginal organization “Ka Ni Kanichihk.” It is headed up by a facilitator who has a background in social work. The participants of the program are selected based on a percentage of “at-risk factors” performed after a referral is received. The majority of the youth/teens in the program have been referred by Manitoba Justice as “conditions to their release”, scoring 100 out of 100 on the risk factor scale.

The intervention and prevention programming is usually given to a group of about 15 youth/teens on a weekly basis, through two daily sessions. The first is the intervention session, which runs from 12:00 to 4:00 pm, and the second is the prevention session from 4:00 to 8:00 pm. Youths aged 15 to 17 who are already involved in gang activity and/or gang related crimes, as well as those who dropped out of school, attend all day from 12:00 to 8:00 pm. They are joined at 4:00 pm by youths aged 12 to 14 who are at-risk of gang involvement, and are still in school, but struggling.

The 12:00 to 4:00 pm intervention program is classroom-based and involves a series of organized activities, including life-skills training activities, anger management, coping and

decision making training, sexuality education, addictions education, pre-employment training and other related skill development education.

At 4:00 pm the second group of program participants joins this group (once they finish their day at school). The main topics of this session revolve around similar and related skill building activities, including a variety of life-skills training, leisure and recreation activities, sports games attendance, proper nutrition education (including how to cook and clean), as well as many cultural knowledge teachings, including rites of passage and other Aboriginal ceremonies. One of the main aims of this second session is to teach the youths the importance of family, and how families operate. For example, the teaching of cooking and cleaning is used as a mechanism to educate them about peaceful family interaction and teamwork, which they can take back to their homes, and then on into their future. The program also involves individual counselling, and monthly family outings aimed at connecting the youth to their families, and vice versa.

As well, the second half of the program day allows the 15 to 17 year olds to mentor the 12 to 14 year olds, helping them with skills that the older youths have learned and are learning in the program. They connect with them on their level, due to their similar life experiences and backgrounds. This ensures the younger youths do not see only the successes, but the challenges as well, and how they can be overcome.

In addition to what goes on in the classroom setting, there are many other educational events, such as outdoor learning activities, and attending museums—such as the Man and Nature Museum—and the planetarium. Instead of these simply being “trips,” they are seen as learning opportunities, and the program coordinator uses a variety of teaching styles and methods in order to connect with the youths, and provide them with an alternative way to learn and become interested in learning.

The program seeks to address a number of different risk factors and enhance many protective factors. For example, it addresses risk factors associated with unemployment by providing pre-employment training, and it tackles many culture-specific risk factors, such as cultural loss and loss of cultural identity, by providing life skills activities which include and promote Aboriginal people traditional teachings. It also provides youths/teens with a social support network that can be an alternative to gang membership, and aims to help tackle their feelings of hopelessness.

This program is based on Dr. Martin Brokenleg's Circle of Courage model of reclaiming youth at risk (which is also the foundation for the Warrior Spirit Walking Project discussed in Section 3.2 in the review of crime prevention evidence). The program coordinator met with Dr. Brokenleg on several occasions, in order to help build the foundation for the program according to the model.

The Circle of Courage model is based on child psychology and resilience research, as well as Aboriginal traditional teachings, and is thus rooted in the four central values found on the four points of the Medicine Wheel: belonging, mastery, independence, and generosity (Brentro et al., 2002). For example, belonging is based on the idea that every human being needs to have a sense of identity and belong to a social support network. Mastery refers to the need be competent and achieve personal goals, as well as to have opportunities for success and responsibility, experience social recognition, gain inner satisfaction and, at the same time, honour others who succeed. Independence is based on the idea that children must have opportunities to be independent, and they must be guided without interference, meaning that children must learn by doing, not by being instructed to do (Brentro et al., 2002: 52-53). Generosity means that children need to be taught to be unselfish and generous; they must develop a value system based on

simplicity, generosity and non-materialism. Finally, all four components must be in present for one to be able to live in balance and harmony, and have their circle of courage complete.

This program is premised on the idea that mending the broken circle (which encompasses the four components of belonging, mastery, independence, and generosity) for gang involved youth can help bring balance back into their life, and they will not need to rely on a gang to fill the void caused by the broken circle. And for the youth who are at-risk of gang involvement, the program will help to build and strengthen the four major components, so they will not have a void that could be filled by a readily available outlet, such as a gang.

When discussing whether this program tackled risk factors, program stakeholders indicated that due to its major focus on Aboriginal ways of being, and traditional Aboriginal child-rearing philosophies, it automatically has a major focus on tackling risk factors and strengthening resiliency in youth. They believed this because in Aboriginal tradition strong family bonds and ties were at the core of living and being. Much emphasis was placed on family, especially with regard to connecting Elders to youth, education, and teaching youth by setting positive examples in the family. Many Elders and parents also put major emphasis on nurturing and leading by example. The model which frames this program is rooted in holistic Aboriginal philosophy of child development, which is built on the idea that education of children is the most important function of a society (Brendtro, et al., 2002: 44).

Similarly, the risk-focused approach to prevention puts primary emphasis on children, youth, and families as a way to intervene and interrupt the cycle of victimization and offending (Waller and Welsh, 1999: 203-206; Farrington and Welsh, 2007), or, what could also be considered as—“mending the broken circle” (Brendtro, et al., 2002: 60-68)—a concept which was referred to by some Aboriginal stakeholders.


Thus, essentially it was found this Aboriginal-focused program (similar to many programs by and for Aboriginal people in Winnipeg), had similar outcome goals, and overlapping modes to achieve similar results as compared to the research evidence described throughout Chapter Two and Three. However, it conceptualized strategies and activities differently, and/or used other terminology to achieve outcome goals. For example, instead of simply providing preventative programming activities to interrupt the cycle of victimization and offending (risk-focused approach), the premise of this program was to strengthen essential core values (i.e. belonging, mastery, independence, and generosity) in order to achieve balance, and mend the broken circle.

A logic model describing program activities, outputs and expected outcomes was created for this program in order to obtain funding (see Appendix E for this model, created by the program stakeholder for this program). However, though they agreed with what the logic model entailed the program stakeholder and people in the Aboriginal organization which operated the program, felt that the model's hierarchal structure, with its specific start and finish did not fit with how they envisioned the program would work. As explained by the stakeholders, programs seeking to assist youth should not be considered finished once a desired set of outcomes are achieved, instead, the program goals and outcomes should provide youth with assistance for life, even after they have left the program. As a result, the team leader of this program created a culturally adapted circular logic model that could be used as a guide throughout the delivery and execution of the programming (see Appendix E for the culturally adapted circular logic model created by the program stakeholder for this program).

This program is funded through the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC), and is under evaluation. Like many of the programs being delivered by non-governmental

organizations, it receives minimal funding, and is thus delivered on a pilot basis. From April to June 2011 they lost their funding with the NCPC. Given this, the program director tried to seek out alternative sources of funding for the program, such as through the Provincial Justice Ministry and others, in order to avoid losing the program. However, in July 2011 the NCPC refunded the program and it will receive funding until March 31st 2012. See below for this program's accompanying program theory model.

Figure 8: Circle of Courage Program Theory Model*



Strong Heart Teaching Lodge: Seeing Oneself Program

Another program identified as specific to reducing risk factors for crime affecting Aboriginal people, is the Seeing Oneself Program,⁸⁷ which is part of the Strong Heart Teaching Lodge which operates out of the Thunderbird House. The primary focus of this program is to reduce addictions to alcohol and other substances—a risk factor cited as being highly correlated to victimization and offending.⁸⁸ The way this program is striving to achieve a reduction in alcohol is by trying to get to the “root” of the problem, as explained the program stakeholder for this program:

“So I think what we’re trying to do with our work is to get to the root, I think it is about getting to the root and trying to see root causes and getting into that place of understanding them self, beginning to see them self more and I think that's the perspective we want to take with these other components to bring the cultural, not just to go through the same cultural awareness kind of stuff but look at some ways that their teachings, the things that have helped them cope in the past can be applied to their life today. So it’s also trying to use culture as, in a way that is helping them look at the root causes as well.”

The program also attempts to tackle other risk factors for crime, such as hopelessness and lack of cultural identity and pride. It essentially strives to provide youth with a vision for their future through education and awareness, as well as engaging them in traditional Aboriginal teachings. The foundation and basics of the program were detailed in Section 3.2, where it is

⁸⁷ See end of section for the accompanying Program Theory Model.

⁸⁸ See Yuan et al., (2006) and Brzozowski, Taylor-Butts and Johnson (2006) which describe the correlation between alcohol and crime.

outlined as an example under the Aboriginal-focused crime prevention evidence section (see Section 3.2 for details of this program).

When the stakeholder for this program was interviewed, the Seeing Oneself program in Winnipeg was not completely implemented; it was in a research and planning stage in preparation for full operation. This involved a research team conducting a thorough examination of the population it is intended to serve, using the original Aboriginal-focused ‘Seeing Oneself’ program methodology (as applied in Nova Scotia with Mi’kmaq communities). The researchers are completed a component which assesses the current needs of the target population, including specific cultural requirements, and they are performing an in-depth examination of the target population’s risk factors for drinking behaviours.

This was done in Winnipeg through interviews (story sharing) with Aboriginal youth and members of the community, including Elders and others with local knowledge. The purpose was to more completely understand the needs of the target population in order to make the program as relevant as possible, and to create facilitator program manuals that are specific to the target population, based on the consultations. These interviews also had another component, beyond developing valuable insights from community people, which is to gain support and coordination from the community, given that a major aspect of this program is coordination among persons, organizations and relevant agencies in the community.

Furthermore, as explained by the stakeholder for this program, the goal is more than just getting youth to stop drinking; it is also about helping them understand the reasons why they are in their current situations. For example, teaching youth about residential school experiences and the displacement and re-allocation of their communities, and how these have affected many Aboriginal people today, in order to help youth understand why they and their families may now

be faced with addictions and other associated problems. This importance placed on this goal of teaching youth about history and about why they suffer from these risk factors is born out of the stakeholders own personal experience, for example:

“I mean I used to live on the streets in this very neighbourhood before there was a Thunderbird House or an Aboriginal Centre, this was all dive bars and you know. And it wasn’t until I began to understand many of the reasons how I wound up where I was, why I was feeling that anger, why I was feeling depressed, why I was using substances as a way to escape. And having the education and that awareness of recent historical events, unresolved historical events that helped me to see that, that put a light on in my head, cause then I was supposed to tackle something, I was actually able to see it, I was actually able to know the real issues as to why things were the way they were and I wasn’t just doing a lot of blaming whether it was my own self, my own people or blaming other people, and blaming them. It put it into perspective so that I knew that by making these changes or focusing on where I could make change that’s a big reason, that and going to the ceremonies for the first time that really helped support me to change my life to be you know get away from addictions and get away from violence and have a good family and do the work that I’m doing now and you know move into learn how to be lodge keeper, you know sundance and sweat lodge keeper, I mean all these things, I mean it was a big influence as to why I changed.”

Furthermore, this program is premised on the idea that the current westernised worldview (dominant and mainly white), perpetuates the violence and crime affecting Aboriginal people,

because of its emphasis on, and encapsulation of, a highly individualised way of life. And therefore, see what is lacking as being a holistic, collective approach to education, learning and being, which the program intends to re-teach and bring back to the participants' families and communities.

The program stakeholder argued that western society perpetuates an addictive logic, due to the highly individualized lifestyle under which current Canadian society operates. It was felt that this fuels Aboriginal people's addictive behaviours, because it gives them no understanding of why they are in their current situations, and at the same time leaves them with no source of collective support to address it. In his own words:

“one could look at society itself as perpetuating addictive logic, where this you know, we have a disposable society is one component that we have, people who believe that number one is the most important, you know how many people remember number two kind of thing you know ... we have society that seems to be very individualistic which is contrary to holistic worldview thinking.”

At the time of the interview, he stated that the program organizers were really trying to get this program into the school systems in Winnipeg and that stakeholders were trying to obtain funding for implementation. However, they had had some difficulty. Applications were submitted to government departments, including the NCPC, but the program organizers were not getting a response back regarding whether the program would be receiving funds. As one stakeholder of this program stated:


“What the frustrating part of it is, is that NCPC hasn’t got back to us and we haven’t heard nothing from them, we don’t know what the process is, all we know it’s in Ottawa being decided by the Minister, but it is, I guess the hard part of it is that if you don’t know what’s actually being done you’re just sort of left to them to decide and get back to you. I should say that the person I was working with, I am working with, at NCPC has been supportive, but she herself seems to be a bit in the dark as to where things are at, so it doesn’t leave a person feeling very good about you know where the proposal is at, especially if you have the knowledge and I’ve been in several national committees in Canada who all seem to have the same kind of perspective of NCPC is that they want to support the fantastic urban evidence-based programs in the States, and anything from Canada is hardly ever funded, so I’m kind of, you know I’m a bit concerned with that.”

This view is shared by a number of the program stakeholders interviewed; many expressed their struggles in trying to get their programming implemented. Receiving adequate and sustained funding was something that this program, and many other preventative programs in Winnipeg, struggled with.

This problem was viewed as very frustrating by many program stakeholders, particularly when they felt that there was a backup of supportive, evidence-based knowledge and/or development based on research and/or other knowledge, as well as people willing and able to implement and run such programs—as is the case with the Seeing Oneself program. The stakeholder above also mentioned that the NCPC seems to be interested in providing funding only to programs which are based on evidence from the United States (as well as the U.K).

Currently this program is receiving funding to operate in four schools within the Winnipeg School Division. Their funding came from a combined source of funding from the National Crime Prevention Centre and the Urban Aboriginal Strategy. Their grant will expire in December 2011. See below for this program's accompanying program theory model.

Figure 9: Seeing Oneself Program Theory Model*



Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre: Spirit of Peace Program

Finally, another program which is specifically aimed at reducing risk factors affecting Aboriginal people is the Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre's Spirit of Peace Program.⁸⁹ Like all programs run out of the Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre, the Spirit of Peace program is culturally relevant, preventative, supportive and based on Aboriginal cultures and value systems. Their programs are premised on the idea that colonization has interrupted Aboriginal people ways of living and value systems, and simultaneously broken up many families. They are therefore seeking to rebuild and strengthen Aboriginal families based on an Aboriginal value system, which puts primary emphasis on healing families, reconnecting people with their culture, and to help people take back their role as caregivers of their children.

The Spirit of Peace program aims to end the cycle of violence occurring in families. It has gone through many changes throughout the 1990s' up to today, in order to best serve the needs of the community it is trying to reach. For example, for some time the program was directed at men, who were required to attend due to charges related to violent offending. However, once staff felt that this approach was not working, it was reorganized so that no one was required to attend, and the focus was put on families rather than offenders.

Later it was also no longer referred to as the 'Spirit of Peace Violence Prevention Program,' but simply the 'Spirit of Peace Program.' Although the program still aims to reduce violence in families, this is no longer specifically stated—the program stakeholder explained this was to reduce negative connotations or stigmatization. According to the program stakeholder interviewed, since this latest reorganization, program staff have found that participants are much more interested in the program, and that they actually have higher attendance now that it is not mandatory, and open to all family members.

⁸⁹ See end of section for the accompanying Program Theory Model.

Thus, this program is targeted at families, which, since they are made up of men, women and children, represent these three different target groups. Men, for example, are separated into their own programming group, where they receive prevention and intervention educational programming and mentoring relevant to their unique situations, including educational activities, intervention centred on tackling risk factors related to aggressiveness, family dysfunction, and family violence and crime. Women are also separated into their own programming group, where they also receive prevention and intervention educational programming and mentoring relevant to their unique situations, including educational programming regarding safety which involves ensuring they have safety plans. Children are provided with mentoring and educational programming and support based on their unique situations as well.


The three groups of men, women, and children, meet separately three times a week, and they continue the program for 12 to 14 weeks or until the family has successfully reached its program goals. Each group is staffed by a trained facilitator (professional resources intervener) and a co-facilitator, both of whom lead and provide the educational and supportive group activities (in some cases they provide individual support services as well, depending on people's unique situations). And, like all programs run out of the Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre, the co-facilitators have successfully completed the programming which they are now helping to deliver, thus providing positive peer influence.

A formal evaluation of this program was conducted in 1995/96 by an external evaluator before the program had undergone its most recent re-working and re-focusing. There has been, however, no formal evaluation assessing the program's complete effectiveness. However, like all programs run out of the centre, data are collected on participation rates, and many programs—including the Spirit of Peace program—also provide pre and post-program surveys to their

participants to elicit their feedback and opinion of the program. For the Spirit of Peace program specifically, this type of assessment component is completed every one to two years, and changes are made to the program based on the participants' reported experiences.

Finally, programs at the centre, including the Spirit of Peace Program, are often limited by funding. For example, they are only able to conduct their assessment components within the limits of their often strict budgets, and/or according to a specific funding mandate they are following at the time. Like many Aboriginal organizations which offer preventative programming, Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre's programs are funded by a variety of sources and organizations. These include government grants, which they are usually required to compete for through funding competitions, and/or are limited by guidelines and mandates set by the funders. See below for this program's accompanying program theory model.

Figure 10: Spirit of Peace Program Theory Model*



7.2 Aboriginal Programs Not Targeting Crime but Tackling Risk Factors Related to Crime

Winnipeg Aboriginal Sports Achievement Centre (WASAC), and the University of Winnipeg's Innovative Learning Centre (ILC)

The Winnipeg Aboriginal Sports Achievement Centre (WASAC), and the University of Winnipeg's Innovative Learning Centre (ILC)⁹⁰ are examples of organizations providing Aboriginal focused programming which does not specifically target crime, but tackles many of the risk factors related to crime which affect Aboriginal people (which were identified in Chapter Two).

Their programs include Eco Kids and Eco-U Programs, the Enviro Tech Program, the Shine On Program, Model School Programs and other related educational-based, highly structured programs. These are offered under the umbrella of the ILC; however, there is overlap between the ILC and WASAC. As the program stakeholder interviewed explained, WASAC is the unofficial manager of ILC, since they operate collaboratively and the manager of WASAC is also the coordinator of the ILC. According to the risk-focused implementation literature outlined in Chapter 3, this would be seen as a positive situation, given the benefits of coordination and partnership between two related centres with similar goals and target groups.

The programs offered by the centres are interrelated and have many overlapping functions—the two centres actually operate like one large crime prevention initiative. For example, the ultimate aim is for their participants to obtain a university degree, so the main focus is on getting youth successfully through elementary and high school; and upon successful graduation from high school, getting them prepared for university. This ambitious goal is based on the program coordinators' realization of the large graduation gap that faces many disadvantaged youth in Winnipeg. The program is based on the idea that if children and youth

⁹⁰ See end of section for the accompanying Program Theory Model.

can get a university education, they will be able to succeed in terms of overall well-being (i.e. health, economic status, social participation, employment, security and safety).

Many of the centres' programs have a structured educational focus, and are good examples of prevention which targets Aboriginal children and youth's risk factors related to crime. Like other programs and Aboriginal organizations in Winnipeg, their primary function is not to reduce crime. However, many of the activities are analogous to what is considered "effective prevention", when compared with research reviewed in Chapters Two and Three (see also Waller, 2006; Farrington and Welsh, 2007; Sherman, et al., 2007; Sherman, et al., 2002).

All the programs offered through WASAC and the ILC are specifically targeted to low income Aboriginal children and youth, and new Canadian children and youth (those who have recently immigrated to Canada). The programming also targets youth living in the inner city/north end of Winnipeg, who are typically surrounded by poverty, crime and persons with addictions.

There are also a variety of eco-focused programs, which are offered through partnerships with Winnipeg schools and the University of Winnipeg. These programs have an environmental theme, and incorporate indigenous science. For example, the Eco-Kids on campus activity involves elementary students (typically Grade six) coming to the University of Winnipeg campus one afternoon a week for approximately one semester (four months). Educators from the university's Faculty of Science, in partnership with educators from the participating elementary schools, deliver a science curriculum to these children in the university environment.

The youth engage in a wide variety of structured and organized, hands-on educational activities, which usually involve scientific and environmental experiments and events, thereby addressing risk factors associated with low education and poor school access and involvement.

The youths are provided with practical skills which the intention is for them to take them back with them into to the general education system to help them achieve. The purpose of this is to give them better prospects for graduation from elementary and/or high school. This is in addition to providing the students with alternatives to the typical educational system, and encouraging them to get involved through the use of mentors and other specially trained educators.

The Eco-Kids After-School program is a similar eco-related programming activity, and is typically provided to children and youth from the ages of 7 to 12. This program tackles the same risk factors as those identified for the Eco-Kids campus activity, by providing structured learning activities to disadvantaged at-risk youth after school. It promotes continued learning through a variety of teaching approaches, which thus, seeks to makes it assessable to students with diverse learning skill sets. Furthermore, since the programming is targeted toward disadvantaged youth, it also seeks to provide those from broken homes and/or dysfunctional families with a place to develop positive social ties. In other words, it seeks to provide another positive support system and an alternative/additional learning environment.

Another program that tackles similar risk factors is the Eco-U Summer Kids Camp, an eco-based activity that provides ongoing support and education to children during the summer. In addition to many structured educational activities that aim to educate youth and promote educational advancement, this summer camp also incorporates cultural activities, such as teaching youth about traditional Aboriginal culture by having them participate in smudging ceremonies, and providing them the opportunity for traditional storytelling, and thus, tackling the risk factor related to lack of cultural identify and pride.

The Shine On Program specifically targets inner-city high school students, and assists them with the transition from high school to university. It delivers leadership courses, and

provides the students with bursary information and employment readiness training and assistance, to help them transition successfully to university, and eventually into the workforce.

All the programming described above is delivered by trained educators and/or social work specialists. Furthermore, many of those hired to work with program participants have successfully completed the programs they are helping deliver, either through WASAC or the ILC. As the program stakeholder for this program explained, not only does this set a great example for the youth in the program, but it also gives them the opportunity to connect with someone who successfully completed similar programming, thus providing positive peer influences.

In addition to providing employment training, the centres offer employment opportunities, and a chance to get work experience. For example, as explained by the program stakeholder, in the summer of 2009 the summer camp program alone created over 100 jobs, 75 to 80% of which were staffed by Aboriginal youth and young adults from the community who had taken ILC and/or WASAC programs. WASAC also has a partnership with the Centre for Aboriginal Human Resource Development (CAHRD), and every high school enrolled youth who works for WASAC has access to an employment counsellor to help them with their employment responsibilities and work life.

Another component of the ILC is the opportunity fund, an initiative for children and youth who are successful in school. Since the main goal and priority of the ILC is to have all their youth achieve a post-secondary degree, the centre rewards them when they succeed and pass their grades in school. Similar to the Quantum Opportunities evidence-based crime prevention program outlined in Section 3.2, the youth receive a financial incentive, which is put towards their post-secondary education (see Hahn et al., 1994).

The ILC opportunity fund starts in grade four, and when students successfully pass and move on to grade five they receive \$150, which goes into a tuition credit account for the University of Winnipeg. The more successful they are, the more money they qualify for; when they advance from Grade 10 to Grade 11, for example, they can receive up to \$750, as the amount possible increases with each grade, with bigger increases as they get closer to graduation. In essence, the goal is that by the time they reach Grade 12 and are ready to graduate from high school, they have acquired up to four thousand dollars to apply toward attending the University of Winnipeg.

As explained by a program stakeholder, while the opportunity fund decreases the economic barrier for youth living in low income situations, it has an additional purpose: to help change the perceptions parents and teachers have of the students. For example, it was explained that parents who might have once had a sense of hopelessness regarding their children's education, can now envision them having a successful future, an aspiration which wasn't previously available.


Furthermore, WASAC has a Bboard of Aboriginal people from the local community, who meet periodically to discuss program direction. The Board considers how programs should be run and what their focus should be, and helps ensure that any modifications or changes to programming are based on knowledge derived from Aboriginal community residents. The Board is made up of a variety of people closely involved with Winnipeg's Aboriginal community; the current Chair is Yuon Dumont, the first Métis Lieutenant Governor. Other members include an Aboriginal prosecuting attorney, an Aboriginal social worker and other Aboriginal people who have been and remain active members of their Aboriginal community who bring to the table a

variety of experience and expertise specific to at-risk Aboriginal youth in Winnipeg, among others.

The programs offered through the ILC and WASAC do not have current impact evaluations regarding the number of participants graduating from elementary school, high school and university. The program stakeholder for the program explained that they currently only measure success based on participation rates. And the programs continue to have large amounts of the same youth continuing to sign-up and stay involved.

Finally, the ILC and WASAC are funded differently, and through a variety of sources. For example, WASAC receives its funding from various government entities, while the ILC is funded through the University of Winnipeg and an array of private supporters. Similar to many other Aboriginal focused prevention programs and organizations, in order to keep their programs going and respond to the increasing Aboriginal population, program staff are always seeking and trying to raise funds in order to meet the demands and need. See below for this program's accompanying program theory model.

Figure 11: Winnipeg Aboriginal Sports Achievement Centre and Innovative Learning Centre Program Theory Model*



7.3 Programs Specific to Reducing General Risk Factors for Crime

Triple P Program

The Triple P Program⁹¹ is a parenting program that aims to reduce child abuse, neglect and other interrelated family issues. It helps parents learn effective management strategies to deal with many childhood developmental and behavioural issues, thereby tackling risk factors related to poor child rearing and supervision, and dysfunctional, disorganized and disconnected families; as well as assisting mothers and fathers who might be single parents. The program is specific to reducing general risk factors related to child abuse and neglect. Though it is not specifically aimed at Aboriginal families, it is delivered to many Aboriginal families in Winnipeg, and as according to the a stakeholder who spoke on behalf of this program explained, a current goal is to make it more culturally appropriate for Aboriginal families it is seeking to serve:

“I think what we’re doing now is actually we’re looking at making the materials more Manitoba Aboriginal appropriate.”

The program is based on the idea that if the knowledge, skills and confidence of parents are strong and/or strengthened, their children will be less likely to experience behavioural, emotional and/or developmental problems.

This program was outlined as an example of promising Aboriginal-focused crime prevention evidence in Section 3.2, since many evaluations have shown successful results in reducing child abuse, maltreatment and related factors (Sanders, Markie-Dadds and Turner, 2003; Prinz, et al., 2009). One evaluation was conducted with Aboriginal families in Australia,

⁹¹ See end of section for the accompanying Program Theory Model.

and showed success with respect to significantly decreasing the rate of problem child behaviour, as well as parents relying less on dysfunctional parenting practices post-intervention. The study provided empirical support for the effectiveness and acceptability of a culturally relevant approach to Group Triple P (Turner et al., 2007). The outcomes of the evaluation made a compelling case for providing increased and appropriate services to Aboriginal families, and reducing barriers to accessing available services within the community (See Section 3.2 for a complete description of the program).

A variety of Triple P program support levels are now being implemented in many communities and, notably, in a number of Aboriginal communities in Winnipeg. Provided through 'Healthy Child Manitoba,' (an agency with services for children, youth and families) the program began in March 2005, and was officially launched throughout the province in the fall of 2008 (most Healthy Child Manitoba programs are delivered provide-wide). There are currently over 650 trained and accredited Triple P practitioners in the province, including public health nurses, child care workers, social workers, teachers, psychologists and psychiatrists, as well as practitioners from many other disciplines (Healthy Child Manitoba, 2008).


In Winnipeg alone, there are 40 agencies offering a variety of Triple P programming. And as according to the program stakeholder interviewed in regards to this program:

“it’s been rolled out province wide, we’ve trained almost a thousand people now in delivering Triple P.”

Many of the programs include both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal clients, and all vary according to the agency implementing the program. For example, the Manitoba Métis

Federation, through their Métis Community Liaison department, provides Level 3 Triple P to their many of their Métis clients. Like all programs offered through Healthy Child Manitoba, they are evaluated as well as receive funding through the province. See below for this program's accompanying program theory model.

Figure 12: Triple P Program Theory Model*



The Roots of Empathy (ROE) Program

The Roots of Empathy (ROE) Program⁹² is another program that aims to reduce general risk factors related to crime. It does not target certain crimes directly. Rather it is centered on reducing violence and violent related activities. A key focus is reducing levels of bullying, aggression and anti-social behaviour, with the intention to eventually reduce future delinquency in students' later teen and adult lives (Gordon, 2005: 172).

Roots of Empathy is a primary preventative, universal, classroom-based program for elementary school students from kindergarten to grade eight. Though it does not specifically target Aboriginal families, it is delivered to many Aboriginal families in Winnipeg, who both participate in the programming and work with the program as certified instructors. Furthermore, although the program is not culturally focused, it is adapted to fit the needs of the clientele.

The ROE program is a school-based intervention that is integrated into the curriculum, with certified instructors leading the students through the program. Real-life parents with young infants come into the classroom to assist, giving the students a visual representation of positive child-parent interaction and related education, by placing babies in the role of the teacher (Gordon, 2005). The program is based on the idea that if children become better at understanding their own feelings, and the feelings of others (empathy), they will be less likely to physically, psychologically and emotionally hurt one another through bullying and other forms of violence.

In Manitoba, the program typically involves a neighbourhood infant and parent visiting the classroom once a month throughout the school year, and a certified instructor delivering the programming three times a month, also throughout the school year. There are about 44 different schools in Winnipeg participating in the ROE programming, all of them funded through Healthy Child Manitoba. An ROE program has also been tailored for use in classrooms which deal

⁹² See end of section for the accompanying Program Theory Model.

specifically with children with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD), with FASD professionals trained as ROE instructors delivering the program.

Although this program was not described in Section 3.2 in the review of evidence-based knowledge, it is supported by research outlining its success in reducing many risk factors related to crime, and several evaluations showed its effectiveness in decreasing aggressiveness and anti-social behaviour in students (See Schonert-Reichl, 2005; Schonert-Reichl et al., 2007). For example, an evaluation of ROE conducted in Vancouver with 132 students in grades one to three (consisting of five program groups, and five comparison groups) showed that the children who experienced the ROE programming were more advanced in their emotional and social understanding of aggression, and had significant decreases in aggressive behaviours associated with bullying compared to children who did not participate in the programming (see Schonert-Reichl, 2005 for evaluation).

More recently, an evaluation of ROE was done in Manitoba⁹³ (see Santos, et al., 2008). Healthy Child Manitoba, who deliver this programming in Winnipeg and across the province, conducted a clustered randomized controlled trial from 2002 to 2006, to evaluate the implementation of ROE in the province (Santos et al., 2008). ROE was randomly assigned to five of eight different school divisions, in kindergarten, grade four and grade eight classrooms (n=445) (Santos et al., 2008). The remaining three school divisions served as a wait list control group (n=315) (Santos et al., 2008).


The programming was delivered through 27 separate sessions throughout the school year. Students observed parent-child interaction, and learned about brain development, temperament, attachment, reading emotional cues, conveying thoughts and feelings, and the value of social

⁹³ The results of this program evaluation have not been published in any official report or peer reviewed article. They are based on a poster presentation at the Banff Conference on Behaviour Sciences and thus are limited.

inclusion (Santos et al., 2008). Three child behaviour measures were rated by teachers before the program started (physical aggression, indirect aggression, and pro-social behaviour) and then immediately after program completion, and followed up annually for additional three years (Santos et al., 2008).

Compared to the control group, ROE had reduced physical aggression and indirect aggression, and increased pro-social behaviour (Santos et al., 2008). Thus, the Manitoba evaluation showed that ROE was successful in tackling many risk factors highly correlated to crime, including aggressiveness and poor social skills. See below for this program's accompanying program theory model.

Figure 13: Roots of Empathy Program Theory Model*



7.4 Programs Not Targeting Crime but Tackling General Risk Factors Related to Crime

The Healthy Baby Program

The Healthy Baby Program is another program provided through Healthy Child Manitoba.⁹⁴ Though it does not target crime specifically, it does tackle many general risk factors related to crime. The program has two main components: the Healthy Baby Community Support Programming itself, and a Manitoba Prenatal Health Benefit. The Prenatal Health Benefit is financial assistance of up to \$80 per month, to help pregnant, low-income women meet their nutritional needs during pregnancy. The community support programs assist pregnant woman throughout their pregnancy, and during their first year of parenthood. The program primarily tackles risk factors related to poverty, poor child rearing and supervision, and in some cases, dysfunctional, disorganized, and disconnected families.


Similar to the Elmira (New York) Prenatal/Early Infancy Project discussed in Section 3.2 in the review of risk-focused crime prevention evidence, the Healthy Baby Program targeted those with low-income; typically young women who are pregnant and/or who are young parents of toddlers (Olds, et al., 1999: 53). The assistance is provided by public health nurses through home visits, as in the Elmira project.

In addition to home visits, many group sessions are also offered. The programming is slightly different, depending on which agency is delivering it, as there are 32 different sites in Winnipeg providing Healthy Baby programming funded through Healthy Child Manitoba. However, the main focus of all the agencies is to provide low income mothers and mothers-to-be, with education about nutrition for both mother and baby, and an array of parenting skills, including awareness of babies' nurturing needs. This involves providing pre-natal classes and

⁹⁴ See end of section for the accompanying Program Theory Model.

drop-in support, as well as assisting with additional services and support in the community. For example, the Sweet Grass and Little Braids Healthy Baby Program run out of the Indian and Métis Friendship Centre of Winnipeg, teaches young mothers how to care for themselves and their babies. It is delivered by a public health nurse, and a program worker who provides specialized support in teaching young mothers about how to interact and bond with their children. The program is based on the idea that if support and services are provided to at-risk pregnant mothers and mothers with young children (community capacity building), it can positively affect their pregnancy and, consequently, the future of their children and families. See below for this program's accompanying program theory model.

Figure 14: Healthy Baby Program Theory Model*



Community Schools Investigator (CSI) Summer Learning Enrichment Program

The last program to be described herein is the Community Schools Investigator (CSI) Summer Learning Enrichment Program.⁹⁵ This is another program which does not target crime specifically, but tackles many general risk factors related to crime. It operates under the auspices of the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, in partnership with numerous organizations, including the Winnipeg School Division, the Centre for Aboriginal Human Resource Development, the Centennial Project, the Community Education Development Agency and the Winnipeg Boys and Girls Club, among many others (Botting, 2008: 3).

This program was established in response to research conducted by the Manitoba Centre for Health Policy, which outlined a significant overlap between poverty and education, as well as the impact that summer learning loss was having on many children in the inner-city (Botting, 2008: 3). The CSI program was created in 2005, with the intent of preventing summer learning loss and improving opportunities for children in the summer months. Therefore, the overall primary aim is to improve the graduation rate of vulnerable inner-city children. And similar to the WASAC and ILC programs described earlier, the CSI program is based on the idea that if children and youth can successfully get through school and obtain an education, they will be able to succeed in life, in terms of overall well-being (i.e. health, economic status, social participation, employment, security and safety).

The program is a school-based, summer day camp, aimed at children in grades one to six from low income communities in Winnipeg. It serves approximately 360 students (as of 2008, and participation grows every year), for five days a week for a five week period during the summer (Botting, 2008: 7). While it does not target Aboriginal children specifically,

⁹⁵ See end of section for the accompanying Program Theory Model.

approximately 60% of the children who take part in the program are of Aboriginal heritage, and another 30% are from immigrant or refugee families (Botting, 2008: 7).

Through the CSI program, children participate in many daily activities designed to strengthen their math problem solving skills, reading comprehension, analytical skills, language acquisition and writing skills, thus tackling risk factors related to low education and poor school access and involvement. And though the program does not have a specific cultural focus, it does include cultural-related activities, including Aboriginal and other cultures. For example, children were taught about Aboriginal drumming, and African drumming; thus the program also tackles risk factors related to lack of cultural identity and pride, as well as risk factors related to racism and discrimination, through exposure to a diversity of cultural practices.

A teacher from each of the different participating schools coordinate and supervise the program, which is delivered by 54 university and high school students, 22 of whom are of Aboriginal heritage, and many who are from local communities, thus providing jobs and at the same time providing positive peer influences (Botting, 2008: 7). However, there is also no formal training specifically for this program.


Although there have been no formal evaluations of this program, since its inception in 2005 there have been several ad hoc assessments of its operations and effectiveness. For example, at the end of June 2006, children were assessed in reading in their final school reporting period, and the same students were assessed again in September 2006 through the Winnipeg School Division C.A.P. assessment. Of the students assessed, 90.5% remained the same or improved, and 9.5% fell slightly behind (Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, 2006: 3). During the same period, another pre and post-test was given to a random sample of participating

students in the math curriculum, which showed that 80% of the students had either improved or maintained their math skills (Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, 2006: 3).

In 2008, survey data were gathered from teacher coordinators and the university and high school educators, as well as from other sources such as questionnaires completed by food coordinators, and tabulations of children's goals (Botting, 2008: 8). It was found that of the 360 children in the program in 2008, 70% attended on a regular basis (Botting, 2008: 8). And there was positive feedback from teacher coordinators and student educators, with 90% expressing that they felt the program had been effective in terms of improving literacy and mathematics skills.

Finally, like many programs implemented by non-government organizations, there is no secure core funding for this program. Instead, the funding comes from a variety of sources, including the province, several different foundations, a host of individual donors and others (see Botting, 2008: 18). See below for this program's accompanying program theory model.

Figure 15: Community School Investigator Summer Learning Enrichment Program Theory Model*



7.5 Conclusion

There are programs in place that tackle risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people. Eight were selected because they synergise with the risk-focused research evidence reviewed in Chapter Two and Three.

Program theory models outlined program inputs, activities, intervening variables and outcomes, and thus, were able to provide a better description of how the program functions and the program's theoretical basis.

The majority of action related to prevention which tackles risk factors is implemented by Aboriginal organizations and other non-governmental and community-based entities, rather than through strategies organized by the government or city. These types of programs tend to spring up in small, non-government agencies, and/or by volunteer organizing efforts, and they usually operate on funding obtained through fundraising and/or responding to government calls for proposals.

In addition, not all of these programs undergo evaluations, or have consistent and uniform evaluation processes in place to determine program effectiveness. This tended to be more prevalent with the community organized programs, such as the WASAC and ILC, the Spirit of Peace Program and the CSI Summer Learning Program.

A common theme throughout the review was the fact that many of the community-based programs must continually struggle and/or compete for funding. Finally, not only do many programs lack sustained funding, especially those which are delivered through Aboriginal organizations, but these programs are also not part of any comprehensive implementation or action plan which is consistent with the implementation model outlined in Chapter Three. There is no sustained funding and/or infrastructure for crime prevention in the city of Winnipeg.

Chapter Eight: Are Collaborative Community Safety Strategies Used For Urban Aboriginal Crime Prevention Programming?

This chapter begins by discussing whether a responsibility centre to mobilize different sectors to tackle crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg exists. The next section discusses whether a strategic planning process (i.e. diagnose, plan, implement, evaluate) organizing Aboriginal crime prevention programs and services is in place in Winnipeg. Finally, the last section discusses cost effectiveness with respect to crime prevention in Winnipeg. Stakeholders were asked if they felt knowledge about “what works” (knowledge based on risk factors) and knowledge about what is “cost effective” (in regards to implementing prevention based on risk factors) is utilized in crime prevention planning processes in Winnipeg.

8.1 Is There a Responsibility Centre to Mobilize Different Sectors to Tackle the Crime Problem?

When stakeholders were asked whether there was any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people that is run either by an organization, the city, and/or which engages the public, there were both multiple and overlapping answers provided.

Seventeen interviews mentioned community coalitions. Ten interviews mentioned “LiveSAFE,” which is a crime prevention city led strategy. Nine interviews identified that nothing was in place. Five interviews mentioned advisory boards. Two interviews mentioned “PowerLine” which is a neighbourhood run and organized collaborative initiative.

First, interviews which discuss advisory boards and community coalitions are discussed, followed by a discussion of responses from those who stated that no structured and organized collaboration exists at all.

Finally more in-depth descriptions of both LiveSAFE and Powerline are provided. This is because the LiveSAFE Strategy and the Powerline initiative were found to have the most overlaps with the crime prevention research identified in Chapter Three (see section 3.3), and thus, are discussed in more depth and are described within the context of the existing literature reviewed. In terms of these two initiatives, analysis of documents assisted in providing more detailed information and/or filling in any gaps which were not explained in the interviews.

Advisory Boards

Five interviews mentioned advisory boards when asked whether there was any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people (that is run either by an organization or by the city).

For example, many of the Aboriginal organizations identified earlier, such as Ka Ni Kanichihk, the Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre, and Ndinawe were all identified as having advisory boards which discussed their organizations operations, and/or which were in place to help inform specific programs.

Some of these Aboriginal organizations were found to have different components that incorporate some of the implementation strategy fundamentals found in the crime prevention literature, such as coordination among each other and other organizations in the city (for some programs and/or for referrals), and boards to organize the implementation of their programs. As well, many of the Aboriginal organizations are structured on the premise of working together, deciding together, and doing things collaboratively. For example when referring to their Aboriginal organization this program stakeholder stated:

“a lot of our programs are informed and in some ways directed by advisory committees, so the Circle of Courage for example brings together a lot of stakeholders in the community that's includes the police, the City of Winnipeg, principals of high schools, community members and we sit down on a fairly regular basis to collaborate.”

Thus, there were organizations which were found to have advisory boards to help inform specific programs (or their organization as a whole). As in the case above, the Circle of Courage Program aims to reduce crime affecting urban Aboriginal people and has a board from many sectors that provides input into the programs operations. The fact that there is collaboration from many sectors who are brought together to discuss crime affecting urban Aboriginal people and prevention, shows overlap with literature in Chapter Three. However, given that these advisory boards are specific to the individual programs and are not part of a broader city wide collaborative umbrella organization or strategy, they are not exactly what the crime prevention literature reviewed described.

Community Coalitions

There was, however, an array of different community coalitions identified and described. Seventeen interviews made mention of a community coalition. These types of initiatives all typically entailed meetings and/or community forums which brought together people from many sectors and organizations, and sometimes included the discussion of crime affecting urban Aboriginal people for the whole city, and beyond just a specific program or organization. However, as per the existing crime prevention literature (reviewed in Chapter Three), none were in existence which had their primary objective on the prevention of crime affecting urban

Aboriginal people in Winnipeg—and thus, on implementing and coordinating prevention programs that tackle urban Aboriginal people risk factors related to crime.

Overall it was found that these coalitions typically got together to exchange ideas and discuss an array of themes. For example, some stakeholders identified different coalitions that they are a part of and explained:

“We also sit on the Inner City Safety Coalition, and that's also a very broad coalition of groups and people that, that sit around talking about safety activities in the community...”

In this case, an Inner City Safety Coalition was mentioned, however, this coalition, similar to all of the other coalitions described, it typically involves people getting together to discuss and exchange ideas.

This is similarly described by this program stakeholder:

“I know there is different types of collaborations that are around. I think for the most part they do a lot of talking about just what programs there are and partnering and things like that, and then they just talk about certain themes...”

Although these organizations may collaborate in terms of informing each other of what they, other organizations, and/or government agencies are doing, still, none of these coalitions represent a collaborative strategy which is focused specifically on reducing crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg. For example, as explained by this stakeholder:

“we have groups that are meeting regularly and that I’m a part of, like the Sexually Exploited Youth Coalition that does look at you know components of that, but it’s not as specific”

Lack of a Responsibility Centre and a System of Silos

Nine interviewees stated that nothing related to structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people exists at all. These stakeholders simply stated that there was no over-arching comprehensive umbrella organization and/or strategy (similar to what was described in the crime prevention research reviewed for this study: see Chapter Three).

For example, when asked whether there was any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people. Responses from those indicating that nothing exists included: “not yet,” “no,” “not at this point,” or “hmm. I’m not aware of any,” or as this stakeholder explained:

“I think your question of is there a place where it goes beyond that comes together, that eventually gets converted into some real action, I’d say no.”

Also similar is this stakeholder’s response:

“in order to deal with it you’d need an umbrella organization; a safety council or whatever, there have been minor attempts at safety councils.”

As identified by this stakeholder, there is a lack of an umbrella organization (responsibility centre).

Furthermore, many stakeholders expressed frustration with the operation of the current government organizations and structures, pointing out the lack of any type of coordination, their concern with the state of fragmented services, and the many departments and organizations that all work individually with their own separate agendas. As one Aboriginal program stakeholder explained:

“We’re also dealing with a system that is working in “silos.” The system itself is separated and I think that has a strong influence on what kind of help we can get, not as Aboriginal people or as people in general but when you’re looking at specific service related agencies you know you have to go to this place for health, you have to go to this place for social services, you have to go to this place for addictions, and, and all of them aren’t working together”

Furthermore, many Aboriginal people interviewed for this study expressed related opinions. For example, further stating that a central organization, coordination of services and/or a comprehensive plan and/or approach was something that was wanted and needed, but had experienced difficulty in making it a reality. For example, as one Aboriginal program stakeholder stated:

“You have to have a comprehensive approach, a proper plan to address the different facets of the issue”

Similarly, another Aboriginal program stakeholder stated:

“The government, our bureaucracy, is really doing a lot of planning, and yeah they do a lot of planning and then they come up with some money and then they throw the money in different organizations and that's supposed to fix the problem. And yes there is a lot of programs, we run programs out of here that I believe will make a difference down the road, but what needs to happen is there needs to be more coordination of these programs, there needs to be more central kind of watching of statistics and actually working together and making sure that each of these programs are doing what they do.”

“LiveSAFE” Strategy

Ten interviews mentioned the “LiveSAFE” Strategy (sometimes referred to as the “Search Conference”) when asked whether there was any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people exists. For example, as this stakeholder stated:

“Well I think the closest thing is that might be the Search Conference.”

The Search Conference an initiative stemming from the City of Winnipeg’s Community Services Department which was set up as an initial attempt to get community stakeholders and city agencies collaborating and organized around issues related to crime. When stakeholders were discussing this strategy many mentioned that it had its major focus on common risk

factors and crime prevention through social development more generally, for example, as identified by this stakeholder:

“the LiveSAFE committee which helped to organize that thing at the Fort Garry Hotel is working on a crime prevention strategy for the city of Winnipeg. And they certainly, part of that work is about what are the common risk factors and so on.”

As identified by this stakeholder above, part of the LiveSAFE strategy is focused on risk factors, which overlaps with the crime prevention research reviewed in Chapter Three. The following stakeholder further points out that this strategy has specific action plans which incorporate Aboriginal people in relation to crime prevention through social development, thus, also revealing overlap with the crime prevention literature reviewed in earlier chapters:

“there are recommendations that are coming out of LiveSAFE that have specific action plans targeted towards meeting the needs of the Aboriginal community as it relates to them specifically in crime prevention through social development”

However, even though there is specific action plans included in the strategy which incorporate Aboriginal specific recommendations. This strategy is not an Aboriginal specific strategy; instead, it is a strategy directed at Winnipeg as a whole, which includes Aboriginal people. This is indicated by the following stakeholder:

“but at the high level for LiveSAFE the city’s policy was not directed at Aboriginal youth, it was directed at crime prevention through social development”

In March 2008, the LiveSAFE Policy was approved by the Winnipeg City Council. This policy statement recognized that successful crime prevention initiatives should involve all sectors within the community, including all levels of government, agencies and organizations from the private and non-profit sectors, as well as community groups and citizens. The five guiding principles of this policy were prevention, leadership and coordination, interconnectedness and partnerships, sustainability and accountability. The intent of this policy was to find a balanced approach to crime prevention that includes policing as well as prevention, in order to address the “root causes” of crime in Winnipeg.

The LiveSAFE strategy began with two community leaders’ forums/conferences on crime prevention which were held in Winnipeg (which also initiated the inquiry into Winnipeg). In November 2008, the city assembled many people involved in crime prevention and related programming and policy, at a conference entitled “Community Leaders Forum on Crime Prevention” (also attended by the author of this study). This forum was a collection of about 85 community leaders in Winnipeg, including the Executive Director of the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, the Director of Winnipeg’s Community Services Department, the Chief of Police, the directors and leaders of various crime prevention and reduction programs in the city, and professors from local universities. Organized by the City of Winnipeg and the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, it was facilitated by Dr. Don De Guerre, a professor and professional group facilitator from Concordia University in Montreal. The purpose of this first meeting was to discuss and brainstorm whether a “Search Conference” on crime prevention was achievable in

the City of Winnipeg. A search conference is a planning process that has the intention of developing a desired final action plan, in this case an action plan for crime prevention in the City of Winnipeg. At the conclusion of the forum, participants were asked to provide the names of people they thought would be interested in being involving in the search conference.

The Search Conference was organized and took place in January, 2009 (also attended by the author). It brought together many of the people from the first conference, as well as a number of new players, including Aboriginal youth leaders from the city, professors from local universities, the Executive Director of the Boys and Girls Clubs of Winnipeg, a political advisor from the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs Secretariat and the Coordinator of the Innovative Learning Centre (ILC). The meeting was again facilitated by Dr. De Guerre, and included many small group sessions to discuss what is happening in the city, and what is being done. The final outcome was a cross-sectoral action plan for crime prevention, involving leadership commitment and accountability from a variety of departments and organizations in Winnipeg, including business, government, education, health, non-profit and others.

After the Search Conference, a follow-up meeting was held in April 2009, and in May of that year a second Community Leaders Forum was held, and then a final report was issued in November 2009. The recommendations in the report included the intention of the City of Winnipeg to work in partnership with various sectors and organizations to address crime prevention through social development. Six different action themes were proposed:

- the community and the Winnipeg police working more closely in neighbourhoods attempting to implement prevention;
- resources being targeted at high risk neighbourhoods and families;

- building community capacity to develop resiliency in youth, children and families by focusing on recreation and school attendance;
- a publicly funded Aboriginal school division;
- a responsible and balanced media that recognizes its role in prevention; and, finally,
- implementing a ‘community driven’ organization which would lead a strategy of crime prevention in the city through social development. This organization would promote best practices, effective use of resources and holistic responses to crime prevention.

Implementation

However, after all these recommendations, and many meetings, conferences and planning, nothing has happened with regard to actual practice and/or implementation of the proposals. There has been no concrete action taken by persons in a position to do so. For example, throughout the planning processes there was a lack of attendance and commitment by senior officials, such as the Mayor who was never in attendance (which is because politicians were excluded from these meetings).

This is something that is notably different when comparing this Winnipeg strategy to other city crime prevention collaborative strategies in Canada. For example, Edmonton who also made a similar attempt at achieving a collaborative strategy and responsibility centre for crime prevention in the city actually got many of their recommendations implemented, including funds to set up a responsibility centre for crime prevention. Edmonton had nine recommendations that all resulted in action, unlike these six recommendations in Winnipeg which have gone nowhere.

In Edmonton the Mayor is the one who actually set up the development of their city's crime prevention collaborative strategy. He first set up a task force, who then organized community consultations, followed by the development of a report which outlined their nine recommendations. On the other hand, not only did this Winnipeg LiveSAFE strategy not have the Mayor playing a role in setting it up, but as mentioned, didn't even have him in attendance at the organizational meetings because politicians were excluded as invitees.

Furthermore, the Mayor of Edmonton was not only very active in the creation of a crime prevention strategy, but he was also very passionate about it as well. For example, this can be seen from his quotes in the "Reach Report" (which was the Edmonton report outlining all of the recommendations of Edmonton's crime prevention strategy), for example, his quote on the first page of the report reads:

"We want ideas and strategies that prevent criminal behaviour in the first place, programs to help reduce crime before it happens. Change happens in small steps, but real change requires these steps to be continuous and purposeful. It requires broad vision and a long line of sight. We need fresh eyes and new perspectives to create a city where all citizens feel safe" (Edmonton Task Force on Community Safety, 2008)

Another notable difference between Winnipeg's strategy and Edmonton's is that Winnipeg's recommendations never went to city council in order to get implemented. Much of the crime prevention research reviewed in Chapter Three stressed the importance of having involvement and leadership from key people and agencies (for example see Linden, 2000: 3; Waller et al., 1999: 66; IPC Review, 2007; Waller, 2006). Thus, having the support of city council and/or the

Mayor may have assisted Winnipeg in actually getting some of their recommendations implemented.⁹⁶

And although it was not a question asked in the interview, many participants brought up this strategy and expressed their concern with it in terms of its inability to lead to actual action. For example, one program stakeholder stated:

“With goddam flipcharts ... this consultation and talk and all this, its crap, nothing happens. They have a committee here, the police roll their eyes, nothing ever happens. We quit going, I mean it was an absolute waste of our time ... Oh it’s a, it’s a huge waste of money”

Other stakeholders stressed the lack of *actual* coordinated action and agreement between government officials/agencies and Aboriginal organizations. Three of them discussed what they termed “Aboriginal ‘token’ involvement,” and felt that this strategy, like many others undertaken by the city, included Aboriginal participants for appearances sake; not because they wanted actual input from them, but only so they could say that Aboriginal people were involved. For example, one person who expressed this was an Aboriginal stakeholder who was invited to participate in the strategy but didn’t attend; their name, however, was still included on the participant list. This ‘token’ involvement also demonstrates another possible barrier to action in regards to this strategy, given that Aboriginal organizations and people constitute a large proportion of those doing actual risk-focused crime prevention. Thus, based on the crime

⁹⁶ A similar example related to Winnipeg’s search conference approach was carried out in Texas in the 1990’s. They organized a similar type conference and had little funding, no responsibility centre and no follow through from city council, and thus, had no action in regards to their attempted crime prevention city strategy.

prevention research reviewed, not including key people and organizations may weakens such a proposed strategy, as it is based on coordination and cooperation.

However, the action theme on including a publicly funded Aboriginal school division was based on input expressed by a small group of Aboriginal persons who were in actual attendance at the Search Conference meeting in January, 2009. Yet this still only represents input from the small group of Aboriginal persons who were actually in attendance at the meeting and not those who were not. Furthermore, this action theme, like most others, has yet to be put into actual action.

Finally, the LiveSAFE strategy is a move toward a crime prevention implementation model similar to what was described in Section 3.3. However, nothing has actually happened in regards to actual practice and/or implementation, and the degree to which Aboriginal organizations/people voices and input are represented in this strategy is unknown. Nevertheless, the strategy does indicate the interest and willingness of some to get a collaborative crime prevention strategy underway in the city.

Point Douglas “Powerline”

Only two interviews mentioned the “Powerline” initiative, however, when data were reviewed and compared to the research evidence there was overlaps found with the body of crime prevention literature reviewed in Chapter Three, thus, it will be described below.

In the Point Douglas neighbourhood a strategy with an aim to make a difference to the levels of crime was organized by two community members on their own volition, and has been underway for over three and a half years. This strategy represents an attempt at coordinated effort, and an example of a neighbourhood that wants to collaborate on some sort of coordinated

strategy. Essentially, this strategy aims to get government departments, agencies and services working together to meet their mandated responsibilities.

One component of their strategy has been termed the Point Douglas “Powerline,” as it is what is at the core of their strategy. This is simply a local telephone number (without caller identification) and an email address which the two community volunteers/activists have set up in their home, that people can use for various reasons; if someone wants to report or has information about a crime, for example, and/or anything pertaining to disorganization or delinquent activity in the neighbourhood. This could include issues from reporting drug sales or gang related crime, to overflowing garbage, mattresses left on lawns, or even information pertaining to a condemned house which is not properly boarded up.

The leader of this initiative (with assistance from his spouse) works closely with Winnipeg’s Chief of Police, acting as an intermediary between the police and the community. As the stakeholders of the initiative explained, many people in their neighbourhood do not feel comfortable calling the police, for a variety of reasons. They might not feel comfortable identifying themselves possibly due to past negative interactions with police. This system allows them to remain anonymous, but still take action. Once people call and provide information, the two people behind the strategy take action, either by contacting the police with tips and other information, and/or reporting to bylaw officers, who can then do what is required. They might contact local landlords, for example, to inform them that their property is being used as a crack house.

The community activists of this initiative use the Safer Communities Neighbour Act (SCAN). SCAN operates by holding property owners accountable for threatening or disturbing activities that regularly take place on their property related to:

- Unlawful drug use, dealing, production or cultivation
- Prostitution and related activities
- Unlawful sale of liquor
- Unlawful use or sale of intoxicating substances - non-potable and solvent-based products
- Sexual abuse or exploitation of a child or related activities
- Possession or storage of an unlawful firearm, weapon or explosive (Manitoba Justice, 2005).

These community activists ensure that bylaws are being followed and properly enforced. They are very action oriented and aim to solve problems. As the stakeholders explained, they are merely getting bylaw officers and other city officials to “do their jobs.” Instead of these city workers “sitting in their offices making plans” that may be ineffective or never get implemented, they call them directly (and/or contact a series of other higher up officials) and get them out of their offices and taking care of things. They might check that houses are correctly boarded up, for example, which includes ensuring that boards over the windows fit properly, the house is enclosed by a secure and appropriate fence, and the grass is mowed. Other issues include the proper disposal of mattresses and other garbage—which the program stakeholders indicated that after Powerline started, the fire department called to tell them there was major decrease in the number of dumpster arsons.

The stakeholders also explained that, even though Winnipeg only has only two truant officers for the entire city, they call them and get them “doing their jobs.” If they get information through Powerline that a youth and/or child is not in school, they call the truancy officers to get them out on the streets and knocking on doors, to enforce that children and youth are in school when they should be.

However, they do this not because they are looking to punish children, but instead because they care about the future of the children in their neighbourhood. For example, the lead stakeholder for this initiative expressed concern with the children in the city not having access to sports and/or other productive activities, and stated:

“Kids in the inner city, there are no teams; the community center over here has a trophy case full, full of trophies, not one of them within the last ten years”

Furthermore, these two community activists also help get agencies working together so they can be more efficient and useful. When youth are not attending school, the lead stakeholder explained, many agencies were blaming each other, and not taking responsibility to do something about it. So the activists called Child and Family Services, the Ministry of Education and Probation services, got them to understand their respective duties and expectations, and helped them work together to address truancy and other related issues.

Using the media to help publicize, many people in the neighbourhood learned about it, and joined together to make “Point Douglas a Crack Free Zone,” which was the headline for their first community meeting which got this strategy underway, attracting more than 200 community members, including public officials, the Police Chief, and even star Blue Bomber football players.

The stakeholders of this strategy were able to get a large majority of people in the neighbourhood interested, stating that many of them wanted to see something done about the crime in their neighbourhood and play a part in making a difference to the level of crime. As

explained by the stakeholders, this was why “Powerline” was ideal; it served as a tool to allow persons to come together and address the crime issue as a community.

Mobilization of Neighbours and Collective Efficacy

Although this Powerline initiative may sound similar to “Crime Stoppers,” because of the similarity it has with being an anonymous tip line. It has some major differences, first and foremost is that it is not set up by the police, but instead, by neighbourhood residents. Furthermore, this initiative is actually much broader and more extensive than crime stoppers, because in addition to acting as intermediaries for community members and the police and other agencies, the Powerline leaders also provide advice to community members regarding how they can intervene in crime related issues themselves. For example, a woman called Powerline asking what she could do about a female prostitute who was working on her street corner. Powerline suggested that she go outside and discuss the issue face-to-face with the prostitute, as a fellow community member, and tell her why she was concerned, which was because her children could see what was going on from the window. Thus, not only does this strategy aim to assist people in terms of advice, but also works toward getting community members talking and working out issues collaboratively.

Despite increased reporting to the police, the stakeholders interviewed for this study indicated that this neighbourhood had a 70% reduction in police recorded crime during the first two years of Powerline operations, and it continues to decrease. Although one cannot calculate a direct correlation to this initiative, there exists a possibility that this reduction could be related to this initiative. Furthermore, the stakeholders also indicated that by using their bylaw enforcement strategy (utilizing SCAN), they managed to get 25 crack houses in the neighbourhood shut down.

In many ways, this strategy demonstrates the possible engagement of the neighbourhood in informal social control, or what Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997) termed “collective efficacy” (see Section 3.3), by its attempts at coordination and organization by neighbourhood members in a disadvantaged community in order to come together and intervene in crime issues. For example, these community activists have not only made many attempts to get governments on top of things and “doing their jobs” (as the program stakeholders described), they have also helped mobilize and foster social cohesion among their neighbours. They provided central leadership, and acted as a hub for efforts to make changes regarding crime and its related problems, with the assistance of people from the neighbourhood. With the assistance of these community activists, this neighbourhood was able to come together as a collective, and take action against many different crimes and crime related issues.

Ultimately, this strategy’s survival is largely due to the two community activists who started it and continue to run it, and its long term viability ultimately depends on the willingness and capability of other neighbourhood residents to continue their efforts, and/or someone else to take on the activists’ roles once they stop. However, given the fact that the current leader has over 30 years experience as a very efficient community organizer and activist, with many key contacts in government and significant experience working with government bureaucracies and systems, it is unlikely that someone as experienced and qualified would be readily available to fill this volunteer role.

Furthermore, the initial crime prevention research reviewed for this study indicated the importance of having a responsibility centre in place for crime prevention (see Section 3.3). This would be a centre which acts as a leadership and coordination hub and for all of the city’s crime prevention organizing efforts and programs, and would be led by a central figure (Waller

et al., 1999: 66; Linden, 2000: 3; Linden, 2001: 29). Though the Powerline initiative is not a reflection of such a responsibility centre for crime prevention, it does, however, show overlap in terms of attempts at coordination between civil authorities, police, social agencies, as well as community members working collaboratively toward a common goal—with the help of someone who had taken on a leadership role. Furthermore, not only does this strategy represent that collaboration between government agencies and community members, it also indicates the willingness and capabilities of some people in Winnipeg to collaborate on issues related to crime.

Conclusion

Advisory boards, community coalitions and LiveSAFE and Powerline strategies were the initiatives and strategies discussed in the interviews when asked whether there was any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people. After an examination of these advisory boards, coalitions and strategies it quickly became apparent that there is no crime prevention responsibility centre entailing integrated, cross-sectoral coordination of the many sectors, agencies and partners throughout the city working to implement and coordinate programs which address the multiple factors related to crime.

Although many Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people working in the area of crime prevention may want to implement crime prevention programming in a collaborative and strategic way, and many Aboriginal organizational structures are premised on notions of working together, deciding together, and doing things collaboratively, the current government environment and its systems of silos and lack of an organized structure make this difficult.

In terms of “winning conditions” identified in Chapter Three, there is a lack of support from the police chief. There is also no major effort being dedicated to public engagement. There is no political leadership or support, including no leadership or support from the Mayor. There is also no human capacity, and very little public engagement.

There is little in the way of infrastructure for allocation and accountability, no criteria to distinguish between efficient and poor use of funds, and no effective mechanisms for managing the many small agencies and projects that inevitably spring up.

However, LiveSAFE and Powerline show some overlap with the research evidence, as they provide smaller scale examples of coordination by getting a variety of sectors working together on certain crime related issues.

8.2 Is There a Strategic Planning Process in Place? (diagnose, plan, implement, evaluate)

When stakeholders were asked whether a strategic planning process is in place for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people which; first diagnoses the problem, creates an action plan to tackle the problem, implements the action plan, then completes an evaluation, there were both multiple and overlapping answers provided.

Eleven interviews mentioned a specific program or organization which had its own strategic plan. Nine interviews mentioned the LiveSAFE strategy which was described in the previous section. Five interviews said that no strategic plan exists. Three interviews briefly mentioned the City of Winnipeg’s strategic plan. Finally, two interviews mentioned the Winnipeg Auto-Theft Suppression Strategy and/or the Spotlight Strategy. These responses are now explained below.

Program and Organization Strategic Plans

Eleven interviews mentioned a specific program or organization which had its own strategic plan. However, these plans were not related to what was described in the literature. In these cases stakeholders simply listed or made mention of programs or organizations that have their annual or general strategic plans for their organizations. For example as stated by this stakeholder when discussing an Aboriginal organization:

“So our organization has a strategic plan that we’ve been, that every year we examine where we’re at in the strategic plan, then we bring together our board and our staff to kind of engage in that process, and so if we’re, if we’re on it, if we’re off it, why we’re off it, you know so we do that analysis and we engage people to come and support us like through a consultant so everybody has an opportunity to engage in it”

This strategic plan mentioned above, similar all other program and/or organizational strategic plans were not plans that were specific to reducing crime affecting urban Aboriginal people in Winnipeg which diagnoses, plans, implements and evaluates. And although some of these programs and organizations strategic plans might include a crime component, it was not the specific objective for any which were mentioned.

LiveSAFE Strategic Plan

Nine interviews mentioned the LiveSAFE strategy which was described in the previous section (Section 8.1). These stakeholders typically mentioned that although this strategy is not

completely rolled out, its vision is to follow a similarly related strategic planning process. For example as explained by this stakeholder (who was discussing LiveSAFE):

“... yeah it hasn’t got that far. I think now they’ve kind of brought the community together to first evaluate what we think is the problem.”

Similarly, some stakeholders who brought up this strategy identified it as being the closest thing in existence. For example, as outlined by the following stakeholder:

“now again I think the Search process was as close as it gets, but it’s not Aboriginal specific.”

Lack of a Strategic Plan

Five interviews said that no strategic plan exists. For example, these stakeholders simply stated “no” “I’m not aware of it,” and “I don’t think so” or:

“I don’t really see much evidence of there being any kind of plan”

The following stakeholder not only pointed out that a strategic planning process does not exist, but that they felt that one should be in place:

“Are you joking? Those bunch of turkeys, really they’re [the City of Winnipeg] hopeless, they are absolutely hopeless. No they don’t, they do not. They do not, they

ought to, they ought to have something in place very much like what you've just described, I think it's their responsibility and they do not have that in place."

City of Winnipeg's Strategic Plan

Three interviews briefly mentioned the City of Winnipeg's strategic plan. However, they were simply referring to the City's broad annual plan for the City, which includes a section on crime. They were not referring to something specific that was in place for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people which; first diagnoses the problem, creates an action plan to tackle the problem, implements the action plan, then completes an evaluation. For example, when mentioning the City of Winnipeg's strategic plan, this stakeholder stated:

"I don't think they have one for urban Aboriginal crime, but they, this is I think probably what would constitute the strategic planning process for crime and safety."

Winnipeg Auto-Theft Suppression Strategy (WATSS)

Finally, two interviews mentioned the Winnipeg Auto-Theft Suppression Strategy and/or the Spotlight Strategy. Although these two strategies were mentioned the least, they were actually found to be the two strategies which overlapped the most with the crime prevention literature reviewed in Chapter Three (in regards to strategic planning) and thus, are discussed in more depth and are described within the context of the existing crime prevention literature reviewed.

In terms of these two initiatives, analysis of documents assisted in providing more detailed information and/or filling in any gaps which were not explained in the interviews. First the Winnipeg Auto-Theft Suppression Strategy is described, followed by the Spotlight Strategy.

The Winnipeg Auto-Theft Suppression Strategy (WATSS) has a specific mandate to reduce the number of auto-thefts in Winnipeg. Though it is not specifically targeted toward Aboriginal youth, the key stakeholder interviewed in regards to this strategy reported that the majority of the services for youth outreach to Aboriginal youth.

WATSS started in September 2005, as a response to the high incidence of vehicle theft in Winnipeg at the time. After several attempts to address the problem, the Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force found success with the implementation of the WATSS initiative (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 3).

This strategy is based on a highly integrative approach combining policing, environmental design and social development (Linden, 2009b: 4). WATSS follows the strategic planning process incorporating: a diagnosis, an action plan, implementation based on knowledge of risk factors, followed by an evaluation.

At the core of WATSS was an initial safety diagnosis of the crime issue. Up front planning, and examining the particulars of the problem before implementation were key components. Data sources such as police statistics, insurance company statistics, police files and court files, as well as interviews with police, justice officials and young offenders, were all utilized in the examination and analysis of auto-theft and its related issues (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 3). After finding that most vehicles were being stolen by group of youth⁹⁷, typically for joyriding, and that certain makes and models—such as older Chrysler vehicles—were more likely to be stolen, the strategy was targeted based on this information. A clear target

⁹⁷ Including youth who were Aboriginal

group was identified, which was aimed at targeting the 250 youth at risk of vehicle theft (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 3). Practical outcomes and objectives were also set, which were initially to reduce vehicle theft by 20% over 2 years (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 3).

A comprehensive strategy entailing strong multi-agency partnership between the Winnipeg Police Service, Manitoba Public Insurance and Manitoba Justice (including youth probation and Crown prosecutors) was then formed (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 3). This partnership provided leadership from government, sufficient resources (which were put in place to ensure success), and a strong commitment to working together across organizations (Linden, 2009b: 4).

Overall, the initiative has three major programming components: a tiered approach to at-risk youth with intensive supervision of high-risk youth, a program requiring compulsory vehicle immobilizers for the most at-risk vehicles, and youth programming addressing the root causes of vehicle theft (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 3).

The tiered approach involved probation staff assessing all files which identified offenders as being involved with vehicle theft. Once identified, they were classified into four categories: low risk (Level one) up to high risk (Level four), thereby including all the relevant prevention and intervention measures.

- Level 1 is for low risk offenders who are considered at-risk, so programming was targeted and delivered in neighbourhoods with high levels of vehicle theft. This included public education, prevention and intervention, and required involvement from parents, care-givers and teachers, as well as from support programs such as schools, police school resource officers and youth services agencies (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 7).

- Level 2 programming is directed at the “early involved,” who received prevention and diversion, and were involved in a Turnabout program⁹⁸ for youth under 12 years of age (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 7).
- Level 3 programming focuses on the “repeaters,” and includes youth and family involvement, increased offender programming directed at auto-theft, and enhanced case management and supervision by youth corrections (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 7).
- Level 4 programming is directed at youth classified as “very high-risk to re-offend.” Those in this group had daily face-to-face interaction with their probation officer seven days a week, in addition to contact every three hours, including phone calls to determine their whereabouts. An absolute curfew was enforced, as well as a zero- tolerance policy for non-compliance, including having the Crown advocate for custody (pre-trial/sentence).

The second major programming component of WATSS was getting electronic immobilizers in vehicles. This involved installing devices which disable a vehicle’s starter, ignition, and fuel systems unless the car is started using a coded transponder. These were put in the most at-risk cars, and were eventually made mandatory for these high risk cars (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 8).

The third programming component was to address the “root causes” of vehicle theft. This involved probation staff working directly with youth and their families to try to reduce the number of youth who considered vehicle theft an amusement and/or a recreational activity

⁹⁸ This is a program that connects youth with the appropriate prevention and counselling services. It promotes reconciliation between offenders and victims and encourages accountability from the youth and the youth’s family. It also seeks to standardize the way workers in the justice and welfare system, the police, and the community deal with youth who are too young to be charged under the criminal code, and referrals are made to help youth trouble with the law.

(Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 8). This was in addition to providing other high quality social development based prevention programs, which were funded by the National Crime Prevention Centre and specific to high-risk offenders and their families. These were delivered through community partners, including Big Brothers and Big Sisters of Winnipeg, New Directions for Children, Youth, Adults and Families, and the Winnipeg School Division (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 9).

Finally, an ongoing assessment of auto-theft data collected in cooperation with the police was completed, as well as an external evaluation of the strategy. Initially, WATSS demonstrated success, with vehicle theft decreasing 27% from the beginning of the program in September 2005 to December 2005. However, from January 2006 to August there was only an 8% decrease, and in the first quarter of 2006 vehicle thefts actually increased by 26% (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 9). Thus, it was apparent changes were required.

One of the major changes made after the 2006 increase was more focus on the intensive supervision component, which checked in on youth every three hours to ensure that their conditions and, more important, their curfews were being kept. Another major change was increased concentration on social development programming to tackle “root causes.” Senior probation staff spent six months working with community partners and others to adapt the social development programming to match risk factors with level specific interventions (Levels 1 through 4, described above).

Once the strategy was refined by increasing focus on personalized deterrence (checking in on youth), and on social development programming tackling root causes, vehicle theft declined again, even more than previously, and it continued to decline. Theft decreased by 29% in 2007, 42% in 2008 and 34% in the first four months of 2009 (Manitoba Auto Theft Task

Force, 2009: 3; Linden, 2009b: 4). Rates as of April 30, 2009 were 76% lower than in 2004 (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 3).

Cost Savings and Sustained Funding

This strategy also saved a considerable amount of money. Unlike many of the smaller individual initiatives and/or programs that are run out of non-governmental organizations, this program had secure and continuous major funding, which may be one of the reasons it was able to achieve such significant crime reductions. Sustained funding is one of the major components identified in the review of crime prevention literature in Chapter Three. Furthermore, as indicated by the Agenda for Safer Cities (1989: 7):

“Crime prevention strategies and programs must be tailored to local needs—but not limited to local resources. Local efforts must be supported by national policies which provide stable, direct and timely funding and allow for local flexibility in program design.”

The total investment backing this WATSS strategy was about \$52 million, while savings to date have been calculated at \$59 million, with a forecast of at least \$30 million per year based on a theft rate close to the current level (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009: 12).

This strategy also has also received an award for its achievements. For example, in 2009 it received a Herman Goldstein Finalist Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. This is an award which recognizes innovative and effective problem-oriented policing projects that have accomplished measurable achievements in tackling a recurring specific crime, disorder

or public safety problem. There were about 50 submissions for this award and WATSS made the top six. In 2010 this strategy won two international Association of Chiefs of Police awards. The first was the Motorola Webber Seavey Award for Quality Policing and the second was the 2010 Vehicle Theft Award.

In many ways WATSS can also be compared to an evidence-based project executed in Kirkholt, U.K. This was a strategy focused on preventing neighbourhood burglaries. Before the initiative was undertaken, the neighbourhood suffered high rates of residential burglaries, (similar to Winnipeg, however in Winnipeg the crime was auto-thefts) (Forrester et al., 1990: 1). Using data from police records, this strategy revealed a 58% reduction in burglaries in the first year of implementation and a 75% reduction in burglaries over 4 years as well as an 80.5% drop in repeat burglaries over 4 years (Forrester et al., 1990: 28-29).

Similar to WATSS this strategy used a problem solving method, which like WATSS, a thorough diagnosis of the crime issue, and how to tackle it was researched and examined before the strategy was implemented. The project also adopted a multi-sector approach, and mobilized many sectors and organizations, including probation, police, a victim's organization, neighbourhood members and the local housing authority, among others. It also included intensive probation, the reinforcing of protections in apartments/homes, as well as victim protection and social development components. Finally, also similar to WATSS, was an evaluation of the strategy.

Spotlight Strategy

The Spotlight Strategy is based on a similar methodology to WATSS, but focussed on reducing gang related crime. It is a specific unit within Community and Youth Corrections. It

targets the top 60 at-risk youth gang members in Winnipeg, and has a specific mandate to reduce the number of gang involved youth, and thereby reduce and eliminate gang related crimes committed by these youth. And though this strategy does not specifically target Aboriginal youth, the stakeholder interviewed indicated that the majority of the youth who end up in their target group tend to be Aboriginal.

The specific target group includes: gang-involved male youth between the ages of 12 to 21, those on a youth court order, those assessed to be at high or very high risk to re-offend, and those with a criminal history of serious assaults, weapons and substance-related offences (i.e. trafficking) (Prendergast et al., 2010: 7).

What sets the Spotlight strategy apart from WATSS is that it is more deeply rooted in the community, and it has a higher focus on families. However, it does follow a similar process, based on a highly integrative three-pronged approach combining prevention, intervention and suppression. It also follows the strategic planning process incorporating: a diagnosis, an action plan, implementation based on knowledge of risk factors, followed by an evaluation. Another similarity with WATSS is that it puts primary focus on personalized deterrence (checking in on youth), as well as on coordinating programming with social development aspects of tackling “root causes.”

A director, probation officers, street mentors and family workers are the people who execute this strategy. Each probation officer is paired with a street mentor when working with an assigned youth (Prendergast et al., 2010: 8). The probation officers regularly visit the homes of the youth to ensure that their basic needs are being met, for example they might help them shop for food and/or clothing, and they might accompany them to meet with landlords in order to secure a place to live (Prendergast et al., 2010: 14). As mentioned, and also similar to WATSS,

the strategy incorporates mentors who ensure that the youth are participating in the programming, and that they are where they are supposed to be, when they are supposed to be there (e.g. in school during school hours). There are other partners and collaborators, such as a designated Crown attorney, who works closely with gang involved youth and provides them with consultation on cases.

A task force was formed to provide leadership and support for the strategy, and to assist with collaboration between all three levels of government. The task force includes representation from Manitoba Corrections, Manitoba Public Prosecutions, the Winnipeg Police Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

The Spotlight Strategy entails the implementation and coordination of direct programs, and partnerships with law enforcement agencies and community organizers (for example, program stakeholders of crime prevention social development programs). The partnerships and programs coordinated under this strategy include the Turnabout program (similar to WATSS), which provides support and referrals for children who are too young to be charged for criminal acts, but who would otherwise be considered criminals. There are also ten “Lighthouse” programming sites in Winnipeg, which are in place to provide youth with alternatives to gang membership, such as a safe place to participate in recreational activities. In addition, the CHOICES Youth Program operates in eight different Winnipeg schools. This program targets at-risk students in grades six to eight, providing them with support and education regarding staying in school, staying out of gangs, and how to succeed in school. The Triple P program described earlier (see section 3.2b), is another program provided through this strategy.

Furthermore, risk assessments, including gang affiliation, are performed on youth when they enter the correctional system. Partnerships with the Addictions Foundation of Manitoba and

Manitoba Adolescent Treatment were created to provide drug and alcohol treatment. And the Manitoba Integrated Organized Task Force is using police resources to focus intelligence-led enforcement to disrupt gang related crime.

This strategy is currently the subject of an ongoing external evaluation by an academic from the Criminal Justice Program at the University of Winnipeg.⁹⁹ The first year of the evaluation has been completed, and has shown positive results. For example, it has been found that during the first year of the program's operation the recidivism rate (based on two years after the completion of sentence) improved approximately 30% (indicated by a stakeholder interviewed about this strategy).

Also similar to WATSS, this strategy has ongoing financial backing (though it is not as substantial compared to what WATSS receives). Spotlight was allocated \$1 million for its implementation in 2006, and it continues to receive monetary support from the Manitoba government.

Conclusion

Finally, this section has shown that there is no overall strategic plan in place for crime prevention in Winnipeg. There are, however, two examples of strategic planning underway, one focused on vehicle theft (WATSS), and the other, based on the WATSS approach, focused on gang related crime (Spotlight). Both of these strategies are provincial initiatives, not run by the city. In fact, the city doesn't really participate in them.

Both strategies have demonstrated the potential for reducing crime in the city, through their strategic and coordinated implementation for specific crimes. Thus far, findings have shown that when comparing the crime prevention research evidence presented in Chapter Three

⁹⁹ The interviewee did not want to give out information relating to who the external evaluator was.

to the actual state of practice in Winnipeg, some programs and strategies overlap with the research evidence. However, there is no strategy in terms of an overall comprehensive, collaborative strategy for crime prevention in the city of Winnipeg.

8.3 To What Extent is Evidence about What Works and What is Cost Effective Used in the Planning Process?

This last section of this chapter discusses cost effectiveness with respect to crime prevention in Winnipeg. Stakeholders were asked if they felt knowledge about “what works” (knowledge based on risk factors) and knowledge about what is “cost effective” (with regard to implementing prevention based on risk factors) is utilized in crime prevention planning processes in Winnipeg.

When stakeholders were asked this they tended to answer this in either two ways. First, it was either in regard to whether they felt their specific organization (or another organization they were discussing) was operating based on evidence or whether the government operates based on evidence.

Is Evidence About What Works Used in the Planning Process?

Fourteen interviews identified that evidence about “what works” was used to some extent in crime prevention planning processes. Of these fourteen interviews, the majority (12) discussed this question in regards to non-government organizations and/or other programs. Therefore, in these 12 interviews, the stakeholders felt that these organizations, to some extent, take into consideration evidence about ‘what works’ in their planning processes. For example, as this stakeholder explained:

“Well there’s a, there’s a little bit, like I say in terms of what Ndinawe is doing and WASAC is doing, what Ma Mawi is doing, Ka Ni Kanichihk, certainly they’re applying some of those things in their approaches, but its again not comprehensive enough.”

Of those fourteen interviews which identified that evidence was being utilized in planning processes for crime prevention, two mentioned Healthy Child Manitoba (HCM). These stakeholders felt that HCM is guided by evidence when implementing programs (see Chapter Seven for a description of HCM and some of their evidenced based programs which are being implemented). For example, as stated by these specific stakeholders:

“Healthy Child, one of our guiding principles is evidenced based investment.”

Similarity, this stakeholder stated:

“I can speak from the Healthy Child Manitoba perspective of the utilization of the early childhood research, it’s very strong.”

Seven interviews indicated that evidence was not used in planning processes. When this was explained people were referring to or discussing the government more generally, and their lack of evidence based practices. For example, when asked whether evidence about cost

effectiveness was used in crime prevention planning this stakeholder simply stated: “No, not at all, not at all,”

Also similar was this stakeholder’s response:

“I think you know the whole Canadian dialogue is, isn’t really based on the research when it comes to crime and victimization”

Or in this case, the following stakeholder gives an example:

“No, no. I mean what we have is fewer health nurses that go into people’s homes now than they used to. Oh yeah. They’re in their offices way more.”

The majority of stakeholders who discussed that evidence was not used in planning practices seemed to be aware that risk focused preventative knowledge existed, and they were very frustrated because they felt governments didn’t make better use of it. In the example above the stakeholder made a clear link to evidence based knowledge that was review in section 3.2(a) (see the description of the Elmira (New York) Prenatal/Early Infancy Project) by making reference to value of public health nurses in relation to prevention. The following example also reveals stakeholders frustration and at the same time their awareness of evidence based crime prevention knowledge:

“And I think that its overcome by the get tough on crime mentality.... you know there’s things like early intervention, certainly the Perry Preschool Studies that show that you know kids later on are less likely to do this than that.”

As in the case above, this stakeholder specifically stated the Perry Preschool Project which was explained in the review of crime prevention evidence in section 3.2(a) as well.

Finally, three interviewees indicated that they were unsure if knowledge about “what works” is used in crime prevention planning processes, and in three interviews an answer was not provided (they discussed something unrelated instead).

Is Evidence About What is Cost Effective Used in the Planning Process?

When stakeholders were asked whether evidence about what is cost effective is used in planning processes for crime prevention, the majority (11 stakeholders) felt that it was not. When expressing this, these stakeholders were making reference to the government (and its response to crime reduction) as not utilizing cost effective measures in the planning process for crime prevention. For example, as indicated by this program stakeholder:

“Well I can tell you that the justice system definitely isn’t cost effective whatsoever, you know and I have some experience working with the justice system and I always find it funny because someone who has been in the justice system their whole life and I’ve had this with foster parents that I fostered homes was if they have a justice background their always their fix is more money, more money, well if we had more money we can do this, well if we had more money we can do that. There is a lot better cost effective things and

the best cost effectiveness is prevention, is preventing it from even happening, preventing it from getting that far. So I'm a huge believer that there needs to be more resources focused into prevention rather than how do we fix now."

A similar response is provided by the following stakeholder:

"I know this is a more cost effective way of doing these, you know doing the root causes, including people ... then you know there's courts, there's all this other stuff that they don't really, they've been so inbred to saying well it's the courts, they need tougher penalties, they need more police, it's not necessarily the answer."

A common theme was that the government could and should be allocating tax dollars in a way which would help re-build families and assist youth at-risk, and not continue to direct resources largely to band-aid type solutions which they felt, just reinforced and perpetuated the problems. For example, as a program stakeholder stated:

"I mean there shouldn't be truant officers, but how many people are there working on getting kids in school, for the whole city of Winnipeg, two ... I did the math, two...on contract, they're not even employees. For the whole city instead of two truancy officers for the whole god damn city you could have twenty culturally appropriate people"

This stakeholder supported the need to ensure children attend school, but also expressed the view that it should be done by culturally appropriate employees, rather than simply relying on two truant officers. This stakeholder particularly felt very strongly about how the government misuses resources.

The majority of Aboriginal stakeholders expressed that the governments misuse of resources is related to the fact that the Canadian government as a whole is still working with an unequal and dated justice system that operates according to the outmoded notions of ‘difference’. It was relayed that, such ingrained, biased ideas only perpetuate the cycle of victimization and offending that Aboriginal people are caught up in. For example, as this program stakeholder explained:

“The resources aren’t going into creating healthy human beings who are making healthy life affirming decisions; it’s going into criminalizing this particular group and having a whole lot of salaries and whole structures.”

Many program stakeholders made it clear that, instead of redirecting resources to what is known to work, an unfair criminal justice system actually continues to criminalize people, the large majority of whom are Aboriginal people. This was a common theme expressed by the majority of Aboriginal stakeholders.

On the other hand, there were five stakeholders that felt that evidence about what is cost effective was used in crime prevention planning processes in Winnipeg. Two stakeholders stated that WATSS (described in section 8.2) operated based on evidence of cost effectiveness, one stakeholder felt similarly about Healthy Child Manitoba (described in Chapter Seven), and two

stakeholders (who were speaking in regards to the non-government organization they were a part of) felt that these organizations operate in a way which is cost-effective (The Boys and Girls Club and the Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre – see Chapter Seven for descriptions).

Finally, three stakeholders stated that they were unsure as to whether evidence about what is cost effective is used in any planning processes, and eight stakeholders never provided an answer (they went on to talk about something else and/or further elaborated on the previous question).

Lack of Sustained Funding

When ‘costs’ were discussed, many stakeholders started to bring up their discontent with the way they felt funding is allocated to non-government organizations who are implementing crime prevention in Winnipeg. This stood out as a common theme among all program stakeholders interviewed—with the large majority of program stakeholders making some type of indication regarding inconsistent funding and/or a lack of funding to support many non-government organizations.¹⁰⁰ These stakeholders explained that the assistance many non-government organizations receive from governments is often in the form of small, pilot project funding, which expires and/or is not ongoing or sustained for a reasonable period. As an Aboriginal stakeholder explained:

“So when you get funding from government you can’t always use it as you would like to use it, the funding comes with criteria and you have to meet those criteria and your proposals have to fit those criteria, so you can’t always be as innovative or as, as you

¹⁰⁰ This is common within other cities as well, given how funding for crime prevention primarily operates in Canada. A large amount of funding for crime prevention is obtained through calls for proposals, where organizations typically receive time-limited funding.

know bring new thinking into play, using new thinking in terms of addressing some of these issues right.”

Similarly, another stated:

“That's the trouble with most Aboriginal organizations is they're funded from year to year and their funding, their ongoing funding is completely at the whim of non, primarily non-Aboriginal bureaucrats right ... even our political voice in Canada is controlled by governments and funding, the AFN [Assembly of First Nations], they're all funded by government.”

Furthermore, it was felt that program stakeholders, Aboriginal organizations and other community-based entities seeking to help Aboriginal people, typically have to respond to government's requests or priorities at and/or within a certain time. This means those working most closely with people in need and/or at-risk are restricted in terms of what they can implement and deliver. And, as explained in Section 6.2, some stakeholders felt that much of what the government asks for in these funding proposals could be based on information provided by someone who has never even set foot in the inner city and/or north end of Winnipeg. Thus, it was felt that, sometimes decisions that are made are based on inaccurate information, and do not reflect the reality of many living in these areas.

Instead of running and executing programs, program deliverers and organizers explained that they spend much of their time filling out funding proposals, and adjusting their programs to fit the “wants” and priorities of the government at a given time.

Healthy Child Manitoba was found to be a partial exception to this, as its programs are funded and delivered provincially. However, typically these programs are ultimately delivered by Aboriginal organizations and/or other non-government organizations that have little or no core funding. Many simply do not have enough funding to support their everyday operations, and are typically operating on a strict budget. For example, the Winnipeg Indian and Métis Friendship Centre deliver the Sweetgrass and Little Braids Healthy Baby Program, and are provided funding for this program by Healthy Child Manitoba. However, Friendship Centres are often not provided adequate core funding to cover infrastructure, administration and process costs, and must therefore still have to seek out ways to get additional funds in order to stay in operation.

When reviewing the funding allocations to Friendship Centres it was found that all Friendship Centres in Canada have not received an increase in their core funding since 1988 (National Association of Friendship Centres, 2009: 8). Instead, Aboriginal organizations like the Native Friendship Centres compete for funding with other organizations and departments in order to maintain operations.

When organizations do manage to secure funds, it was found to be only typically for a certain time period; usually for a year (in a few cases three to four years). This is currently how Canada's National Crime Prevention Centre operates, where they offer funding typically for a three years. NCPC, similar to the stakeholders interviewed, have recognized the problems with this structure. Basically, it provides just enough time to hire people, get the program up and running, work out the kinks and begin to help people; then they have to either re-apply or start looking for another source of funding. Many participants mentioned that, in essence, program funding comes to an end before programs can reach their potential. In other cases, program

workers are expected to reapply for funding every year for the same programs they have been offering for years, and thus, felt that they were having to use skills and time which could be going to towards implementing programming and assisting those in need. Instead, it was felt they instead are having to fill out funding proposals, and are in effect redirecting their skill set to other ‘priorities’ in order to keep the program operating.

The problem of having to continually re-apply for funding in order to continue operations seemed to be a major concern for Aboriginal and other non-governmental organizations. For example, as one Aboriginal stakeholder who organizes and runs an Aboriginal organization explained:

“We have no provincial funding, we have no core funding, everything we’ve been doing is through contribution agreements. I mean I can tell you right now and I’m, I’m not ashamed to say it, I mean last month I had to sink twelve thousand dollars through my own VISA account to help support the programming until the money could come through because like this year the, they’ve decided to change when they would pay the payments, and that left a big gap in terms of keeping the program running, so it’s, it’s challenging. I mean I wouldn’t change it, I mean it would change it definitely, but I mean I wouldn’t change what I’m doing in terms of the work for anything. It’s just I believe in it strongly. But I think it would be good to have you know ongoing funding that you can just bring this approach to the different communities and do different collaborative work and maybe look at community partnerships and not have to worry about you know reapplying for funding just to keep yourself going.”

Furthermore, as indicated by a few Aboriginal stakeholders, since Aboriginal organizations are always struggling to compete for funding, there is now even competition between the Aboriginal organizations. As one Aboriginal stakeholder described:

“It’s a lot of our people that are out there that are fighting [for funding], and its amongst each other and its not only in the community, like sometimes its organizations that are you know feuding against each other and its unfortunate because we’re all there for the same reason”

Finally, the majority of stakeholders who discussed that evidence was not used in planning practices seemed to be aware that risk-focused preventative knowledge existed, and they were very frustrated because they felt governments didn’t make better use of it.

When stakeholders were asked whether evidence about what is cost effective is used in planning processes for crime prevention, the majority felt that it was not. When expressing this, these stakeholders were making reference to the government (and its response to crime reduction) as not utilizing cost effective measures in the planning process for crime prevention. Thus, although the stakeholders seem to be aware of this knowledge of risk factors the majority felt this risk type approach was not actually used in planning processes (and practice) and that funds were not allocated towards such processes/practices to any large extent.

8.4 Conclusion

Winnipeg does not have a responsibility centre to mobilize different sectors to tackle crime, and no overall strategic planning process is in place for crime prevention. There is a lack

of localized coordinated action (including support from the police chief and public engagement). There is no political support, nor is there any leadership being taken by the Mayor.

The LiveSAFE strategy is an initiative which showed overlap with the research evidence reviewed, and a move toward a crime prevention implementation model similar to that described in Section 3.3. There has been no progress with regard to actual practice and/or implementation of recommendations. None of the “winning conditions” outlined in Chapter Three were present, such as adequate and sustained funding, political leadership, support from the police chief, from city officials, and other key leaders in the city. There was no human capacity, and little public engagement.

The degree to which Aboriginal organizations are accurately reflected and included in the strategy is unknown. Nevertheless, this strategy does represent some similarities with the crime prevention research as well as demonstrates a willingness and interest in getting a collaborative crime prevention strategy underway.

There is also a small scale volunteer initiative underway in a Winnipeg neighbourhood, known as the Powerline strategy that demonstrates the residents’ desire for collaboration within a Winnipeg neighbourhood. Although Powerline is not a responsibility centre for crime prevention, it demonstrates an effort of collaboration between civil authorities, police, social agencies and community members.

There is no overall strategic plan in place for Aboriginal crime prevention efforts in Winnipeg, though there are two examples which invoke some fundamentals of the implementation framework outlined in Chapter Three, most notably in terms of taking a strategic planning approach. One of these focuses on vehicle theft (WATSS), and the other, which is based the WATSS approach, focuses on gang related crime (Spotlight). They are not

comprehensive strategic plans for the city, but both involve strategic and coordinated implementation—targeting specific crimes.

Finally, although the stakeholders seem to be aware of the knowledge of risk factors the majority felt this risk type approach was not actually used in planning processes (and practice) and that funds were not allocated towards such processes/practices to any large extent.

Furthermore, many program stakeholders felt that the justice system, with its heavy reliance on policing and incarceration continues to over criminalize Aboriginal people. Furthermore, it was made known by the stakeholders that many Aboriginal organizations who are delivering preventative type programming have minimal core funding, are largely left to operate on time limited pilot project funding and struggle to stay in operation.

Chapter Nine: What Are the Attitudes and Expectations of Aboriginal Stakeholders Compared to non-Aboriginal Stakeholders toward Aboriginal Crime Prevention and its Implementation?

This chapter will discuss the attitudes and expectations of Aboriginal stakeholders compared to non-Aboriginal stakeholders when determining who is best suited to implement crime prevention strategies and programming.

Much research related to Aboriginal people has indicated the importance of Aboriginal traditions and culture. This is also important when implementing prevention programming (see Section 3.2: b). This chapter was added to address an additional question that arose from the research, and the subsequent similarities found in the research. It sought to determine who could best deliver the programming, given the many ties to Aboriginal culture/traditional knowledge inherent in such programs.

The chapter is therefore structured as follows. First, the perceptions regarding the current extent of Aboriginal people's involvement in crime prevention implementation in Winnipeg are outlined, in order to provide an overview of the actual situation in practice. This is followed by an outline and comparison of the attitudes and expectations of the two stakeholder groups (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) with regard to whether they believe Aboriginal people should be leading and implementing crime prevention programming and policy intended for Aboriginal people. Finally, an outline and comparison of attitudes and expectations of these two stakeholder groups is done again, but this time in terms of whether they believe non-Aboriginal people should be leading and implementing crime prevention programming and related policy which is intended for Aboriginal people.

9.1 The Extent of Involvement by Aboriginal People in Crime Prevention

Overall, it was found that all stakeholders who were interviewed felt that Aboriginal people are very involved in preventative type crime prevention programming. However, this is typically with respect to the work and commitments of Aboriginal organizations, other non-profit organizations and/or sometimes through volunteer organizing efforts. When it comes to being involved at the level of government, in a leadership position and/or in terms of policy making or executing government organized initiatives, Aboriginal involvement seems to be significantly less.¹⁰¹

For example, and similar to what was indicated in Section 7.1, it was indicated that Aboriginal people involved in government led initiatives are sometimes called upon just because the organisers want a “token” Aboriginal person to be seen as taking part, and do not really take Aboriginal people’s needs into consideration. As a program stakeholder explained:

“leadership should be coming from the people whose lives you’re talking about [Aboriginal people] and there should be very deep involvement and meaningful involvement, not just “token” involvement. I’ve seen too much “token” involvement and I think that unless we’re serious about it and people know when they’re just being used, you know and they know when people are being sincere. But I don’t think we can even have these kinds of programs and they can’t be effective unless you have leadership from these folks that you’re talking about.”

Having demonstrated that Aboriginal people tend to be more involved at the programming level through Aboriginal organizations and/or non-profit organizations, rather than in policy and/or

¹⁰¹ This is according to the stakeholders interviewed

leadership positions, the next two sections outline the degree to which Aboriginal persons and non-Aboriginal persons should be involved in these types of initiatives, based on stakeholders perceptions. This will be determined by comparing responses from both the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal stakeholder groups.

9.2 Stakeholder Groups Attitudes and Expectations of Aboriginal People Involvement in Crime Prevention

In terms of stakeholders attitudes regarding whether Aboriginal people should be involved in prevention programming and initiatives, the interview responses of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal stakeholders were much the same, with similar overlapping conclusions and reactions. The responses indicated that Aboriginal people should be very involved in crime prevention programming intended for Aboriginal people, both at the policy and programming level. However, as outlined in the preceding section, this is not what is currently happening in practice. And the majority of stakeholders interviewed also expressed that there needs to be a shift to including Aboriginal people in positions of leadership and policy with regard to crime prevention.

For example, as indicated by this Aboriginal stakeholder:

“We should be leading it ... Like we really should be, we should be, it needs to be our Urban Aboriginal Strategy, not the city’s, not the province’s, not the fed’s, and having the resources, and there’s nothing wrong with saying, fork over the money, we’ll come up with a plan and we’ll let you know. And there is a, but it’s a power issue that influences, I think it’s, we’ve you know and we become part of their processes and but that will always only go so far ... True engagement is rolling up your sleeves and being part of the

work and following it through and there's still, we still lack that in the province for sure, all throughout whatever funding, even the feds, like all of the funding programs you don't see very many Aboriginal people that work in those positions."

Similarly, another Aboriginal stakeholder stated:

"Well I think we should be the majority at the table ... I mean people need to realize that what's contributing to this is the policies that general society has made, and that their solutions aren't working, so like maybe they need to figure out a different way and include different people in the process."

The following response from a non-Aboriginal stakeholder was similar:

"I don't think any program is going to work if the people whose lives are being impacted are not seriously involved in it, and so I mean the short answer is if you're not going to have Aboriginal people, if you want to be a helper that's great, but your leadership should be coming from the people whose lives you're talking about"

Another similar response from a non-Aboriginal stakeholder:

"totally, its, I mean they are the ones who have to solve the problems, they need supports, they need, civic, provincial and federal government support of a variety of kinds,

particularly resources to do the things that they have to do but it is Aboriginal people who need to take the lead on solving these problems, absolutely.”

Finally, it was evident from both the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal stakeholder responses that the majority felt Aboriginal people need to be the leaders, implementers and organizers of crime prevention programming and policy which are intended for Aboriginal people and no stakeholders indicated that they should not be involved. Responses from Aboriginal stakeholder groups and non-Aboriginal stakeholder groups are compared and contrasted again in the next section, this time showing not as much similarity with regard to whether non-Aboriginal people should be involved in regards to crime prevention programming which is intended for Aboriginal people.

9.3 Stakeholder Groups Attitudes about and Expectations of Non-Aboriginal People Involvement in Crime Prevention

When it came to responses regarding non-Aboriginal people’s involvement in prevention programming and initiatives for Aboriginal people, both the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal responses overlapped somewhat, with a couple of exceptions. The majority of Aboriginal respondents felt that non-Aboriginal people should no longer be the leaders and/or heavily involved but, instead, they could take part as supporters and partners. For example, when discussing the latter viewpoint, this Aboriginal Stakeholder indicated:

“Well they should be partners. I mean we should be equals at the table in the sense that the issue isn’t owned by us alone, it’s a shared responsibility in society. But like I say we’re coming from sort of a parent/child relationship, the parents being the non-

Aboriginals and primarily the Caucasian people. The French and English ran this country for the last two hundred years right.”

Similarly, and as stated by another Aboriginal stakeholder:

“As allies and as supporters, absolutely one hundred percent, because we all have to understand it. I mean it’s for everybody because unless they understand that then this relationship will continue to be perpetuated, so absolutely, I mean but not as, no more, no longer as they’re the ones that are going to save us and no that’s got to end, and that’s a colonial relationship that’s a holdover from a colonial past that we need to resist.”

However, according to a few Aboriginal stakeholders, in some cases non-Aboriginal people should not be involved at all in Aboriginal-specific prevention programming and/or policy. This was mentioned in 3 of the 13 interviews conducted with Aboriginal persons.

For example, when asked to what extent non-Aboriginal people should be involved in urban Aboriginal programs/initiatives that tackle risk factors for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people, this Aboriginal stakeholder clearly indicated:

“Not at all, no ... When it comes to determining and defining best practice and what works for Aboriginal people and what, and I said earlier like we’ve tried every once in a while a non-Aboriginal person working for us, never ever works out. The value base, no matter how you cut it up and dice it, it just, it always, there’s always conflict, there’s always, and it’s not us, like it’s not, people tend to want to box things up and have a very

rule based sort of narrow frame of thinking and, and not to say that we're all loosey goosey or anything, it's a real sort of whole person that you're working with, so there is, so non-Aboriginal people I would like to think would need to start being the facilitators, the mentors and the helpers and rather than the leaders when it comes to urban Aboriginal issues, they need to know what their role is and how they can help rather than to hijack the process and run with it and then nothing, and then they sit back and wonder why it didn't work, you know it just is amazing that that consistently happens all the time."

Other responders were more cautious, indicating that non-Aboriginal people could be involved, but, "Only upon very strict criteria" and/or:

"I think there's a role, many good roles that non-Aboriginal people can have in helping do that work, but I, I wish people could and including our own Aboriginal people, I wish people could understand at least the difference in the worldview thinking that happens in doing this work."

This indicates that it was felt a role may exist for non-Aboriginal people to be involved in Aboriginal programs/initiatives, but only if an Aboriginal worldview¹⁰² is included and understood.

On the other hand, when it came to non-Aboriginal stakeholder responses, all agreed that non-Aboriginal people should be involved. For example, in response to whether non-Aboriginal people should be involved in Aboriginal programs/initiatives, non-Aboriginal stakeholders

¹⁰² There are certainly a number of Aboriginal worldviews which may vary in such terms of generation.

indicated: “Oh they should be absolutely involved” and “And yeah cause it shouldn’t be like oh its their problem,” and “well we should be involved as well,” and other similar responses.

Among the non-Aboriginal stakeholder group there were also a few responses indicating that non-Aboriginal persons should be involved only to the extent of being partners in the process. For example:

“Well to the extent that if it’s perpetuating the dialogue of colonization and if there’s racist undertones then no, but if it’s about you know basing this on a human rights and walking beside people not in front, then yes.”

Similarly, this non-Aboriginal stakeholder stated:

“they definitely should be involved and I, I mean I say that from the perspective of like just a common understanding.”

The attitudes and expectations of these stakeholders indicated that, given the possibility of some non-Aboriginal people’ lack of knowledge and understanding of Aboriginal people’s circumstances as it relates to victimization and offending, as well as the possible lack of an Aboriginal worldview and/or value base, non-Aboriginal people should only be involved as supporters and/or partners of Aboriginal programming and policy, and should not be seeking and/or attempting to lead such initiatives.

Aboriginal Specific Implementation Model

Finally, in terms of non-Aboriginal people's involvement in crime prevention intended for Aboriginal people, it was shown through the interviews they could be involved to a degree. However, it was also made clear that non-Aboriginal people dominate the policy making and government positions, and have authority over what ultimately gets implemented; it was also indicated that this is something that needs to change. Based on Aboriginal people's significant involvement with the system as both victims and offenders, their involvement in addressing this and deciding policy was regarded as important and very much needed.

Based on the crime prevention research and literature, in combination with the data derived from interviews and document analysis, an implementation model which provides a visual representation of how to implement crime prevention in Winnipeg is provided in Figure 16 below. This model utilizes the crime prevention research and collaborative community safety approach described in much of the literature, and as outlined in Section 3.3. In terms of funding allocation (\$1 per capita for prevention) it specifically referenced the recent Institute for the Prevention Action Briefs (2008).

It also draws on the continuing circular understanding explained by Aboriginal stakeholders from the Circle of Courage Program (and as represented in their culturally adapted logic model – see Appendix E), as well as knowledge from Aboriginal organizations organizational structures investigated for this study, which are all premised on the idea of working together, deciding together and doing things collaboratively and together (see Chapter Seven). All these data sources contribute to the model, which represents the specific situation in Winnipeg.

This model also utilizes the Medicine Wheel. The Medicine Wheel is an ancient symbol, and a very important healing tool in many Aboriginal traditions. The Medicine Wheel symbolizes the interrelatedness of all things. It serves as a guide to maintaining balance within ourselves, and in the world around us. It is a circle, which has no top, bottom, length or width. There are four points on the Medicine Wheel that represent the four cardinal directions: North, East, South, and West, and these are usually represented by the colors white, yellow, red and black.¹⁰³ It embodies a wide variety of teachings and meanings, and also aids in providing a visual representation and/or framework to describe the logic and connectedness of many things—in this case it is being used to show the logic and connectedness of crime prevention implementation fundamentals.

¹⁰³ The Medicine Wheel is an important healing tool in many Aboriginal traditions. It embodies a wide variety of teachings and meanings, these can differ from Nation to Nation; however, they all encompass the similar fundamental attributes. The Medicine Wheel symbolizes the interrelatedness of all things. According to some teachings the four colours of the wheel represent the four races/colours of people on earth. The four points also represent many other things, including the seasons (winter, spring, summer and fall), the elements (water, air, earth and fire), the time of day (night, morning, noon and sundown), stages of life (Elder, child, youth and adult), and the different aspects of the human makeup (physical, emotional, mental and spiritual). Many of these different associated components represent our connectedness to creation, and provide positive examples of how to live in harmony. Many of the teachings and associated stories of the Medicine Wheel explain that people must live at the centre of the wheel and, therefore, in balance with the four directions. For example, many teachings explain that the physical/environmental, emotional/social, mental/educational and spiritual/cultural realms are all equally important to living a balanced life, and thereby maintaining the health of the individual, family and community.

**Figure 16: Implementation of Urban Aboriginal Crime Prevention:
In Order to Reduce Crime Affecting Urban Aboriginal People in Winnipeg**



9.4 Conclusion

Although all stakeholders felt that Aboriginal people are very involved in programming that is relevant to preventing crime, this was typically with respect to the work and commitments of Aboriginal organizations, other non-profit organizations and/or sometimes through volunteer organizing efforts. When it comes to being involved at the level of government, in a leadership position and/or in terms of policy making or executing government organized initiatives, Aboriginal involvement seems to be significantly less.

Both stakeholder groups' felt that Aboriginal people should be very involved in crime prevention programming intended for Aboriginal people, both at the policy and programming level. The majority of stakeholders interviewed also expressed that there needs to be a shift to including Aboriginal people in positions of leadership and policy with regard to crime prevention.

Chapter Ten: Conclusions and Recommendations for Urban Aboriginal Crime Prevention

This study examined knowledge of risk-focused crime prevention in relation to urban Aboriginal people and theories about how these might be implemented. It tested the extent to which stakeholders in Winnipeg agreed with the risk factors and their solutions identified in the literature. It looked at the use of risk factors and crime prevention based on a risk-focused approach to prevention. It examined some of the factors that might support the greater use of these approaches.

This chapter will review those conclusions and propose some recommendations emanating from the dissertation to reduce crime affecting urban Aboriginal people, particularly in Winnipeg.

10.1 Summary of Empirical and Descriptive Conclusions

Based on the review of literature and empirical findings of this dissertation, five key conclusions have been identified. These five key conclusions are presented and discussed below.

1) Crime and the reaction to crime do considerable harm to urban Aboriginal people

The Canadian governments (i.e. federal, provincial and municipal) currently rely mainly on the standard crime control approach which uses police, corrections and the courts to address the disproportionate amount of crime affecting Aboriginal people. This system of crime control is largely centred on deterrence and incapacitation. This current system causes great harm to Aboriginal victims. At the same time, this approach has become increasingly expensive, with much of the expense impacting Aboriginal crime victims.

This study showed how residential schools and colonization have negatively affected Aboriginal people. These accumulations of negative effects have contributed in some ways to Aboriginal peoples multiple risk factors related to both victimization and offending and so their over-representation in these.

Comprehensive reviews of general research evidence from across the world have shown that living with people who are violent, or living in a household characterized by violence, abusing alcohol and/or drinking heavily, and being younger in general, makes one more susceptible to being a victim of violence compared to people not characterized by these risk factors.

General evidence based on longitudinal research studying child development showed that poor family processes of informal social control, parental delinquency, un-attachment to school, delinquent peers, misbehaviour early in life, lack of job stability and/or commitment to education or work, and lack of marital attachment in middle adulthood are predictors of crime.

Large reviews of research shows strong links between alcohol and violence. Other research has also demonstrated that the socio-economic disadvantage of a neighbourhood's residential area is strongly linked to high rates of both violent and property crime.

Evidence shows that crime affecting Aboriginal people can in part be attributed to their demographics (a higher proportion of people in the "high risk" 15 to 24 age group), but also Aboriginal people also experience many of the same multiple risk factors for crime and victimization, such as lower education levels, higher rates of substance abuse and higher unemployment.

Some of the risk factors which were fairly consistent in Aboriginal-specific research studies included family violence and crime, dysfunctional, disorganized and disconnected

families, high residential mobility, poverty, and alcohol abuse. Many risk factors identified in the general research on risk factors were similar to those risk factors identified in the Aboriginal specific literature.

2) There is strong evidence that evidence-based crime prevention can significantly reduce that harm by preventing crime in the first place

The review of crime prevention literature demonstrated that a large body of crime prevention evidence was found, including evidence derived from rigorous scientific evaluations of projects. Results from these projects suggest that if the major risk factors related to crime are tackled, crime can be significantly reduced.

A number of projects and evidence were briefly mentioned and some were explained more extensively. A briefly mentioned project included the Youth Inclusion Program. This project demonstrated the success targeted interventions can have. They show very positive results in terms of steering youth away from offending and crime related activities through offering positive programming (that includes sports, education and training, arts, culture and media, mentoring, health and drug education, motor programmes, outreach and detached work, group development, personal assessments, and family programmes) on a weekly basis to at-risk youth in the most deprived neighbourhoods.

Another example, which was explained more thoroughly included, a project supporting young high risk single parent mothers, which provided them with visits from public health nurses, assisted them in developing supportive relationships with family and friends, connected them to essential health and human services, and taught them about health and development of their children showed major positive results. Those who received such services were found to be

significantly less likely (as compared to a control group) to abuse and neglect their children, and were also found to be more likely to avoid substance abuse and criminal behaviour. Furthermore, the children of these mothers were also found to be less likely to be arrested for crimes in their future, as compared to the control group.

Furthermore, a small but growing body of Aboriginal focused crime prevention evidence is evolving, demonstrating that when risk factors related to Aboriginal people's victimization and offending are tackled in a relevant manner, they can be reduced. For example, the Nemi'simk, Seeing Oneself Intervention, which targeted at-risk Aboriginal youth through a variety of interactive culturally relevant teaching exercises, showed significant results in reducing alcohol and drug abuse—which has been identified as a significant risk factor related to victimization and offending affecting Aboriginal peoples.

Intergovernmental agencies, networks of municipalities and others working on implementation have come to conclusions on how to implement such knowledge of prevention. It is an implementation model that asserts that tackling one or more risk factors in a systematic way—first a diagnosis of the gaps in services, then a plan to address the gaps, then a concerted effort to implement programs to fill the gaps using an integrated approach across the sectors, followed by an evaluation of the outcomes—guided by a responsibility centre, is an effective way to implement risk-focused crime prevention knowledge.

This consensus also stressed several “winning” conditions, such as the importance of adequate and sustained funding, political leadership, and support from the police chief, city officials, and other leaders (i.e. an Aboriginal leader). Human capacity and public engagement are also key features.

Local city-level crime reduction projects which utilized a similar implementation model, and at the same time utilized a three pronged approach combining prevention, treatment and/or enforcement activities were reviewed. These examples brought forth the research base for which this three-pronged approach is largely based on.

3) Stakeholders agree that several agencies in Winnipeg are acting consistently with what the literature says will reduce that harm

The case study findings, based on stakeholder interviews, were then presented. First, stakeholders' perceptions of crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg were examined. Many crimes, ranging from specific offences like gang and drug related, to non-official criminal code crimes such as continued colonialism, were all cited by the stakeholders as crimes which they felt affect Aboriginal people in Winnipeg. Many stakeholders even cited crimes which they had firsthand experience with, such as the death of a family member from a gang shooting, or witnessing "crack runners" outside their home.

It was found that stakeholders were aware of the risk factors identified in the crime prevention literature relating to Aboriginal people victimization and offending, with only three of the identified 20 risk factors compiled from the crime prevention literature going unmentioned. The most common choice identified by stakeholders was "poverty," with 19 interviews making reference to it. The second and third most commonly identified risk factor (equally discussed throughout the interviews) were low education and poor school access and involvement, and poor peer influence, both of which were discussed in 13 separate interviews. Ultimately, of all 27 interviews, only three of the risk factors which were identified by the examination of risk

factors in Chapter Two went unmentioned, namely poor social skills, aggressiveness and family violence and crime.

Dissatisfaction with the degree to which knowledge of “risk factors” and other “root causes” are recognized in policies relating to victimization and offending was also mentioned in the interviews. Stakeholders expressed concern that policy does not always address the actual “needs” and “risks” of specific communities affected by crime.

The following section showed that there are some programs in place that tackle risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg. Eight specific programs were identified and explained, as they had components that were similar to the large body of pre-existing risk-focused crime prevention research. These programs were categorized as follows: programs specific to reducing risk factors for crime affecting Aboriginal peoples (three programs identified); Aboriginal programs not targeting crime but tackling risk factors related to crime (one program identified); programs specific to reducing general risk factors for crime (two programs identified); and finally, programs not targeting crime but tackling general risk factors related to crime (two programs identified).

Furthermore, the majority of actions related to prevention that tackle risk factors are implemented by Aboriginal organizations and other non-governmental entities, rather than through strategies organized by government. These programs often do not receive sustained or adequate funding. Many programs offered through these Aboriginal and/or other community organizations do not have formal ongoing program evaluations.

4) These effective actions are in need of sustained funding and support within an overall framework

The next chapter showed that the city does not have a responsibility centre to mobilize different sectors (such as schools, police, city officials, housing and social services etc.) to tackle crime, and there is no overall strategic planning process for crime prevention.

There is a lack of localized coordinated action. This includes a lack of support from the police chief. There is also no major effort being dedicated to public engagement. There is no political support, including no leadership from the Mayor.

The LiveSAFE initiative was found to have ideas and plans similar to the crime prevention research knowledge described in Section 3.3, most notably its attempts to achieve a collaborative strategy focused on crime prevention through social development. However, beyond meetings and planning, no action or actual practice has taken place. None of the “winning conditions” outlined in Chapter Three were present, such as adequate and sustained funding, political leadership, support from the police chief, from city officials, and other key leaders in the city. There was also little public engagement and no human capacity.

The degree to which Aboriginal organizations and people are accurately reflected and included in this strategy is unknown, because, as indicated by some stakeholders, like many other city initiatives, Aboriginal persons may not be involved in a truly meaningful way, and instead may only be included to the extent of “token” involvement.

There is also a limited volunteer, collaborative effort underway in a Winnipeg neighbourhood, known as the “Powerline” strategy. Although this is not a true responsibility centre for crime prevention, it demonstrates a smaller scale attempt at getting civil authorities, police, social agencies and community member’s working collaboratively.

It was also shown that there is no overall strategic plan in place for crime prevention in Winnipeg. However, there are two examples which invoke some fundamentals of the implementation framework underway, most notably in their incorporation of strategic planning. The first example focuses on vehicle theft (WATSS), and another, similar to the WATSS approach, focused on gang related crime (Spotlight). While these are not comprehensive strategic plans for the city, both utilize strategic and coordinated implementation, similar to what was outlined in the crime prevention literature. However, these strategies are not all encompassing for all crime affecting urban Aboriginal people in Winnipeg and only targeting specific crimes.

Finally, the last section showed that stakeholders felt that Winnipeg does not fully utilize crime prevention evidence based on “what works” and “what is cost effective”, with respect to planning risk-focused crime prevention. Thus, although the stakeholders seem to be aware of this knowledge of “risk factors,” the majority felt this risk-focused type approach was not actually used in planning processes (and practice) and that funds were not allocated towards such processes/practices to any large extent. Instead of running and executing programs, program deliverers and organizers explained that they spend much of their time filling out funding proposals, and adjusting their programs to fit the “wants” and priorities of the government at a given time.

Furthermore, many program stakeholders felt that the justice system, with its heavy reliance on policing and incarceration continues to over criminalize Aboriginal people. Furthermore, many stakeholders indicated that Aboriginal organizations who are delivering preventative type programming have minimal core funding, are largely left to operate on time limited pilot project funding and struggle to stay in operation.

5) The process must include action, participation and control by urban Aboriginal people

The last chapter of this study changed focus, and discussed the extent of Aboriginal people's involvement in crime prevention, as well as compared the attitudes and expectations of the two stakeholder groups (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal stakeholders). Although all stakeholders felt that Aboriginal people are very involved in crime prevention, this is mostly at the volunteer and/or community level and typically not as much at the governmental level. The majority of stakeholders expressed that there needs to be a shift to include Aboriginal people in positions of leadership and policy with regard to crime prevention.

Finally, the majority of Aboriginal respondents felt that non-Aboriginal people should no longer be the leaders in Aboriginal specific crime prevention programming but, instead, they could take part as supporters and partners. According to a few Aboriginal stakeholders, it was felt that non-Aboriginal people should not even be involved at all in Aboriginal-specific prevention programming and/or policy. Some Aboriginal stakeholders said caution should be taken with regard to non-Aboriginal involvement.

When it came to non-Aboriginal stakeholder responses, all agreed that non-Aboriginal people should be involved. Although, there was also a few non-Aboriginal stakeholder responses indicating that non-Aboriginal persons should be involved only to the extent of being partners in the process.

10.2 Discussion: Practical Implications

We currently have a professional enforcement system, what we do not have is a professional prevention system. There is major reliance on enforcement. Given the reliance on enforcement, there are also large amounts of money allocated to enforcement. The risk-focused

crime prevention literature is not about having either or, instead to move from only enforcement to a blending of prevention, enforcement and treatment.

The reduction of harm caused to Aboriginal people is of utmost importance, because as explained in Chapter One, there are many harms resulting from crime. This includes injury, trauma, financial loss, emotional distress and suffering. People can also lose property. Many times people place an emotional value on items which one cannot place a dollar value on. In addition, for Aboriginal peoples, harm caused by incarceration is a major cost of crime suffered.

The cost of harm to Aboriginal victims in Canada was estimated at about \$4 billion (see Chapter One). If this is the cost of harm caused by crime to Aboriginal people, then the argument is that more money should be allocated to reducing this harm.

Given this harm affecting Aboriginal people, the study had a practical implication—which is the ability to provide conclusions and recommendations which might be able to assist in the reduction of crime affecting urban Aboriginal people. Preventing this crime would reduce harm to Aboriginal victims.

Stakeholders highlighted that relying simply on pilot projects funded by the NCPC (and others) that run for one to three years then come to an end is inefficient. Not only does it reinforce the notion that government (typically non-Aboriginal bureaucrats) should be controlling and coordinating what Aboriginal people/organizations (and other community-based people/organizations) should be doing, but it also does not allow these projects to fully develop and show they can make a difference; they barely have time to work out the kinks, get up and running and start helping people before their funding is pulled out from under them. Program coordinators are then left scrambling for funds, while still trying to support their at-risk population with whatever resources they can find.

It is clear there is great need for a shift to prevention which is focused on mending the broken circle/cycle of victimization and offending, and this could be achieved by addressing the well documented causes/risk factors. The fact that crime prevention stakeholders are highly aware of many of the risk factors for Aboriginal people' victimization and offending is encouraging, and makes a switch to prevention which tackles risk factors an easier venture, given the fact that people already have a good base understanding of what to target.

Since many grassroots structures/Aboriginal organizations and other community-based organizations are pursuing goals which overlap with crime prevention knowledge and research, there is a good opportunity for further development and action to with regard to this knowledge. However, it is also clear that persons in positions to implement change (e.g. the Mayor and/or senior officials) must be on board in order to move forward.

The potential for effective evidence-based crime prevention in Winnipeg is strong, given many stakeholders knowledge of risk factors, the many grassroots structures/Aboriginal organizations and other community-based organizations in existence providing programming which overlaps with crime prevention knowledge/research. See Table 16 below for a summary of the current situation, gaps and recommendations. Based on these conclusions, a series of recommendations are presented below the chart.

Table 16: Crime Prevention Research vs. Current Situation - Gaps and Recommendations for Crime Prevention in Winnipeg

Crime Prevention Research	Current Situation	Gaps	Recommendations
Responsibility Centre and Strategic Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No permanent responsibility centre to mobilize the different sectors to tackle risk factors. • The City’s “LiveSAFE” Strategy represents a first step forward towards a responsibility centre for crime prevention. • No overall strategic plan for crime prevention. • Two great examples of strategic planning for specific crime problems: one which focuses on vehicle theft (WATSS), and another, based off the WATSS approach, which is focused gang related crime (Spotlight). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No city-wide leadership for crime prevention. • No city-wide infrastructure for allocation and accountability • City strategies may not involve Aboriginal people in a meaningful way, and instead they may only be included to the extent of “token” involvement. • Lack of a comprehensive city-wide strategic plan for crime prevention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A central organization (responsibility centre) for crime prevention. • This centre requires leadership from a central figure such as an Aboriginal Leader who has a commitment to reducing crime affecting Aboriginal people. • A city-wide strategic planning process for crime prevention (Diagnose, plan, implement, evaluate)
Aboriginal Relevant Crime Prevention that Tackles Risk Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promising programming being offered through many Aboriginal and other non-governmental organizations. • Healthy Child Manitoba also offering many evidence-based early childhood development programs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resources for programs are largely a result of fundraising through private donors, foundations or government funding competitions. • Government priorities through funding competition are not always conducive to actual community needs. • Many Aboriginal and other non-governmental organizations operate on small and very limited core funding budgets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adequate and sustained resources for culturally relevant crime prevention that tackles risk factors. • Greater investment in Aboriginal and other non-governmental organizations prevention efforts (every additional \$1 spent on reactive measures (i.e. policing) an equal \$1 should be spent on prevention. • Focus lent to responding to Aboriginal people needs and priorities. • Shift to investment in children, youth and families, rather than police, corrections and courts.
Mobilization of Sectors, Collaboration and Collective Efficacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WATSS and Spotlight mobilize sectors for their specific crime strategies (car theft and gangs), however this is not comprehensive for the city and does not focus exclusively on Aboriginal people • The Powerline initiative coordinated and mobilized neighbours in their disadvantaged community to come together and intervene on crime issues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major focus on reactive measures: catching and locking up offenders. • Lack of coordination between different sectors, organizations and citizens. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination and engagement among many sectors, agencies, and partners – including Aboriginal organizations. • The City of Winnipeg (led by the leaders of the responsibility centre) needs to outreach to citizens in order to create higher levels of social cohesion among people in the city and city neighbourhoods.

Sustained Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No sustained funding for crime prevention in the city 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of sustained funding. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adequate and sustained resources for crime prevention responsibility centre (\$1 per capita) • Develop Aboriginal capacity to manage and organize prevention funds and enable Aboriginal people to get funds.
Engaging the Public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Powerline initiative engages the public in a specific neighbourhood 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of engagement of the public in crime prevention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communication with the public regarding crime issues as well as programs in place to tackle these crime issues

10.3 Recommendations

*“Winnipeg murder count keeps rising: Homicide Count nearing city record”
~ Winnipeg Sun, September 2nd 2011*

1) Responsibility Centre with Aboriginal Representation

First, a central organization (responsibility centre) is necessary for crime prevention in Winnipeg. This would be led by central figures such as the Mayor of the city and members of city council. The Mayor is already elected to lead, and the city heads a city council able to make changes, set policies, and decide how funds are spent. Furthermore, the Mayor also oversees government sectors and organizations (such as the police), and thus has some ability to bring together different sectors.

Given that such a large number of Winnipeg’s offending and victim populations are Aboriginal people, at least one of the leaders (and other key players) should come from within Winnipeg’s Aboriginal population. Furthermore, the staff of the responsibility centre would be committed to reducing crime in Winnipeg, and at the same time reflect the population it serves. Findings from Chapter Nine showed that Aboriginal stakeholders want to be, and feel that they absolutely should be, involved in leadership positions related to crime prevention.

The responsibility centre would also take the lead on organizing a city-wide strategic planning process for crime prevention. This strategic plan must include a diagnosis of the city’s crime problem; an action plan based on the identified gaps; be implemented based on knowledge of the specific population it is seeking to serve; and finally, include an ongoing evaluation to determine whether changes in this city wide strategy need to be made, as well as an impact

evaluation to assess whether it is producing the desired effects, with priority given to reducing crime affecting urban Aboriginal people.

2) Infrastructure

This above mentioned responsibility centre would require actual infrastructure. This would be a physical space and organizational structure dedicated to crime prevention leadership (allocation and accountability) in Winnipeg.

This centre would act as a hub and coordinate the work of municipal, provincial and federal governments. At the same time, this responsibility centre would literally be the centre of responsibility for the sustainability of resources and ensuring that Aboriginal people's needs and major concerns are being met. It would be a centre for allocation and accountability, outlining clear criteria for distinguishing between good and poor use of funds.

A specific reference group dedicated to reducing crime affecting urban Aboriginal people, chaired by an Aboriginal leader, other Aboriginal people working in the area of prevention as well as an Aboriginal academic could also serve as a helpful adjunct to the responsibility centre.

3) Sustained Funding to Implement Programs to Address Risk Factors

Based on the review completed for this study, culturally relevant programs which tackle risk factors would be implemented and allocated ongoing resources (not funded on a pilot basis). They would be implemented based on knowledge of the specific population and target location to be served. These programs would place emphasis on the structural environmental hazards and

processes and, as such, focus on improving environments and/or social processes, increasing resiliency and durability, guardianship, reducing inequality and improving access to resources.

Furthermore, programs and initiatives which originate from Aboriginal people and their respective communities, and which represent those communities' worldviews, cultural imperatives and traditional approaches, and tailored to the populations they are intended to serve would be the types of programs developed and supported. Thus, new programs should not simply be imposed on a neighbourhood based on an assessment made by someone who is not from, or knowledgeable about the area. Instead, people making these decisions must have first-hand, detailed knowledge of the community's issues and problems. Therefore, those affected by programs must also be involved in the planning and implementation process. Additionally, and similar to the model implemented by the Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre, programs should have a co-facilitator who has successfully completed the program they are now helping to facilitate.

An ongoing evaluation to determine whether changes are needed to these programs, as well as an impact evaluation to assess whether they are producing the desired effects must be implemented as well. Furthermore, a major focus should be lent to building capacity around this evaluation component, so that, over five years or so there would be a solid group of established evaluators for these types of programs, with salaries comparable to other criminal justice professionals.

4) Mobilization of Sectors, Collaboration and Collective Efficacy

The responsibility centre and its staff would organize and enhance the interaction of the many sectors, agencies and partners throughout the city to get them working together, and braiding all the agencies and projects that deliver prevention. It would work to build bridges

between current government silos and other organizational entities, and direct all partners and agencies to reach agreement on common language usage. The centre would provide clarity and definition of roles, as well as assist in breaking down myths, rumours and misguided opinions about other organizations, agencies and partners. The staff would also coordinate and organize specialized crime prevention programming education and training for those who deliver the programming. The responsibility centre would maintain a direct relationship and association with crime prevention research institutes and other related research centres or university departments, in order to assure they stay connected to the most up-to-date crime prevention knowledge and research. An advisory Board which has Aboriginal representation from various Aboriginal people and partners throughout the city would also need to be created and consulted. This should not be simply another non-Aboriginal (i.e. “white bureaucrat”) driven initiative, because as explained in Chapter Nine, Aboriginal people want, and need to be, the leaders of their own crime prevention initiatives and strategies.

Furthermore, an attempt to achieve more collective efficacy among people in the city would be essential. Similar to the Powerline initiative which coordinated and mobilized neighbours in their disadvantaged community to come together and intervene on crime issues—the city would need to make a similar effort. The leader(s) of Powerline acted as a hub for efforts to make changes regarding crime and its related problems, with the assistance of people from the neighbourhood who were experiencing these problems. Therefore, the City of Winnipeg (led by the leaders of the responsibility centre) would need to reach out to citizens in order to create higher levels of social cohesion among people in the city and city neighbourhoods.

5) Balance Between Enforcement and Prevention

Based on the successes of WATSS and Spotlight, which implemented a highly integrative approach combining policing, environmental design and social development—a better balance between enforcement and prevention strategies would need to take place.

The primary approach to reducing crime affecting urban Aboriginal people in Winnipeg is through reactive measures (i.e. enforcement by police). Given the large body of knowledge regarding the effectiveness of prevention, a balance should be implemented rather than relying so heavily on one.

6) Sustained Funding

Given that there is a large gap in terms of funding crime prevention in Winnipeg, it is also recommended that the city invests \$1 per capita to crime prevention to support the responsibility centre.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, given that Winnipeg has a total of 694,668 people; it is recommended that \$694,668 is allocated to the crime prevention responsibility centre.

In terms of funding for individual programs, building on already existing programs could serve as a starting point. For example, not all programs have evaluations, but as many stakeholders indicated, if they had secure sustained funding they could hire additional staff, and thereby implement evaluations, in addition to being better able to serve the needs of their clients. Thus, given the evidence on prevention, it is recommended that for every additional \$1 spent on reactive measures (i.e. police), a matched amount of \$1 should be spent on prevention programs which are in existence.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ See the IPC Action Briefs (2009) which outlines this funding criterion.

¹⁰⁵ See the IPC Action Briefs (2009) which outlines this funding criterion.

Furthermore, Aboriginal capacity to manage and organize prevention funds should be developed, as well as assistance to enable Aboriginal people and organizations to receive funds for prevention efforts.

7) Informing and Engaging the Public

Similar to how the lead stakeholder of the “Powerline” initiative engages the public in their neighbourhood, a crime prevention leader in the city needs to take on the same task for the entire city. This should be the same person(s) who leads and heads the responsibility centre. The leader(s) of the responsibility centre must listen to and communicate with the public.

The public must also be provided with information pertaining to the city’s crime issues, and well as programs which are in place to tackle these crime issues. This should also entail the collaboration of community organizations, coalitions and groups who are willing and able to assist with the city’s crime prevention strategy.

Closing

In conclusion, there must be alternatives to the retributive-based justice system, which can often be a system of injustice. Ultimately, many Aboriginal persons who are affected by crime are currently doing the best that they can do with the little resources and supports that they receive. The same can be said for those persons and organizations who are implementing prevention for Aboriginal people affected by crime, as they too are operating the best that they currently can with the little resources, supports and infrastructure for prevention which is in place and available.

In order to reduce crime affecting urban Aboriginal people there would need to be a responsibility centre with Aboriginal representation. Evidence driven strategic plan must be set into motion. Funding must be expanded to support the community based organizations that are tackling established risk factors. Sustained funding must be provided to these programs and the responsibility centre.

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APPENDICES:

APPENDIX A: Interview Format: Program Stakeholders

Risk Factors and Programs

- 1) What would you say are the primary crime problems that affect urban Aboriginal people in your city?
- 2) What do you consider to be the main causes (risk factors) for these crime problems affecting urban Aboriginal people?
- 3) Are any of these causes (risk factors) being tackled or addressed through the programming you or your organization is offering? (if no move to question 4)
 - a) Which of these risk factors (causes) are you (or is your organization) tackling through your programming/initiatives?
 - b) Is this (or these) program(s) specific to Aboriginal people or are they general programs which include Aboriginal people?
 - c) Do you consider this (or these) program(s) to be targeting crime specifically? For example do you consider this/these programs to be crime prevention programs?
- 4) Are you aware of any other programs tackling these causes (risk factors)?
 - a) Is this (or these) program(s) specific to Aboriginal people or are they general programs which include Aboriginal people?
 - b) Is this (or these) program(s) targeting crime specifically? For example do you consider this/these programs to be crime prevention programs?

Collaborative Community Safety Strategies

- 5) Does your program or organization have any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting urban Aboriginal people? For example is there a board, committee or a roundtable that meets on a regular basis?
- 6) Are you aware of any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime that is organized by the city? (If so, who takes part in this, and what do they do?)
- 7) Are you aware of any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime that engages the public? (Either by your organization, other organizations or agencies, or by the city, etc?)

Strategic Planning Process

Experts say that a strategic planning process must be in place in order to implement crime prevention effectively. Meaning, there is a plan that first diagnoses the problem, creates an action plan to tackle the problem, implements the action plan, then completes an evaluation. This is usually a rolling process over a number of years, for example over 3 years or 5 years, etc.

- 8) Does your program or organization have a strategic planning process in place? And/or, is your program or organization part of a broader strategic planning process that goes beyond your organization?

Experts say that much evidence on how to reduce crime exists. This evidence is a result of crime prevention program evaluations that have shown that if causes (risk factors) are tackled - crime is not only reduced, but in a cost effective way as well.

- 9) To what extent is evidence about what works used in any planning processes?
10) To what extent is evidence about what is cost effective used in any planning processes?

Attitudes and Expectations of Aboriginal Stakeholders Compared to non-Aboriginal Stakeholders

- 11) Do you identify as an Aboriginal person or a non-Aboriginal person?
a) To what extent do you feel you are involved in programs/initiatives that tackle risk factors (causes) for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people?
- 12) To what extent are Aboriginal people involved in any programs/initiatives that tackle risk factors (causes) for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people?
- 13) In your opinion, to what extent should Aboriginal people be involved in urban Aboriginal programs/initiatives that tackle risk factors (causes) for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people?
- 14) In your opinion, to what extent should non-Aboriginal people be involved in urban Aboriginal programs/initiatives that tackle risk factors (causes) for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people?

APPENDIX B: Interview Format: Policy Makers/Policy Development Analysts

Risk Factors and Programs

- 15) What would you say are the primary crime problems that affect urban Aboriginal people in your city?
- 16) What do you consider to be the main causes (risk factors) for these crime problems affecting urban Aboriginal people?
- 17) Are any of these causes (risk factors) being tackled or addressed through programming and/or other initiatives in your city? (If so, please explain the programs/initiatives) (if no move to question 4)
 - d) Which of these risk factors (causes) are being tackling through these programming's or initiatives?
 - e) Is this (or these) program(s)/initiative(s) specific to Aboriginal people or are they general programs which include Aboriginal people?
 - f) Do you consider this (or these) program(s) to be targeting crime specifically? For example do you consider this/these programs to be crime prevention programs?

Collaborative Community Safety Strategies

- 18) Is there any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting urban Aboriginal people in the city? For example is there a board, committee or a roundtable that meets on a regular basis? (If so, who takes part in this, and what do they do?)
- 19) Are you aware of any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime which affects urban Aboriginal people that might not be at city level, but maybe organized by someone else in the city, for example an Aboriginal organization etc? (If so, who takes part in this, and what do they do?)
- 20) Are you aware of any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime that engages the public? (Either by the city, organization, agency, etc?)

Strategic Planning Process

Experts say that a strategic planning process must be in place in order to implement crime prevention effectively. Meaning, that there is a plan that first diagnoses the problem, creates an action plan to tackle the problem, implements the action plan, then completes an evaluation. This is usually a rolling process over a number of years, for example over 3 years or 5 years, etc.

- 21) Does the city have a strategic planning process in place for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people? And/or, are you aware of any programs/initiatives that tackle urban Aboriginal risk factors that has a strategic planning process in place?

Experts say that much evidence on how to reduce crime exists. This evidence is a result of crime prevention program evaluations that have shown that if causes (risk factors) are tackled - crime is not only reduced, but in a cost effective way as well.

22) To what extent is evidence about what works used in any planning processes?

23) To what extent is evidence about what is cost effective used in any planning processes?

Attitudes and Expectations of Aboriginal Stakeholders Compared to non-Aboriginal Stakeholders

24) Do you identify as an Aboriginal person or a non-Aboriginal person?

b) To what extent do you feel you are involved in programs/initiatives that tackle risk factors (causes) for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people?

25) To what extent are Aboriginal people involved in any programs/initiatives that tackle risk factors (causes) for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people?

26) In your opinion, to what extent should Aboriginal people be involved in programs/initiatives that tackle risk factors (causes) for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people?

27) In your opinion, to what extent should non-Aboriginal people be involved in programs/initiatives that tackle risk factors (causes) for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people?

APPENDIX C: Informed Consent Document

INFORMED CONSENT FOR INTERVIEW

My name is Lisa Monchalin. I am a PhD student at the University of Ottawa in the Department of Criminology. This research is being conducted for the purpose of my thesis dissertation requirement and may be published upon completion. I am the co-investigator of this research, and can be contacted at The Institute for the Prevention of Crime, #306, 30 Stewart St. Ottawa, ON, K1N 6N5, or by phone at 613-562-5798 or Email at Lisa.Monchalin@uottawa.ca

You can also contact my supervisor, Irvin Waller at The Institute for the Prevention of Crime, #307, 30 Stewart St. Ottawa, ON, K1N 6N5, or by phone at 613-562-5798.

You can ask me any questions about any part of this research being conducted. If you have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, you may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 159, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Tel.: (613) 562-5841 Email: ethics@uottawa.ca

There are two copies of this consent form, one of which you will keep.

The name of this research dissertation is “The Reduction of Urban Aboriginal Crime: The Potential for Effective Municipal Crime Prevention in Winnipeg.” The goal of this dissertation is to discover, describe and clarify crime prevention attempts directed at the urban Aboriginal population in the City of Winnipeg. An additional goal of this study is to provide some insight into the role of local agencies in their quest for preventing urban Aboriginal victimization and offending. The hope is that a more comprehensive picture of the strengths and barriers to local crime prevention for urban Aboriginal people will be revealed.

The questions that I will ask will be related to crime prevention programs and strategies that you are involved in, and how they are executed. The entire interview will last about 1 hour, and will be conducted in your office or at the location of your organization, or another suitable location such as a private university office. It must be noted that I may critique and make recommendations about your programs and/or initiatives that you are involved in. Therefore, once the interviews are conducted and transcriptions are complete, they will be offered back to you, and you will have the opportunity to remove any information that you do not wish to be further shared.

The benefits of this research involves the possible development of recommendations and conclusions on practical courses of action that can be utilized to help Winnipeg reduce and prevent urban Aboriginal crime, which will also hopefully be adapted to other urban Aboriginal locations throughout Canada in the future.

As a research participant, you have the right to:

- Withdraw from the project at any time or during the interview, and the right to refuse questions without fear of reprisal or ill treatment.
- Full anonymity: If you would not like your organization or program name published or identified in any way you may refuse so at any time. However, if you choose not to have the organization or program name published, this research project will indicate which programs and initiatives have been included in the study.
- Full confidentiality: If you would like full confidentiality please state so below by checking the first box. I will not use any names; however, my research will indicate the positions of people (such as Director, program coordinator, etc.) with whom I conducted interviews. If you do not want this indicated please state so.

Using a checkmark below please indicate your choice in regards to what you would like to be kept confidential or not confidential:

I do not want my title or organization/program name attributed to my interview material.	
I would like my title associated with my interview material but not my organization/program name.	
I would like my organization/program name associated with my interview material but not my title.	
I would like both my title and my organization/program name attributed to my interview material.	

After this interview is complete, I will transcribe it. Once the transcription is complete, I will offer it back to you within 5 working days, and you will have the option of changing any information. Transcripts will be sent back to you via e-mail. Therefore, you must realize that any transcripts sent via e-mail will be subject to the everyday risks associated with this form of communication.

An additional risk is time away from work to conduct this interview. Please be aware that you may suffer from economic inconvenience as a result of taking an hour away from work to speak with me.

I have read each of the elements of informed consent. My signature below indicates that I agree to participate by giving an interview.

Printed Name	Signature	Date
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I agree to have the interview tape-recorded. I understand that each of the above conditions of informed consent apply to this process.

Printed Name

Signature

Date

I, Lisa Monchalin will be conducting this interview and agree to follow the conditions set out in this consent form

Printed Name

Signature

Date

APPENDIX D: Coding Categories Codebook

Perceptions of Crime Problem

Name of Category	Inclusion Criteria	Exclusion Criteria
Aboriginal Gangs	Refers to discussion of Aboriginal gangs and gang related crime being a crime issue in Winnipeg. This includes discussion of organized crime and gang related violence.	This excludes discussion of non-Aboriginal gangs and/or reference to other locations which have Aboriginal gangs besides Winnipeg.
Alcohol and Addictions Related Crimes	Refers to discussion of crimes in Winnipeg that affect the Aboriginal population that are influenced by the use, abuse and/or addiction to alcohol.	
Assaults	Refers to discussion of crimes in Winnipeg that affect the Aboriginal population that involve assault against another person or persons.	
Automobile Thefts	Refers to discussion of car theft and/or other vehicle theft which involves Aboriginal people in Winnipeg. Has also been referred to as “stolen autos.”	
Break and Enters	Refers to discussion of the crime of breaking and entering which involves Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Continued Colonialism	Refers to a discussion of the continuation of colonialism which still exists in Winnipeg and affects Aboriginal people. This is in reference to colonialism, itself as a crime.	This is not to be confused with colonialism as a cause of crime. This discussion is only in reference to colonialism as being a crime itself.
Crimes Involving Young People	Refers to a discussion of crime affecting young Aboriginal people in Winnipeg. Thus, any type of crime which would involve young Aboriginal people, both male and female.	
Crimes Committed by Young Men	Refers to a discussion of crime committed by young Aboriginal men in Winnipeg.	This excludes discussion of crimes against young Aboriginal men.
Defaulting on Parental Obligations	Refers to a discussion of Aboriginal persons who do not fulfil their parenting obligations in Winnipeg.	
Domestic Violence and Abuse	Refers to domestic violence by and against Aboriginal people in Winnipeg, and includes reference to both males and females.	

Drug Related Crime	Refers to any crime which is related to drugs, or involves drugs, that affects Aboriginal people in Winnipeg as either victim of drug type crimes and/or offenders of drug type crimes. This includes drug trafficking, selling, and/or drug use.	
Interpersonal Violence	Direct reference to interpersonal violence that affects Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Marginalization as a Crime	Refers to marginalization as being a crime in itself, which is affecting the Aboriginal population in Winnipeg.	This is not to be confused with marginalization as a cause of crime, but marginalization as being a crime in itself.
Missing and Murdered Aboriginal Women	Direct reference to the missing and murdered Aboriginal women from Winnipeg.	
Muggings	Direct reference to muggings which occur in Winnipeg which involve Aboriginal people as both victims and offenders.	
Murder and Homicide	Direct reference to murder and/or homicides which occur in Winnipeg which involved Aboriginal people as both victims and offenders.	
Petty Theft	Direct reference to petty theft by and against Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Poverty as a Crime	Refers to poverty as it affects Aboriginal people in Winnipeg as a crime in itself.	This is not to be confused with reference to poverty as being a cause of crime, rather as poverty as being a crime in itself.
Racism as a Crime	Refers to racism as being a crime in itself, which affects Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	This is not to be confused with reference to racism as being a cause of crime, rather as racism as being a crime in itself.
Scamming and Conning	Refers to crimes which involve scams and/or cons which involve Aboriginal people as both victims and offenders.	
Sex Trade and Prostitution	Refers to Aboriginal people involvement with the sex trade industry and/or with prostitution. This includes both victims and offenders in Winnipeg, including Aboriginal women as being victims of and subjected to the sex trade.	
Sexual	Refers to Aboriginal children in Winnipeg	

Exploitation of Children	who are being exploited by others in relation to sex related work and/or sexually related abuses.	
Stabbing	Direct reference made to stabbing which involves Aboriginal people as either a victim or offender in Winnipeg.	
Vandalism	Direct reference to Aboriginal people in Winnipeg who are either a victim or offender of vandalism (e.g. graffiti)	
Violence Against Women	Direct reference to Aboriginal women who experience violence and/or Aboriginal men who engage in violence against women.	
Violent Crime	Refers to discussion of crimes related to violence and violent crimes that affect Winnipeg's Aboriginal population as being a major crime issue.	This excludes simple mention of "violence."

Perceptions of Risk Factors

Name of Category	Inclusion Criteria	Exclusion Criteria
Unemployment	Refers to discussion of not having a job or having difficulty in finding a job as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Poverty	Refers to discussion of having little or no income and/or low socioeconomic status as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
High Residential Mobility and Mobility Between Reserves and City	Refers to discussion of persons moving frequently, also referred to as "transiency," this also includes moving from reserves to the city and not being prepared for urban city life, and/or moving back and forth between reserves and the city as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Substance Abuse and Addictions	Refers to a discussion of persons abusing alcohol and/or other substances, and/or addictions to alcohol and/or other substances (e.g. illegal drugs), as well as paternal substance abuse in which children are exposed to such behaviour as being risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Overcrowded,	Refers to a discussion of persons living in	

Disorganized and Substandard Living Conditions	overcrowded and/or substandard housing, and other poor, disorganized and unstructured living conditions, and/or living in a distressed neighbourhood, and/or being homeless and these being risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Low Education and Poor School Access and Involvement	Refers to a discussion of persons having little or little education/skills and/or having failed in school, and/or having little involvement in school, having difficulty in accessing appropriate schooling, and/or not having graduated from school and it being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Single Parent Families	Refers to a discussion of those who live in a single parent household situation and it being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Lacking Cultural Identity and Pride	Refers to a discussion of those who lack cultural identity and/or cultural pride, including having negative self-imagery as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Poor Child Rearing and Supervision	Refers to a discussion of persons who have poor child rearing skills, including those who do not supervise their children, and/or children who come from homes where discipline is inconsistent and erratic, and/or where parents do not care for them, and/or the parents themselves may have problems with drugs and/or crime, and/or parents and other family members are antisocial and where negative parent-child relationships exists, and an unstructured home as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Few Social Ties	Refers to a discussion of persons who have few social ties in regards to being involved in social activities, and being low in popularity, and/or experience isolation from larger society as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Poor Peer Influences	Refers to a discussion of persons who have little positive influence and/or mix with antisocial peers and/or other negative influences (e.g. joining a gang) as being a risk	

	factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Poor Social Skills	Refers to a discussion of persons who have little or no social/interpersonal skills, have impulsive behaviour, and have poor self management as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Aggressiveness	Refers to a discussion of persons who are both verbally and physically aggressive against both people and objects as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Racism and Discrimination	Refers to a discussion of racism and/or discrimination by other persons and/or institutionalised racism and discrimination, including racism by the police, the legal system, (including racist laws, such as the Indian Act) and/or the government as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Social Exclusion and Marginalization	Refers to a discussion of social exclusion and/or marginalization, including a lack of strong institutional social networks, as being risk factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Poor Mental Health and Health Related Issues that Go Untreated	Refers to a discussion of poor mental health and health related issues that go untreated, and/or are not adequately prevented, including Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) and other mental health problems as being risks factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Hopelessness	Refers to a discussion of persons who have no vision for their future, who feel hopeless and/or have no respect for themselves or others and/or have internalized shame about themselves as being risks factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Dependency	Refers to a discussion of persons who are dependent on others and/or the system for their livelihood, (e.g. reliance on food banks and shelters) as being a risk factor related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg	
Family Violence and Crime	Refers to a discussion of persons who experience and/or are exposed to family violence and/or abuse as being a risk factor	

	related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg. This includes experiencing and/or witnessing any type of crime within the family, or being exposed to violence or sexual assault as a child.	
Dysfunctional, Disorganized, and Disconnected Families	Refers to a discussion of persons who live in or come from dysfunctional and/or disorganized families, including having little family support in their lives, and/or being disconnected from family members and older generations, including a disconnect between Elders and youth as all being risks factors related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg.	
Broader Causal Factors		
Poor and Dysfunctional Social Policy and Social Systems	Refers to a discussion of poor social policies as well as social policy dysfunction as being a cause related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg. This includes lack of sustained funding for prevention programming, government organizations working in silos, the poorly organized and executed child welfare system as well as lack of social support systems and appropriate services.	
Historical Effects and Impacts of Colonialism, Colonization and Assimilation	Refers to a discussion of colonialism, colonization (including residential schools), and other colonial, assimilation type measures, and their intergenerational impacts as being a caused related to crime affecting Aboriginal people in Winnipeg. This includes forced removals, displacement and relocation, forced assimilation, classism, euro-centrism and white supremacy and defragmentation of communities.	
Other Identified Themes		
Interrelated Risk Factors	Refers to a discussion of risk factors being interrelated to other risk factors.	
Policy Makers Lack of Knowledge	Refers to a discussion of policy makers having a lack of knowledge of high crime areas.	

Programs that Tackle Risk Factors

Name of	Inclusion Criteria	Exclusion Criteria
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Category		
Healthy Child Manitoba	Refers to when stakeholders specifically stated that they were aware that this government agency provides evidence-based programming when asked whether any of the causes (risk factors) they identified were being tackled or addressed through prevention programming.	When responses were categorized in this category it was only in reference to when they were discussing what programs they felt tackled risk factors, and not when this organization might have been mentioned during a different point (in relation to a different question) in the interview.
Aboriginal and other non-Government Organizations	Refers to when stakeholders specifically stated that they knew a specific non-government agency and/or organization offered programming that tackles risk factors, when asked whether any of the causes (risk factors) they identified were being tackled or addressed through prevention programming.	When responses were categorized in this category it was only in reference to when they were discussing what programs they felt tackled risk factors, and not when these organizations might have been mentioned during a different point (in relation to a different question) in the interview.
Specific Programs	Refers to when stakeholders specifically stated specific programs when asked whether any of the causes (risk factors) they identified were being tackled or addressed through prevention programming.	When responses were categorized in this category it was only in reference to when they were discussing what programs they felt tackled risk factors, and not when these programs might have been mentioned during a different point (in relation to a different question) in the interview.
Targeting Aboriginal People Risk Factors for Crime	Refers to discussion of specific crime prevention programs or initiatives which make a concerted effort to implement programs that tackle one or more risk factors related to crime that affects Aboriginal people in Winnipeg. This is in reference to the factors that increase ones likelihood that they will be involved in crime, as either victim or offender. For example high levels of unemployment, low income and poverty.	For the purpose of this project, this did not include discussion of programs that might tackle other risk factors related to things other than crime, however many are related. This also does not include programs which are not specifically directed by and for the Aboriginal population in Winnipeg.

Non-Crime Prevention Program Targeting Aboriginal People Risk Factors for Crime	Refers to programs which do not have the specific mandate of targeting crime, but happen to tackle one or more risk factors related to crime that affects Aboriginal people in Winnipeg. This is in reference to the factors that increase ones likelihood that they will be involved in crime, as either victim or offender. For example, high levels of unemployment, low income and poverty.	For the purpose of this project, this did not include discussion of programs that might tackle other risk factors related to things other than crime, however many are related. This also does not include programs which are not specifically directed by and for the Aboriginal population in Winnipeg.
Targeting Risk Factors	Refers to discussion of general crime prevention programs or initiatives which make a concerted effort to tackle one or more risk factors related to crime. This is in reference to the factors that increase one's likelihood that of being involved in crime, as either victim or offender. For example. high levels of unemployment, low income and poverty.	For the purpose of this project, this did not include discussion of programs that might tackle other risk factors related to things other than crime, however many are related. This also does not include programs which are specifically directed at or are for Aboriginal people.
Non-Crime Prevention Program Targeting Risk Factors for Crime	Refers to programs which do not have the specific mandate of targeting crime, but happen to tackle one or more general risk factors related to crime. This is in reference to the factors that increase one's likelihood that they will be involved in crime, as either victim or offender. For example, high levels of unemployment, low income and poverty.	For the purpose of this project, this did not include discussion of programs that might tackle other risk factors related to things other than crime, however many are related. This also does not include programs which are specifically directed at or are for Aboriginal people.

Collaborative Community Safety Strategies

Responsibility Centre	Refers to discussion of a coordination hub for organized crime prevention efforts.	This does not include coordinated centres or similar entities that do have a specific mandate of crime prevention.
Central	Refers to discussion of a central leadership	

Leadership	figure for crime prevention.	
Coordination	Refers to the mobilization and coordination of many sectors and partners who come together for the purpose of crime prevention.	This excludes discussion of coordination or other activities outside of crime prevention.
Safety Diagnosis	Refers to safety audits and/or needs assessments of the city and/or programs' primary crime issues.	
Action Plan	Refers to a plan that has been created based on problems and gaps and knowledge of risk factors, either by the city, program and/or another organization.	
Strategic Planning	Refers to discussion of a plan that first diagnoses the problem, creates an action plan to tackle the problem, implements the action plan then completes an evaluation.	
Impact Evaluation	Refers to a discussion of a program or initiatives which implements an impact evaluation: an evaluation which assesses whether the strategy is producing its desired effects.	
Outcome Evaluation	Refers to discussion of a program or initiative that implements an outcome evaluation: an ongoing evaluation which determines whether changes to the program need to be made, and whether it is operating according to plan.	
Advisory Boards	Refers to when stakeholders were asked whether there was any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people (that is run either by an organization or by the city) and they provided an answer which indicated an advisory board.	
Community Coalitions	Refers to when stakeholders were asked whether there was any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people (that is run either by an organization or by the city) and they provided an answer which indicated a community coalition.	
Lack of a Responsibility Centre	Refers to when stakeholders indicated that nothing related to structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people exists at all.	
"LiveSAFE"	Refers to when stakeholders were asked	

Strategy	whether there was any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people (that is run either by an organization or by the city) and they provided an answer which indicated the “LiveSAFE” Strategy - or sometimes referred to it simply as “the search conference.”	
Point Douglas “Powerline”	Refers to when stakeholders were asked whether there was any structured and organized collaboration around the causes (risk factors) related to crime affecting Aboriginal people (that is run either by an organization or by the city) and they provided an answer which indicated the Powerline Strategy.	

Strategic Planning (diagnose, plan, implement, evaluate)

Program and Organization Strategic Plans	Refers to when stakeholders were asked whether a strategic planning process is in place for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people which; first diagnoses the problem, creates and action plan to tackle the problem, implements the action plan, then completes an evaluation and stakeholders simply listed or made mention of programs or organizations that have their annual or general strategic plans for their organizations.	
LiveSAFE Strategic Plan	Refers to when stakeholders were asked whether a strategic planning process is in place for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people which; first diagnoses the problem, creates and action plan to tackle the problem, implements the action plan, then completes an evaluation and stakeholders stated or mentioned the LiveSAFE strategy strategic plan.	
Lack of a Strategic Plan	Refers to when stakeholders were asked whether a strategic planning process is in place for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people which; first diagnoses the problem, creates and action plan to tackle the problem, implements the action plan, then completes an evaluation and stakeholders stated that no strategic plan exists.	

City of Winnipeg's Strategic Plan	Refers to when stakeholders were asked whether a strategic planning process is in place for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people which; first diagnoses the problem, creates and action plan to tackle the problem, implements the action plan, then completes an evaluation and stakeholders simply stated or mentioned the City of Winnipeg's strategic plan.	
Winnipeg Auto-Theft Suppression Strategy (WATSS)	Refers to when stakeholders were asked whether a strategic planning process is in place for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people which; first diagnoses the problem, creates and action plan to tackle the problem, implements the action plan, then completes an evaluation and stakeholders simply stated or mentioned the Winnipeg Auto-Theft Suppression Strategy (WATSS).	
Spotlight Strategy	Refers to when stakeholders were asked whether a strategic planning process is in place for crime affecting urban Aboriginal people which; first diagnoses the problem, creates and action plan to tackle the problem, implements the action plan, then completes an evaluation and stakeholders simply stated or mentioned the Spotlight Strategy.	

Evidence about What Works and What is Cost Effective Used in the Planning Process

Evidence About What Works Used	Refers to when stakeholders stated that evidence about what works is used in crime prevention planning processes in Winnipeg.	
Non-Government using what works	Refers to when stakeholders stated or discussed that some (and/or a specific) non-government agency utilized crime prevention knowledge of 'what works' in planning for their organization.	
HCM using what works	Refers to when stakeholders stated or discussed that Healthy Child Manitoba takes into consideration crime prevention evidence about 'what works.'	
'What works' not used	Refers to when stakeholders specifically stated that evidence about 'what works' is not used in crime prevention planning processes in Winnipeg.	
Unsure if 'what	Refers to when stakeholders stated that they	


works' used	were unsure to as whether crime prevention evidence about 'what works' is used in crime prevention planning processes in Winnipeg.	
Evidence about Cost Effectiveness Used	Refers to a when stakeholders stated that evidence about cost effectiveness is used in crime prevention planning processes in Winnipeg.	
Cost effectiveness not used	Refers to when stakeholders specifically stated that evidence regarding cost effectiveness in regards to crime prevention is not used in Winnipeg.	
Unsure is cost effectiveness used	Refers to when stakeholders stated that they were unsure to as whether crime prevention evidence about cost effectiveness is used in crime prevention planning processes in Winnipeg.	

Attitudes and Expectations of Aboriginal Stakeholders vs. non-Aboriginal Stakeholders

Aboriginal Involvement	Refers to discussion of Aboriginal people being involved in crime prevention initiatives.	
Pro-Aboriginal Involvement	Refers to reference being made to wanting and needing Aboriginal people to be involved in Aboriginal focused crime prevention programming.	
Pro-non-Aboriginal Involvement	Refers to reference being made to wanting and needing non-Aboriginal people involved in Aboriginal focused crime prevention programming.	
Against Aboriginal Involvement	Refers to reference being made to not wanting and not needing Aboriginal people involved in Aboriginal focused crime prevention programming.	
Against non-Aboriginal involvement	Refers to reference being made to not wanting and not needing non-Aboriginal people involved in Aboriginal focused crime prevention programming. And/or a response which indicates a stipulation and or caution in relation to having non-Aboriginal people involved.	

Circle of Courage Original Logic Model*

APPENDIX E: Circle of Courage Program Logic Models




*This model was created and provided by Lionel Houston - Team Leader for the Circle of Courage Program

Circle of Courage Culturally Adapted Logic Model*

Objective # 1: To decrease Aboriginal male youth engagement/involvement and /or membership in youth gangs

Objective # 2: Empower Aboriginal male youth to develop pro-social competencies, attitudes and behaviours, thereby reducing the risk of gang involvement, affiliation and activity



*This model was created and provided by Lionel Houston - Team Leader for the Circle of Courage Program